If utopias in the western cultural tradition owe their model of ideal, final, unitary order to the objective basis of metaphysics, have they not, like metaphysics, undergone a dissolution in Heidegger’s sense of Verwindung? Insofar as the very notion of unity, like that of an ultimate metaphysical foundation, now reveals its violence and will to domination and as we are interested instead in thinking utopia as a ‘project for emancipation’, the author suggests replacing the unity that was hitherto characteristic of (...) utopia with a multiplicity that is defended as a value and not as a phase of ‘confusion’ to be overcome. (shrink)

. Repetition and Difference: Lefebvre, Le Corbusier and Modernity's moral Landscape: A Commentary. Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 135-144.

If, as Lefebvre argues, every society produces its own social space, then modernity might be characterized by that (anti-)social and instrumental space epitomized and idealized in Le Corbusier's writings. This repetitively patterned space consumes and regulates the differences between places and people; it encapsulates a normalizing morality that seeks to reduce all differences to an economic order of the Same. Lefebvre's dialectical conceptualization of 'difference' can both help explain the operation of this (im)moral landscape and offer the possibility of alternative (...) post-modern social spaces that might produce and respect Otherness. In this sense Lefebvre's work is an incipient 'difference ethics'. (shrink)

Among the reasons for what might be called the ‘utopian crisis’ in post-modern culture, where the very idea of a utopia is the subject of suspicion and where its claim to perfection is held to blame for every fanatical ideology, may well be found the close, perhaps excessively close link that the utopian idea has always maintained with metaphysics. I am referring here to the notion of metaphysics as elaborated by Heidegger. Many defenders of metaphysics still refuse Heidegger's critique, but (...) it remains nevertheless the case that the definition of metaphysics as disregarding being-itself (das Sein) in favour of process-of-being (das Seiende), or of an objective ground of being that reason could grasp and to which it should adhere when interacting with knowledge and praxis, constitutes at least a generally accepted point of departure for discussion. (shrink)