- Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods.Francisco Gallegos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1497-1513.details
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Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value.Bennett W. Helm - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.details
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(1 other version)Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (3):355--88.details
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The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):35 - 42.details
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Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value. [REVIEW]Rosalind Hursthouse - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):418-422.details
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The Case Against Representationalism About Moods.Amy Kind - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge.details
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The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory.Michael Tye - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1):25--50.details
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The nature and plausibility of cognitivism.John Haugeland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.details
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(1 other version)Emotions, moods, and intentionality.William Fish - 2005 - In William C. Fish (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.details
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Recalcitrant Emotions and Visual Illusions.Michael S. Brady - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):273 - 284.details
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