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The author assures readers that Chris Matthew Sciabarra has met all Aristotelian requirements in full, providing not one but two definitions of “dialectics,” which, as the art of context-keeping, is indeed an essential part of Ayn Rand's philosophical method. He shows how Sciabarra's definitional process compares quite favorably in terms of timeliness, transparency, and benevolence to that of Rand and other Objectivists, and notes that Sciabarra's overriding concern, notwithstanding his obvious great respect for Rand's substantive philosophical achievements, has been to (...) |
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Through a study of argument, science, art, and human intelligence, Louis Groarke explores and builds on a line of Aristotelian thought that traces the origins of logic and knowledge to a mental creativity that is able to leap to insightful and truthful conclusions on the basis of restricted evidence. In an Aristotelian Account of Induction Groarke discusses the intellectual process through which we access the "first principles" of human thought - the most basic concepts, The laws of logic, The universal (...) |
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“Through centuries of scourges and disasters, brought about by your code of morality, you have cried that your code had been broken, that the scourges were punishment for breaking it, that men were too weak and too selfish to spill all the blood it required. You damned man, you damned existence, you damned this earth, but never dared to question your code. . . . You went on crying that your code was noble, but human nature was not good enough (...) |
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The author contends that the Objectivist epistemology has lacked a viable model of propositional knowledge for nearly fifty years, due to neglect of Rand's unit-perspective view of concepts. This pioneering insight, he says, not only is an essential building block of her concept theory, but also welds together the three levels of logical theory and provides the clearest X-ray picture of our multilayered conceptual knowledge. Using the unit-perspective to expand Rand's theory of concepts, the author then devises a theory of (...) |
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Central topics in medieval logic are here treated in a way that is congenial to the modern reader, without compromising historical reliability. The achievements of medieval logic are made available to a wider philosophical public then the medievalists themselves. The three genres of logica moderna arising in a later Middle Ages are covered: obligations, insolubles and consequences - the first time these have been treated in such a unified way. The articles on obligations look at the role of logical consistence (...) |
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Some writers have so confounded government with society, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher. Society in every state is a blessing, but government (...) |
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The author discusses how Rand’s largely underdeveloped concept of the “dual-aspect objective,” first introduced in the 1960s, is vital for understanding how knowledge is grounded in reality. He defines it, then applies it to perception and introspection, and to concepts, propositions, and syllogisms. The author also defines content of awareness, carefully distinguishing it from both object and form of awareness, and applies those distinctions throughout. In addition, he discusses how truth is both dual-aspect and contextual, and he extends his discussion (...) |
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ROGER E. BISSELL challenges Ayn Rand's interpretation of the nature of musical perception. Abandoning her earlier Jamesian view of sensation and perception for the flawed Helmholtizian model, Rand overlooked the musical-literary analogy and its usefulness in understanding and evaluating musical experience. Using Rand's analysis of esthetic "identification" and findings of psychophysiological research, Bissell aims to correct this error and to make a stronger case for the underlying unity of the arts. |
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This essay offers a new interpretation and clarification of Rand's intrinsic-objective-subjective trichotomy, arguing that although her writings show the objective as having both epistemological and metaphysical aspects, the latter has been drastically downplayed, much to the detriment of the further development of Objectivism. The article traces the historical roots of the concept of the "objective," as well as the confusion and errors that led to the scope of Rand's trichotomy being radically curtailed by its two chief proponents, and it explains (...) |
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Analyzing various false alternatives using a technique based on Aristotle's Law of Ex eluded Middle, the author show s how a system of individual rights and laissez-faire capitalism relates logically to other politico-economic systems and ideologies. He gives special attention to Nolan 's two-dimensional diagram of the political spectrum, Rand 's critique of conservatism and liberalism, and Rothbard's work on the historical phenomenon of Salutary Neglect and its relationship to fascism, socialism, and laissez-faire. The author also assesses current prospects for (...) |
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In this sequel to his essay "Ayn Rand and The Objective'" (JARS, Fall 2007), the author warns against "the seduction of 'the basic"' and uses ideas by Efron, Peikoff, and Aristotle to argue that introspection and mental data (including mind) are objective and that causal efficacy of mind and mind-body interaction only make sense if mind is conceived of not as an attribute, but as an entity (viz., the conscious human brain). None of this, however, implies Epiphenomenalism or that consciousness (...) |
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