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  1. Aristotle’s Definition of Scientific Knowledge.Lucas Angioni - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):79-104.
    In Posterior Analytics 71b9 12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying due attention to this contrast (...)
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  • AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE “FINS” E “MEIOS” E A RELEVÂNCIA MORAL DA PHRONESIS NA ÉTICA DE ARISTÓTELES.Lucas Angioni - 2009 - Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 18 (35):185-204.
    I discuss three kinds of relationship between ends and means (or "things that promote ends") in the Aristotelian ethical theory, in order to clarify how moral virtues and phronesis are related both in adopting ends and in determining means for virtuous actions. Phronesis seems to be mainly charged with determining means for an end given by the moral virtues, but it must involve some conception of ends too. Phronesis cannot be parasitic on moral virtue concerning the conception of ends, for (...)
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  • The Structure of Teleological Explanations in Aristotle: Theory and Practice.Mariska Leunissen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33:145-178.
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  • Two Ways of Being for an End.Jessica Gelber - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):64-86.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 64 - 86 Five times in the extant corpus, Aristotle refers to a distinction between two ways of being a ‘that for the sake of which’ that he sometimes marks by using genitive and dative pronouns. Commentators almost universally say that this is the distinction between an aim and beneficiary. I propose that Aristotle had a quite different distinction in mind, namely: that which holds between something and the aim or objective it is (...)
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  • Sources of Delusion in Analytica Posteriora 1.5.Pieter Sjoerd Hasper - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (3):252 - 284.
    Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics.W. D. Ross - 1953 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (12):374-375.
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