We criticize the following views: only the rapist is responsible since only he committed the act; no one is responsible since rape is a biological response to stimuli; everyone is responsible since men and women contribute to the rape culture; and patriarchy is responsible but no person or group. We then argue that, in some societies, men are collectively responsible for rape since most benefit from rape and most are similar to the rapist.

The paper is an application of the principle of just deserts (that is, retribution) to the setting of statutory penalties. The conclusion is that there should be no separate penalty for rape but that rape should be punished under the ordinary battery statutes. The argument has four parts. First, there is a description of the place of rape in a typical statutory scheme. Second, there is a consideration of possible justifications for giving rape the status it has in such a (...) typical scheme. All justifications appear to fail for one reason or another. Third, rape is analyzed as battery and the analysis is justified. This analysis includes an explanation of why it would be unjust to punish rape more severely than ordinary batteries. Last, there is a catalogue of some practical advantages to treating rape as battery (for example, simplifying proof of the crime). The paper takes the principle of just deserts (in the form I have elsewhere defended it) for granted, but does add substantially to the understanding of how to apply it. (shrink)

The last issue of this journal published an exchange between Marilyn Friedman and me that had taken place at a lively session of the American Philosophical Association in December, 1990. Friedman's paper “‘They Lived Happily Ever After’: Sommers on Women and Marriage” was a barbed critique of my views on the family. My rejoinder, “Do These Feminist Like Women?” pointed out that Friedman's orthodox brand of feminism was not sensitive to the values and aspirations of most American women. That issue (...) of the Journal of Social Philosophy also published a third paper of Friedman's “Does Sommers Like Women?” twice as long again as my rejoinder. This second critique went further into earlier writings of mine raising new issues, and criticizing me in rather unpleasant ad feminam ways. If an uncharacteristic asperity colors my response, it is because I do not find myself able to deal coolly and impersonally with the accusation that I intentionally misrepresent some of the feminist philosophers I criticize. (shrink)