The `fact' of pluralism in science is nosurprise. Yet, if science is representing andexplaining the structure of the oneworld, why is there such a diversity ofrepresentations and explanations in somedomains? In this paper I consider severalphilosophical accounts of scientific pluralismthat explain the persistence of bothcompetitive and compatible alternatives. PaulSherman's `Levels of Analysis' account suggeststhat in biology competition betweenexplanations can be partitioned by the type ofquestion being investigated. I argue that thisaccount does not locate competition andcompatibility correctly. I then defend anintegrative (...) model for understanding pluralism. This view is based on taking seriously both thecomplexity and contingency of biologicalorganization and the idealized character ofbiological models. On this view, explanationbecomes, among other things, the location forthe integration of diverse models. I explicatemy argument by an analysis of explanations ofdivision of labor in social insects. (shrink)

Classical pragmatism, despite its recognized concern for questions of freedom and democracy, has little to say directly about questions of power. Some commentators have found Dewey’s notion of habit to be a resource for taking up issues of power while others have argued that pragmatism does not provide a sufficiently critical tool to challenge systematic oppression. Still others have proposed to shore up pragmatism by using resources found in post-structuralism, particularly in the work of Foucault. This paper begins with this (...) suggestion, but argues that while Foucault offers a useful starting point his conception of power fails—at least in an American context characterized by the experience of pluralism. I then argue that the pragmatist tradition, through the work of Mary P. Follett (1868-1933) has the theoretical resources to generate a conception of power that begins with the experience of pluralism. (shrink)

For most of the 20th century Mary Parker Follett (1868–1933) was one of the “invisible women” in the history of American philosophy, although her work was taken seriously by philosophers of her time. While some have described Follett as an idealist, this essay develops the pragmatist and feminist elements of Follett’s philosophy. In particular, Follett’s concept of “integration” can be clarified by reading it through a pragmatist lens, connecting it with Dewey’s writing on experience, and with Jamesian pluralism. Follett also (...) shares with Jane Addams an understanding of the creative integrative power of diversity; Addams directly referenced Follett in 1930 when she describes how conflicts were resolved in the process of mutual action. The latter part of this essay discusses the contemporary relevance of Follett’s integrative “power-with” methodology in feminist thought. Taking integrative work seriously requires preparation and training, and Follett’s writing on education for integration has implications for contemporary pedagogical practice. (shrink)