- You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffielddetails
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(2 other versions)Objectual understanding, factivity and belief.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 423-442.details
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Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):489-502.details
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Googled Assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501.details
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(3 other versions)Assertion: knowledge is enough.Mona Simion - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.details
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Testimonial entitlement, norms of assertion and privacy.Philip J. Nickel - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):207-217.details
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Understanding as Usability and Context-Sensitivity to Interests.Andreas Søndergaard - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2603-2623.details
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Knowledge as a Social Kind.Tammo Lossau - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):223-242.details
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The epistemic normativity of conjecture.Mona Simion - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3447-3471.details
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Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.Neri Marsili & Alex Wiegmann - 2021 - Cognition 212 (C):104657.details
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The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?Neri Marsili - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.details
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Elgin on understanding: How does it involve know-how, endorsement and factivity?Emma C. Gordon - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):4955-4972.details
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How to be an optimist about aesthetic testimony.Rachel McKinnon - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):177-196.details
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Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions.Bart Bezooijen, Martin Peterson & J. Carter - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):817-834.details
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Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions.J. Adam Carter, Martin Peterson & Bart van Bezooijen - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):817-834.details
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Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge.Masashi Kasaki - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):83-98.details
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(1 other version)Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Informativeness Norm of Assertion.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology.details
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Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics.Max Lewis - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):5-22.details
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