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Attitudes and Normativity

Axiomathes 27 (3):265-283 (2017)

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  1. The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
    This is a survey of recent debates concerning the normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.
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  • (4 other versions)Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Lawrence Foster & Joe William Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. London, England: Humanities Press.
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  • On the normative significance of brute facts.Ram Neta - 2004 - Legal Theory 10 (3):199-214.
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  • On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle.Jan Lukasiewicz & Vernon Wedin - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (3):485 - 509.
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  • Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.
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  • The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This is a book about normativity -- where the central normative terms are words like 'ought' and 'should' and their equivalents in other languages. It has three parts: The first part is about the semantics of normative discourse: what it means to talk about what ought to be the case. The second part is about the metaphysics of normative properties and relations: what is the nature of those properties and relations whose pattern of instantiation makes propositions about what ought to (...)
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  • Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.
    There is a fairly widespread—and very infl uential—hope among philosophers interested in the status of normativity that the solution to our metaethical and, more generally, metanormative problems will emerge from the philosophy of action. In this essay, I will argue that these hopes are groundless. I will focus on the metanormative hope, but—as will become clear—showing that the solution to our metanormative problems will not come from what is constitutive of action will also devastate the hope of gaining significant insight (...)
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  • On some concepts of pragmatics.Rudolf Carnap - 1955 - Philosophical Studies 6 (6):89 - 91.
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  • (1 other version)How to derive "ought" from "is".John R. Searle - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.
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  • Hume on "is" and "ought".A. C. MacIntyre - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (4):451-468.
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  • A note on the naturalistic fallacy.George R. Geiger - 1949 - Philosophy of Science 16 (4):336-342.
    There is a notion, cataleptic in its effects, that discussion in ethics and values must ultimately be blocked by the “naturalistic fallacy.” We can go so far in analyzing the categories of “good,” “right,” “ought,” “valuable,” and the like, but never so far as to embark from the field of logic or general philosophy and enter the alien provinces of science—at least with a visa. To think to reduce moral problems to those of psychology or biology or to those of (...)
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  • Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
    N.B. Dr Bykvist is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page.
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  • Hume on "is" and "ought": A reply to mr. Macintyre.R. F. Atkinson - 1961 - Philosophical Review 70 (2):231-238.
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  • Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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  • Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).
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  • Wanting as believing.I. L. Humberstone - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):49-62.
    An account of desire as a species of belief may owe its appeal to the details of its proposal as to precisely what sort of beliefs desires are to be identified with, and its downfall may be due to those details it does provide. For example, it may be proposed that the desire that α is in fact the belief that it ought to be that α, or is morally good or desirable that it should be the case that α. (...)
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  • Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
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  • (4 other versions)Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
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  • Success Semantics.J. T. Whyte - 1990 - Analysis 50 (3):149 - 157.
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  • (1 other version)Norm and action.Georg Henrik von Wright - 1963 - New York,: Humanities.
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  • In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Evolution, error and intentionality.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - In Daniel Clement Dennett (ed.), The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.
    Sometimes it takes years of debate for philosophers to discover what it is they really disagree about. Sometimes they talk past each other in long series of books and articles, never guessing at the root disagreement that divides them. But occasionally a day comes when something happens to coax the cat out of the bag. "Aha!" one philosopher exclaims to another, "so that's why you've been disagreeing with me, misunderstanding me, resisting my conclusions, puzzling me all these years!".
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  • (2 other versions)Beyond belief.Daniel C. Dennett - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  • (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.
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  • (2 other versions)Perceiving: a philosophical study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 13 (3):365-366.
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  • (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
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  • Iterated deontic modalities.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1966 - Mind 75 (300):580-582.
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  • On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychology.Anne B. Clark, Eric Dietrich & David Sloan Wilson - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-81.
    The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can be discussed constructivelywithout impeding evolutionary psychologicalresearch. A key is to show how ethicalbehaviors, in addition to unethical behaviors,can evolve by natural selection.
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  • Is folk psychology different?Jonathan Knowles - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.
    In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very (...)
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  • Functionalism and anomalous monism.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ernest LePore & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and events: perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson. New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
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  • (4 other versions)Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science.Stephen Stich - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):261-278.
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  • Belief and Meaning.Gary Ebbs - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):613-620.
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  • The normativity of the mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.
    I describe and defend the view in a philosophy of mind that I call 'Normative Essentialism', according to which propositional attitudes have normative essences. Those normative essences are 'horizontal' rational requirements, by which I mean the requirement to have certain propositional attitudes given other propositional attitudes. Different propositional attitudes impose different horizontal rational requirements. I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this doctrine and argue for the weaker version. I explore the consequences for knowledge of mind, and I (...)
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  • (1 other version)Belief and Meaning.Akeel Bilgrami - 1995 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 185 (4):513-514.
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  • Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.R. J. Hirst - 1959 - Philosophical Quarterly 9 (37):366-373.
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  • (1 other version)Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 296, ISBN-13:9780199251315. £35.00. [REVIEW]Chris Alen Sula - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):227-228.
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  • Making sense of ourselves.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):63-81.
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  • (1 other version)Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.
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  • Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.
    Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.
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  • (1 other version)Belief and Meaning.Akeel Bilgrami - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):595-605.
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  • (1 other version)Anti‐Essentialism.Robert Stalnaker - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):343-355.
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  • A theory of moral reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1986 - Ethics 96 (3):506-523.
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  • (1 other version)Modalities.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):978-979.
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  • (1 other version)How to Derive Ought from Is.John Searle - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Who's afraid of the naturalistic fallacy?Oliver Curry - unknown
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