One so-called paradox of blackmail concerns the fact that “two legal whites together make a black.” That is, it is licit to threaten to reveal a person’s secret, and it is separately lawful to ask him for money; but when both are undertaken at once, together, this act iscalled blackmail and is prohibited. A second so-called paradox is that if the blackmailer initiates the act, this is seen by jurists asblackmail and illicit, while if the blackmailee (the person blackmailed) originates (...) the contract, this is commonly interpreted as bribery and is not illicit.But these are paradoxes only for legal theorists innocent of libertarian theory. The authors use that perspective to reject the claim thatblackmail should be unlawful. If this act were legalized, then both paradoxes would disappear, precisely their contention. (shrink)

Capitalism is the best. It's free enterprise. Barter. Gimbels, if I get really rank with the clerk, 'Well I don't like this', how I can resolve it? If it really gets ridiculous, I go, 'Frig it, man, I walk.' What can this guy do at Gimbels, even if he was the president of Gimbels? He can always reject me from that store, but I can always go to Macy's. He can't really hurt me. Communism is like one big phone company. (...) Government control, man. And if I get too rank with that phone company, where can I go? I'll end up like a schmuck with a dixie cup on a thread. (shrink)

L’article présente une étude critique des fondements méthodologiques de l’analyse économique du droit traditionnelle dans laquelle le droit est conçu comme le résultat optimal d’une comparaison de coûts et d’avantages sociaux. Cette procédure judiciaire qui vise en fait à simuler des solutions de marché “socialement efficientes” présuppose inévitablement l’omniscience du juge. Cependant dans le contexte de l’équilibre général, l’analyse économique du droit traditionnelle n’a pas de raison d’être, alors qu’elle s’avère impraticable dans le monde réel où elle serait pourtant nécessaire (...) afin de résoudre des problèmes de coordination entre les individus. A cet égard la théorie économique de l’Ecole Autrichienne qui insiste sur les problèmes informationnels de la société et qui décrit le droit comme une procédure de coordination fondée sur des règles abstraites de juste conduite, semble fournir des fondements plus appropriés pour une approche économique du droit. L’article utilise la méthodologie Autrichienne pour reconsidérer l’analyse économique du droit tout en insistant à la fois sur la dimension institutionnelle et la dimension éthique du droit. Le problème central est l’interdépendance entre le droit et l’ordre de marché, mais il est analysé dans des termes fondamentalement différents de ceux de l’analyse traditionnelle.The paper presents a critical analysis of the methodological foundations of conventional law and economics, where law is generally described as the optimal outcome ot a judicial balancing of social costs and benefits. This law making procedure which aims at simulating “socially efficient” market outcomes inevitably presupposes Judges’ omniscience. Nevertheless, in this context of full coordination, this type of law has no raison d’être, whereas it turns out to be infeasible in the real world where it would be necessary in order to solve information and coordination problems. In this respect, Austrian economic and legal theory which focuses on the knowledge problem of society and which describes law as a coordination procedure built on abstract rules of just conduct, seems to provide more appropriate foundations for an economic analysis of law. This paper uses the Austrian approach to reconsider economic analysis of law in a way that allows for both the institutional and the ethical dimensions of law. The central problem seems to lie in the interdependance of law and the ethical dimensions of law. The central problem seems to lie in the interdependancc of law and the market order but it is conceived in a very different way than it is in conventional analysis. (shrink)