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Because She Wanted To

The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35 (2010)

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  1. Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
    What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as (...)
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  • On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
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  • Springs of action: understanding intentional behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from (...)
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  • In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.
    This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.
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  • The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will and Freedom.Hugh McCann - 1998 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    In these essays, Hugh J. McCann develops a unified perspective on human action. Written over a period of twenty-five years, the essays provide a comprehensive survey of the major topics in contemporary action theory. In four sections, the book addresses the ontology of action ; the foundations of action ; intention, will, and freedom; and practical rationality. McCann works out a compromise between competing perspectives on the individuation of action ; explores the foundations of action and defends a volitional theory; (...)
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  • Reasons explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accounts.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405.
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  • On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Mind 100 (3):390-394.
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  • Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent (...)
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  • Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
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  • Autonomous reasons for intending.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.
    An autonomous reason for intending to A would be a reason for so intending that is not, and will not be, a reason for A-ing. Some puzzle cases, such as the one that figures in the toxin puzzle, suggest that there can be such reasons for intending, but these cases have special features that cloud the issue. This paper describes cases that more clearly favour the view that we can have practical reasons of this sort. Several objections to this view (...)
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  • The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom.Carl Ginet & Hugh J. McCann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):632.
    This book comprises eleven essays in the philosophy of action, six of which were previously published. The book has a fairly extensive index. The essays are arranged in four groups. The first group contains two essays on the individuation of action. The second contains four essays that argue for the view that what makes an event an action is, not how it is caused, but that it is, or begins with, a volition, “an intrinsically actional” mental event. The third contains (...)
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  • Intending.Robert Audi - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):387-403.
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  • Action, Intention, and Reason.Robert Audi - 1993 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    For the first time, Robert Audi presents in Action, Intention, and Reason a full version of his theory of the nature, explanation, freedom, and rationality of human action. Ove the years Audi has set out in journal articles different aspects of a unified theory of action. This volume offers the unity of a single, seamless book with thirteen self-contained chapters, two of them previously unpublished, and a new overview of action theory and the book's contribution to it. The book is (...)
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  • Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reasons, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. In the first part, Mele illuminates the connection between desire and action and defends detailed characterizations of irresistible desires and reasons for action. Mele argues for the viability of a causal approach to the explanation of intentional action in terms of psychological states (...)
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  • Reasons explanation of action: An incompatibilist account.Carl Ginet - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:17-46.
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  • On Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498-500.
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  • The Problem of Value.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - In Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    Here I examine the charge that the indeterminism required by event-causal accounts is at best superfluous; if free will is incompatible with determinism, then, it is said, no event-causal libertarian account adequately characterizes free will. The distinction between broad incompatibilism and merely narrow incompatibilism is brought to bear. If the latter thesis is correct, then an event-causal account can secure all that is needed for free will. However, if broad incompatibilism is correct, then no event-causal account is adequate, though such (...)
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  • An Action Can be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent.Carl Ginet - 2007 - In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, deliberation and autonomy: the action-theoretic basis of practical philosophy. Ashgate Publishing. pp. 243--255.
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