This is identical with the first edition (see 21: 2716) except for the addition of a Supplement containing 5 previously published articles and the bringing of the bibliography (now 73 items) up to date. The 5 added articles present clarifications or modifications of views expressed in the first edition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

This volume tackles the slippery subject of 'meaning'.

A respected Harvard logician and philosopher gathers together twenty-nine writings dealing with the foundations of mathematics, Rudolf Carnap, lin-guistics, ...

am going to discuss some issues inspired by a well-known paper ofKeith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions,”2 but the interest—to me—of the contrast mentioned in my title goes beyond Donnellan's paper: I think it is of considerable constructive as well as critical importance to the philosophy oflanguage. These applications, however, and even everything I might want to say relative to Donnellan’s paper, cannot be discussed in full here because of problems of length. Moreover, although I have a considerable interest in (...) the substantive issues raised by Donnellan’s paper, and by related literature, my own conclusions will be methodological, not substantive. I can put the matter this way: Donnellan’s paper claims to give decisive objections both to Russell’s theory of definite descriptions (taken as a theory about English) and to Strawson’s. My concem is not primarily with the question; is Donnellan right, or is Russell (or Strawson)? Rather, it is with the question: do the considerations in Donneilarfs paper refute Russell’s theory (or Strawson’s)? For definiteness, I will concentrate on Donnellan versus Russell, leaving Strawson aside. And about this issue I will draw a definite conclusion, one which I think will illuminate a few methodological maxims about language. Namely, I will conclude that the considerations in Donnellan’s paper, by themselves, do not refute Russell’s theory. Any conclusions about Russell’s views per se, or Donnellan’s, must be tentative, IfI were to be asked for a tentative stab about Russell, I would say that although his theory does a far better job of handling ordinary discourse than many have thought, and although many popular arguments against it are inconclusive, probably it ultimately fails. The considerations I have in mind have to do with the existence of “improper” definite descriptions, such as “the table," where uniquely specifying conditions are not contained in the description itself.. (shrink)

am going to discuss some issues inspired by a well-known paper ofKeith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions,”2 but the interest—to me—of the contrast mentioned in my title goes beyond Donnellan's paper: I think it is of considerable constructive as well as critical importance to the philosophy oflanguage. These applications, however, and even everything I might want to say relative to Donnellan’s paper, cannot be discussed in full here because of problems of length. Moreover, although I have a considerable interest in (...) the substantive issues raised by Donnellan’s paper, and by related literature, my own conclusions will be methodological, not substantive. I can put the matter this way: Donnellan’s paper claims to give decisive objections both to Russell’s theory of definite descriptions (taken as a theory about English) and to Strawson’s. My concem is not primarily with the question; is Donnellan right, or is Russell (or Strawson)? Rather, it is with the question: do the considerations in Donneilarfs paper refute Russell’s theory (or Strawson’s)? For definiteness, I will concentrate on Donnellan versus Russell, leaving Strawson aside. And about this issue I will draw a definite conclusion, one which I think will illuminate a few methodological maxims about language. Namely, I will conclude that the considerations in Donnellan’s paper, by themselves, do not refute Russell’s theory. Any conclusions about Russell’s views per se, or Donnellan’s, must be tentative, IfI were to be asked for a tentative stab about Russell, I would say that although his theory does a far better job of handling ordinary discourse than many have thought, and although many popular arguments against it are inconclusive, probably it ultimately fails. The considerations I have in mind have to do with the existence of “improper” definite descriptions, such as “the table," where uniquely specifying conditions are not contained in the description itself.. (shrink)

REASON AND THE ART OF LIVING IN PLATO* In Book VI of the Republic, Plato begins his exploration of the principles in accordance with which the city must be ...

Knowledge and Belief An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions by Jaakko Hintikka Prepared by Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons In 1962 Jaakko Hintikka published Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions with Cornell University Press. Almost every paper or a book on epistemic and doxastic logic that has appeared since then has referred to this seminal work. Although many philosophers working in logic, epistemology, game-theory, economics, computer science and linguistics mention the (...) book, it is very likely that most have never literally had their hands on it, much less owned a copy. After a fourth printing in 1969, Knowledge and Belief went out of print and as many of us have found to our dismay, it has become increasingly difficult to find used copies at our local shops or online. It is our pleasure to provide the interdisciplinary community with this reprint edition of Knowledge and Belief. Knowledge and Belief is a classic on which a generation - my generation - of epistemologists cut their teeth. This reissue is welcome. It will provide something for the next generation to chew on. - Fred Dretske, Duke University It is wonderful to see this classic being reissued after so many years out of print. It was extremely influential in its day; its influence continues to this day, through the impact of epistemic logic in fields as diverse distributed computing, artificial intelligence, and game theory. This reissue should make it possible for a new generation of researchers to appreciate Hintikka's groundbreaking work. - Joseph Halpern, Cornell University. (shrink)

The dissertation examines several proposals for necessary and sufficient conditions for understanding sentences of a natural language within the context of a truth conditional theory of meaning. Any such proposal has two parts: first, an account of meaning, second, an account of an interpreter's attitudes toward meanings and meaningful expressions of a language. Efforts to provide an account of linguistic understanding by Frege, Davidson, Dummett and others have largely assumed a certain account of semantic knowledge that leads to difficulties when (...) joined with a truth conditional theory of meaning. It is argued that, rather than abandon an account of meaning in terms of truth conditions, a new account of semantic knowledge is required. A new account is sketched in the final chapter. ;The first chapter describes the "received view" of knowledge of meaning. When this view of knowledge is joined to a simple truth conditional theory of meaning, two puzzles about informativeness result: the problem of informative identity statements and the paradox of analysis. It is argued that an adequate analysis of linguistic understanding should provide solutions to these puzzles. ;The second chapter reviews Frege's analysis of linguistic understanding. It is argued that Frege's analysis faces difficulties because of well-known defects in the Fregean theory of meaning and because it fails to provide a fully satisfactory solution to the paradox of analysis. Explicit knowledge of an adequate truth conditional theory of meaning, it is argued in chapter three, might suffice for linguistic understanding, although Davidson's account should be rejected, because it is based on an inadequate truth conditional theory of meaning. In the fourth chapter, Dummett's analysis of necessary conditions for linguistic understanding is examined. Dummett provides reasons for rejecting the received view of knowledge of meaning but Dummett's positive proposals themselves fail to provide an analysis of linguistic understanding. ;A reinterpretation of an interpreter's attitudes towards truth conditions and meaningful expressions of a natural language is given in chapter five. The reinterpretation is compatible with the criticisms made by Kripke and others of the Fregean theory of meaning, and it tentatively proposes a solution to both puzzles about informativeness. (shrink)