- (1 other version)Naïve Realism and the Colors of Afterimages.Vivian Mizrahi - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):207-227.details
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Attenuated Representationalism. [REVIEW]Angela Mendelovici - 2023 - Analysis 83 (2):373–393.details
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Subjective Facts about Consciousness.Martin A. Lipman - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10:530-553.details
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Propositional Intentionalism and the Argument from Appearance.Zhiwei Gu - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):697-715.details
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How we talk about smells.Giulia Martina - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1041-1058.details
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An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3831-3863.details
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Las filósofas que nos formaron: injusticias, retos y posibilidades en la filosofía.Aurora Georgina Bustos Arellano & Mayra Jocelin Martínez Martínez - 2022 - Monterrey, Nuevo León, México: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León.details
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Philosophy of Perception and Liberal Naturalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 299-319.details
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Filozofija uma: pregled suvremenih rasprava o umu i tijelu (Eng. Philosophy of mind: a survey of contemporary debates on the mind-body problem).Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2022 - Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.details
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Seeing-as, seeing-o, and seeing-that.Søren Overgaard - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2973-2992.details
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(1 other version)Information-Theoretic Adverbialism.Joshua Gert - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):696-715.details
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Quantitative Character and the Composite Account of Phenomenal Content.Kim Soland - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherstdetails
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(1 other version)Naïve Realism and the Colors of Afterimages.Vivian Mizrahi - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1:1-21.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Multivariate pattern analysis and the search for neural representations.Bryce Gessell, Benjamin Geib & Felipe De Brigard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12869-12889.details
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The Significance of the Many Property Problem.Tim Crane & Alex Grzankowski - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):170.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis (2):1-19.details
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Emotion: More like Action than Perception.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2715-2744.details
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Problems for the Argument from Logic: a Response to the Lord of Non-Contradiction.Alex Malpass - 2020 - Sophia 60 (2):239-253.details
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The epistemology of intentionality: notional constituents vs. direct grasp.Uriah Kriegel - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1386-1403.details
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Explaining the Intuition of Revelation.Michelle Liu - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):99-107.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Vulnerability in Social Epistemic Networks.Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):1-23.details
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An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth’s Dagger.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1377-1414.details
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The many-property problem is your problem, too.Justin D’Ambrosio - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):811-832.details
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Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrew D. Thomas - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1197-1208.details
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On Libertarianism as an Explanatory Hypothesis.Andrew Kissel - 2019 - Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (2):91-110.details
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Lingering stereotypes: Salience bias in philosophical argument.Eugen Fischer & Paul E. Engelhardt - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (4):415-439.details
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Objects, seeing, and object-seeing.Mohan Matthen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4).details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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It's Not What it Seems. A Semantic Account of ‘Seems’ and Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):210-239.details
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Introduction: Perception Without Representation.Keith A. Wilson & Roberta Locatelli - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):197-212.details
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Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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The Brentano School and the History of Analytic Philosophy: Reply to Röck.Andreas Vrahimis - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (3):363-374.details
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Solving the problem of creeping minimalism.Matthew Simpson - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):510-531.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Progress and Historical Reflection in Philosophy.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - In Marcel van Ackeren (ed.), Philosophy and the Historical Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 51-68.details
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Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2017 - Synthese:1-18.details
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Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction.Hamid Taieb - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):120-132.details
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(2 other versions)What Is the Problem of Perception?Tim Crane - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.details
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Redness, Reality, and Relationalism.Jonathan Cohen - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):351-378.details
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Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality.Ciecierski Tadeusz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):35-58.details
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Two Russellian Arguments for Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):461-474.details
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Against Fundamentality‐Based Metaphysics.Martin A. Lipman - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):587-610.details
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What It's Like To Have a Cognitive Home.Matt Duncan - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):66-81.details
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(4 other versions)Is There a Perceptual Relation?Tim Crane - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 126-146.details
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The Problem of Perception in Analytic Philosophy.Tim Crane - unknowndetails
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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.details
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A Myth resurgent: classical foundationalism and the new Sellarsian critique.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4155-4169.details
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