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  1. Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
    Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that (...)
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  • The kinematics of belief and desire.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):513-535.
    Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of combinations (...)
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  • Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
    In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby (...)
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  • Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study.Keith Lehrer & Carl Wagner - 1981 - Boston: D. Reidel.
    CONSENSUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES Various atomistic and individualistic theories of knowledge, language, ethics and politics have dominated philosophical ...
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  • Knowledge in Flux. Modelling the Dymanics of Epistemic States.P. Gärdenfors - 1988 - MIT Press.
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  • Pareto Unanimity and Consensus.Isaac Levi - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):481-492.
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  • Allocation, Lehrer models, and the consensus of probabilities.Carl Wagner - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (2):207-220.
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  • Destroying the consensus.Barry Loewer & Robert Laddaga - 1985 - Synthese 62 (1):79 - 95.
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  • Knowledge in Flux.Henry E. Kyburg & Peter Gardenfors - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):519-521.
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  • On the formal properties of weighted averaging as a method of aggregation.Carl Wagner - 1985 - Synthese 62 (1):97 - 108.
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  • Consensus through respect: A model of rational group decision-making.Carl Wagner - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (4):335 - 349.
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  • Consensus interruptus.Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (2):121-131.
    If all reasonable people of goodwill and patience will eventually reachconsensus, then anyone who fails to join inthat consensus as being unreasonable or lackingin good will or patience. The ``nice''''(consensual) and ``nasty'''' (intolerant) faces ofcommunitarianism are thus joined. This articleattempts to deny communitarians that excuse forintolerance by undermining Keith Lehrer''s proofof the inevitability of rational consensusamong all patient people of good will.
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  • Consensus as shared agreement and outcome of inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Synthese 62 (1):3 - 11.
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