Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Disappearance of Change: Towards a Process Account of Persistence.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):12-30.
    This paper aims to motivate a new beginning in metaphysical thinking about persistence by drawing attention to the disappearance of change in current accounts of persistence. I defend the claim that the debate is stuck in a dilemma which results from neglecting the constructive role of change for persistence. Neither of the two main competing views, perdurantism and endurantism, captures the idea of persistence as an identity through time. I identify the fundamental ontological reasons for this, namely the shared commitment (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time.Yuri Balashov - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (2):129-166.
    I examine the issue of persistence over time in thecontext of the special theory of relativity (SR). Thefour-dimensional ontology of perduring objects isclearly favored by SR. But it is a different questionif and to what extent this ontology is required, andthe rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by thistheory. In addressing this question, I take theessential idea of endurantism, that objects are whollypresent at single moments of time, and argue that itcommits one to unacceptable conclusions regardingcoexistence, in the context of SR. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Essential Properties - Analysis and Extension.Nathan Wildman - 2011 - Dissertation, Cambridge
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is There a (Meta-)Problem of Change?Iris Einheuser - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):344-351.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • L'identità diacronica fra ontologia e metafisica.Francesco Franda - 2014 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 2 (5):66-81.
    In this paper, I tackle the problem of diachronic identity. Far from providing a criterion for identity over time, the aim of this work is to understand if this issue pertains to ontology, conceived as that part of philosophy that tries to answer the question about what entities exist, or metaphysics, conceived as that part of philosophy that tries to explain, of those entities, what they are. On the face of it, only metaphysics has the task to solve this problem, (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intrinsic Properties of Properties.Cowling Sam - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):241-262.
    Do properties have intrinsic properties of their own? If so, which second-order properties are intrinsic? This paper introduces two competing views about second-order intrinsicality: generalism, according to which the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction cuts across all orders of properties and applies to the properties of properties as well as the properties of objects, and objectualism, according to which intrinsicality is a feature exclusive to the properties of objects. The case for generalism is then surveyed along with some proposals for distinguishing intrinsic second-order (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Presentist-Friendly Definition of “Endure”.Kenneth Hochstetter & Keith Hess - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1837-1854.
    It is a commonplace that things persist, though thinkers disagree over what persistence consist in. Views about time are closely related to views about persistence, though some have questioned the compatibility of certain combinations, such as Jonathan Tallant’s recent argument that presentism is incompatible with all views of persistence, including endurantism. We believe that such arguments can be avoided with neutral definitions of the terms. However, a nearly exhaustive investigation of contemporary literature revealed that, except for two that we could (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Critical Examination of Abner Shimony’s Transient Now.Brian Hepburn - unknown
    I criticize Shimony's argument from the Transient Now (Shimony 1993) that the B-series view of time is inadequate but offer a reading of that argument that is more charitable than one offered and rejected by Eilstein (1996). Shimony's argument turns on putative phenomenological features of the Now (singularity and numerical identity) but transience only arises as a logical implication of those features. Transience is thus a second order phenomenon. If these two features are accurate then the B-series cannot provide a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2001 - SATS 2 (2):60-79.
    I discuss the general form of arguments that profess to prove that the view that things endure in tensed time through causally produced change (the dynamic view) must be false because it involves contradictions. I argue that these arguments implicitly presuppose what has been called the temporal parity thesis, i.e. that all moments of time are equally existent and real, and that this thesis must be understood as the denial of the dynamic view. When this implicit premise is made explicit, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Jeffrey Grupp.Compresence is A. Bundle - forthcoming - Metaphysica.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Presentism, Persistence and Trans-Temporal Dependence.Jonathan Tallant - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):1-12.
    My central thesis is that presentism is incompatible with all of the main theories of persistence: endurance, exdurance and perdurance.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
    Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Four New Ways to Change Your Shape.Fraser MacBride - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):81 – 89.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Temporal Parts And Temporary Intrinsics.Andrew Botterell - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):5-23.
    In this paper I consider an objection that friends of the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts (MTP) press against other solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics and turn it against the MTP itself. I do not argue that the MTP must be false, nor do I argue that there are no arguments in favor of the MTP. Rather, the conclusion I draw is conditional: if the MTP provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, then the MTP provides (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Esistenza e Persistenza.Damiano Costa - 2018 - Milan, IT: Mimesis.
    Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, esiste in un qualche tempo e in un qualche luogo. Ma cosa significa esistere in un qualche tempo? Il fenomeno dell’esistenza temporale gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella comprensione dell’universo e di noi stessi quali creature temporali. Eppure è un fenomeno profondamente misterioso. L’esistenza temporale è da intendersi come una relazione? Che legami ha con l’esistenza dell’ontologia? L’esistenza temporale e la localizzazione spaziale sono due fenomeni essenzialmente differenti o (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Causal Production as Interaction.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2002 - Metaphysica 3 (1):87-119.
    The paper contains a novel realist account of causal production and the necessary connection between cause and effect. I argue that the asymmetric relation between causally connected events must be regarded as a product of a symmetric interaction between two or more entities. All the entities involved contribute to the producing, and so count as parts of the cause, and they all suffer a change, and so count as parts of the effect. Cause and effect, on this account, are two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Relativity and Persistence.Yuri Balashov - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):562.
    The nature of persistence of physical objects over time has been intensely debated in contemporary metaphysics. The two opposite views are widely known as "endurantism" (or "three-dimensionalism") and "perdurantism" ("four-dimensionalism"). According to the former, objects are extended in three spatial dimensions and persist through time by being wholly present at any moment at which they exist. On the rival account, objects are extended both in space and time and persist by having "temporal parts," no part being present at more than (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Prior and the Platonist.Ulrich Meyer - 2002 - Analysis 62 (3):211–216.
    The aim of this paper is to draw attention to a conflict between two popular views about time: Arthur Prior’s proposal for treating tense on the model of modal logic, and the ‘Platonic’ thesis that some objects (God, forms, universals, or numbers) exist eternally.1 I will argue that anyone who accepts the former ought to reject the latter.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Many, but One.Evan T. Woods - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    The problem of the many threatens to show that, in general, there are far more ordinary objects than you might have thought. I present and motivate a solution to this problem using many-one identity. According to this solution, the many things that seem to have what it takes to be, say, a cat, are collectively identical to that single cat.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Eternalist Tensism.Michael Nelson - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (6):590-605.
    Eternalist tensism is the thesis that tense is an objective feature of reality as it is in itself and that all times, whether past, present, or future, are equally real. I develop an argument from qualitative change in favor of tensism and defend eternalism from an argument from fatalism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Embodiment and Feminist Philosophy.Heinämaa Sara - 2017 - In A. Stone, A. Garry & S. J. Khader (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 180-193.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Modal Realism with Modal Tense.Takashi Yagisawa - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):309-327.
    Modal realists should fashion their theory by postulating\nand taking seriously the modal equivalent of tense, or\n_modal tense_. This will give them a uniform way to\nrespond to five different objections, one each by Skyrms,\nQuine, and Peacocke, and two by van Inwagen, and suggest a\nnon-Lewisian path to modal realism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Simon Bostock.Property Realism - forthcoming - Metaphysica.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Essence Facts and Explanation.Chris Tillman - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):190-195.
    Some essence facts have metaphysical explanations. Some metaphysical explanations for essence facts consist in nonessential facts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Identity Over Time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Singular Propositions.Greg Fitch - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations