Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.

The interpretation of indirect discourse is one of the most persistent and pervasive themes in post-Fregean semantics. Since Frege we have managed to learn a good deal about the workings of various technical approaches to indirect discourse, but fundamental philosophical issues have remained unresolved.

The intent of the article is to point out an objection against analyses that attempt to eliminate propositions and replace them with sentences.

It is argued that davidson's analysis of sentences involving indirect quotation ("on saying that", Synthese, Volume 19 (1968-1969)) is inadequate, On the grounds that the analysans he provides has at least one logical consequence that is not shared by the given analysandum.

This paper concerns the semantics of belief-sentences. I pass over ontologically lavish theories which appeal to impossible worlds, or other points of reference which contain more than possible worlds. I then refute ontologically stingy, quotational theories. My own theory employs the techniques of possible worlds semantics to elaborate a Fregean analysis of belief-sentences. In a belief-sentence, the embedded clause does not have its usual reference, but refers rather to its own semantic structure. I show how this theory can accommodate quantification (...) into belief-contexts. I close with skirmishes against the threat posed by the Liar Paradox. (shrink)

My chief aim has been to convey the thought that the application of model theoretic techniques to natural languages needn't force a distortion of intentional phenomena. I hope that at least I have succeeded in accomplishing this.

We shall be concerned to show that the argument is unsound; that is, even if the premises were true, and we shall argue that they are not, the conclusions of the various forms of the argument do not follow from them. In particular, we wish to deny that the activity of translation commits us to accepting abstract entities such as propositions. Hence we do not regard the argument as providing support for any of,, and. However, although we accept the contradictories (...) of and, and although we reject we do not wish to analyze belief in terms of sentence acceptance. For while the set of sentences to which a person is prepared to assent is evidence of what he believes, it follows from Quine’s indeterminacy thesis that a person’s pattern of belief is underdetermined by this evidence. In fact, the translation argument that we are about to discuss may itself be rejected on the basis of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis, but we are concerned here to challenge the argument by its own standards. (shrink)