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  1. On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal realism is a good reason for believing that it is true.
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  • The Puzzle of Change.Mark Hinchliff - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:119-136.
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
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  • Real Time.David Hugh Mellor - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):197-200.
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  • Real Time.D. H. Mellor - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This is a study of the nature of time. In it, redeploying an argument first presented by McTaggart, the author argues that although time itself is real, tense is not. He accounts for the appearance of the reality of tense - our sense of the passage of time, and the fact that our experience occurs in the present - by showing how time is indispensable as a condition of action. Time itself is further analysed, and Dr Mellor gives answers to (...)
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  • Four-Dimensional Objects.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Noûs 24 (2):245--255.
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  • Identity Through Time.David Malet Armstrong - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. D. Reidel. pp. 67-78.
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  • Scattered Objects.Richard Cartwright - 1975 - In Analysis and Metaphysics. Reidel. pp. 153-171.
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  • Theories and things.W. V. Quine (ed.) - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Things and Their Place in Theories Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and ...
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  • Extrinsic properties.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
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  • Parthood and identity across time.Judith Thomson - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):201-220.
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  • Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
    Persistence through time is like extension through space. A road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. This view — known variously as four dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts, and the theory that objects “perdure” — is opposed to “three dimensionalism”, the doctrine that things “endure”, or are “wholly present”.1 I will (...)
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  • Humean supervenience and enduring things.Sally Haslanger - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):339 – 359.
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  • Persistence, change, and explanation.Sally Haslanger - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):1 - 28.
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  • Temporal parts of four dimensional objects.Mark Heller - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):323 - 334.
    I offer a clear conception of a temporal part that does not make the existence of temporal parts implausible. This can be done if (and only if) we think of physical objects as four dimensional, The fourth dimension being time. Unless we are willing to deny the existence of most spatial parts, Or willing to accept the possibility of coincident entities, Or accept something even more implausible, We should accept the existence of temporal parts.
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