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  1. (1 other version)Logical foundations for belief representation.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.
    This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems for natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because--unlike pure indicators--they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning of the (...)
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  • Interpreted Logical Forms.Richard K. Larson & Peter Ludlow - 1993 - Synthese 95 (3):305 - 355.
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  • Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993).Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.) - 1994 - Vienna: Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
    Online collection of papers by Devitt, Dretske, Guarino, Hochberg, Jackson, Petitot, Searle, Tye, Varzi and other leading thinkers on philosophy and the foundations of cognitive Science. Topics dealt with include: Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science, Content and Object, Logic and Foundations, Language and Linguistics, and Ontology and Mereology.
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  • Russellianism unencumbered.Mark McCullagh - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2819-2843.
    Richard Heck, Jr has recently argued against Russellianism about proper names not in the usual way—by appeal to “intuitions” about the truth conditions of “that”-clause belief ascriptions—but by appeal to our need to specify beliefs in a way that reflects their individuation. Since beliefs are individuated by their psychological roles and not their Russellian contents, he argues, Russellianism is precluded in principle from accounting for our ability to specify beliefs in ordinary language. I argue that Heck thus makes things easier (...)
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  • Quotational and other opaque belief reports.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (4):213-231.
    In a novel move against Russellianism, Heck (2014) has argued that reports of the form S believes that p are semantically opaque on the grounds that there are no other means in English to report psychologically individuated beliefs, such as those Lois Lane reports using the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent.’ I show that there are several other ways to meet this need. I focus on quotational reports of the form S believes “p,” which philosophers have overlooked or mischaracterized. I (...)
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  • Otto Said that I am a Fool: Sententialism, Indexicals and Kaplanian Monsters.Giulia Felappi - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2):172-191.
    According to sententialism, ‘Otto said that I am a fool’ expresses the holding of a relation between Otto and the sentence ‘I am a fool’. Sententialism is generally considered doomed, but I will show that a suitably developed sententialist account can surmount the many objections that have been raised. I will also show how important it is to have a fairer attitude towards sententialism. For if sententialist accounts are recognised as real options, it should also be recognised that the conclusion, (...)
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  • Leśniewski-quantifiers and modal arguments in legal discourse.Burkhard Schäfer - 1998 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 6:133.
    Following an idea first proposed by Jerzy Wróblewski, this paperexamines the usefulness of formal logic for comparative legal analysis. Subject of the comparison are the doctrines of mistake and attempt in Germanand English criminal law. These doctrines are distinguished by the interaction of deontic, epistemic and alethic modalities. I propose a purely extensional logic which is based on Leśniewski’s substitutional interpretation ofquantification to analyse differences in the logical structure of the variouscriminal law doctrines.
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  • A model theory for propositional attitudes.Richmond H. Thomason - 1980 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):47 - 70.
    My chief aim has been to convey the thought that the application of model theoretic techniques to natural languages needn't force a distortion of intentional phenomena. I hope that at least I have succeeded in accomplishing this.
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  • Believing in sentences.John Bigelow - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):11 – 18.
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  • Reference, Context, and Propositions.Kai-Yee Wong - 1990 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    The main chapters of this thesis develop and defend a version of two-dimensional semantics that provides an account of Kripkean a posteriori necessity.
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  • Possible Worlds Semantics and the Liar.Sten Lindström - 2003 - In A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro & G. Kurczewski (eds.), Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 297--314.
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