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  1. The Backward Induction Paradox.Philip Pettit & Robert Sugden - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):169-182.
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  • The chain store paradox.Reinhard Selten - 1978 - Theory and Decision 9 (2):127-159.
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  • Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions.Robert H. Frank - 1988 - Norton.
    In this book, I make use of an idea from economics to suggest how noble human tendencies might not only have survived the ruthless pressures of the material world, but actually have been nurtured by them.
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  • Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):628-630.
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  • Rationality and Coordination.Cristina Bicchieri - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):627-629.
    This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of (...)
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  • Rationality and Coordination.Cristina Bicchieri - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of (...)
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  • To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
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  • Equilibria for far-sighted players.D. Marc Kilgour - 1984 - Theory and Decision 16 (2):135-157.
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  • Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves.Stephen J. Willson - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):201-240.
    This paper proposes a revised Theory of Moves (TOM) to analyze matrix games between two players when payoffs are given as ordinals. The games are analyzed when a given player i must make the first move, when there is a finite limit n on the total number of moves, and when the game starts at a given initial state S. Games end when either both players pass in succession or else a total of n moves have been made. Studies are (...)
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  • To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-utility Violations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
    An agent whose preferences violate the Independence Axiom or for some other reason are not representable by an expected utility function, can avoid 'dynamic inconsistency' either by foresight ('sophisticated choice') or by subsequent adjustment of preferences to the chosen plan of action ('resolute choice'). Contrary to McClennen and Machina, among others, it is argued these two seemingly conflicting approaches to 'dynamic rationality' need not be incompatible. 'Wise choice' reconciles foresight with a possibility of preference adjustment by rejecting the two assumptions (...)
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  • The backward induction paradox.Philip Pettit & Robert Sugden - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):169-182.
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