The idea that physicians should accept recommendations from learned colleagues on how to practice medicine is probably as old as medicine itself, but beginning around 1990, it took on new urgency in the face of rising health care costs, widespread, unjustifiable variation in practice patterns, concerns about medical errors and quality of care, and what some perceived to be perverse effects of the malpractice system. One solution put forward was practice guidelines, which the Institute of Medicine defined as systematically developed (...) statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances. (shrink)

Why do physicians have financial conflicts of interest? They arise because society expects physicians to act in their patients’ interest, while simultaneously, financial incentives encourage physicians to practice medicine in ways that promote their own interests or those of third parties. Because physicians’ clinical choices, referrals, and prescriptions affect the fortune of third parties, these third parties may offer physicians financial incentives to make income-driven clinical choices. In the past, physicians and scholars typically conceived of conflicts of interest as an (...) ethical issue to be resolved according to individual judgment or professional and organizational norms. However, society can mitigate or eliminate conflicts of interest by changing financial and organizational arrangements in medicine. Conflicts of interest, therefore, are as much matters of public policy and management as individual choices or social norms. (shrink)

Why do physicians have financial conflicts of interest? They arise because society expects physicians to act in their patients’ interest, while simultaneously, financial incentives encourage physicians to practice medicine in ways that promote their own interests or those of third parties. Because physicians’ clinical choices, referrals, and prescriptions affect the fortune of third parties (providers, medical facilities, insurers, drug firms and suppliers of ancillary services), these third parties may offer physicians financial incentives to make income-driven clinical choices. In the past, (...) physicians and scholars typically conceived of conflicts of interest as an ethical issue to be resolved according to individual judgment or professional and organizational norms. However, society can mitigate or eliminate conflicts of interest by changing financial and organizational arrangements in medicine. Conflicts of interest, therefore, are as much matters of public policy and management as individual choices or social norms. (shrink)

American medicine has long sought to control the standard of care that physicians are expected to provide to their patients. One effort to insulate the standard of care from external interference, called a “safe harbors” approach, would enable physicians to avoid liability for malpractice if they adhered to medical practice guidelines. The idea is to eliminate the “battle of experts” and reduce defensive medicine by requiring judges and juries to accept guidelines as conclusive evidence of the standard of care. Yet (...) current efforts to improve the guideline development process, including the use of evidence-based guidelines, are unlikely to be able to overcome the shortcomings that led a similar safe harbors initiative to fail in the early 1990s. Moreover, there is no adequate justification for conferring this degree of self-regulatory power on the medical profession. (shrink)

Considered ahead of its time since the first publication in 1981, Medical Choices, Medical Chances provides a telescope for viewing how developments in the fields of medical research, medical technology, and health care organization are likely to influence the doctor-patient relationship in the 21st Century. The book explores this intricate web of relationships among doctors, patients, and families and offers a new framework for mastering the emotional and intellectual challenges of uncertainty, while at the same time providing tools for all (...) concerned to regain control from managed care. It is a must-read for all those interested in medicine and where it is headed in the new millennium. (shrink)

Public policy tries to promote appropriate drug use by allowing firms to market drugs in interstate commerce only for uses that the Food and Drug Administration has found to be safe and effective. Because of their medical knowledge, physicians are authorized to prescribe drugs even for uses unapproved by the FDA. Nevertheless, physicians have relied on drug firms for information on appropriate prescribing despite the inherent tension between drug firm dissemination of information to promote sales and rational prescribing. In the (...) past, physicians often relied particularly on drug firm advertising for information on drug use. Today, physicians rely on drug firms to finance continuing medical education. A historical review reveals connections between these two different ways commercial interests have influenced the information that physicians receive and points the way to needed reforms. (shrink)

The pharmaceutical industry, in its marketing efforts, often turns to “key opinion leaders” or “KOLs” to disseminate scientific information. Drawing on the author's fieldwork, this article documents and examines the use of KOLs in pharmaceutical companies’ marketing efforts. Partly due to the use of KOLs, a small number of companies with well-defined and narrow interests have inordinate influence over how medical knowledge is produced, circulated, and consumed. The issue here, as in many other cases of institutional corruption, is that a (...) few actors have accumulated the power to shape the information on which many others base their decisions. Efforts to address this corruption should focus on correcting large imbalances in the current political economy of medical knowledge. A sequestration of pharmaceutical research and development on one hand from pharmaceutical marketing on the other, though difficult to achieve, would address this and many other problems. (shrink)

Through the 1960s, many people claimed that drug advertising was educational and physicians often relied on it. Continuing Medical Education (CME) was developed to provide an alternative. However, because CME relied on grants, industry funders chose the subjects offered. Now policymakers worry that drug firms support CME to promote sales and that commercial support biases prescribing and fosters inappropriate drug use. A historical review reveals parallel problems between advertising and industry-funded CME. To preclude industry influence and improve CME, we should (...) ensure independent funding by taxing medical industries, facilities and physicians. Independent public and professional authorities should create CME curricula. An independent agency should allocate all funds to educational institutions for approved curricula. (shrink)