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  1. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analytica 1:123-126.
    Russian translation of Gettier E. L. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? // Analysis, vol. 23, 1963. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.
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  • Causal Structuralism, Dispositional Actualism, and Counterfactual Conditionals.Antony Eagle - 2009 - In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press. pp. 65--99.
    Dispositional essentialists are typically committed to two claims: that properties are individuated by their causal role (‘causal structuralism’), and that natural necessity is to be explained by appeal to these causal roles (‘dispositional actualism’). I argue that these two claims cannot be simultaneously maintained; and that the correct response is to deny dispositional actualism. Causal structuralism remains an attractive position, but doesn’t in fact provide much support for dispositional essentialism.
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  • On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):59-84.
    Analyses of dispositional ascriptions in terms of conditional statements famously confront the problems of finks and masks. We argue that conditional analyses of dispositions, even those tailored to avoid finks and masks, face five further problems. These are the problems of: (i) Achilles' heels, (ii) accidental closeness, (iii) comparatives, (iv) explaining context sensitivity, and (v) absent stimulus conditions. We conclude by offering a proposal that avoids all seven of these problems.
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  • How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
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  • Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David K. Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.
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  • Finkish Dispositions.David K. Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
    Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of ‘finkish’ dispositions: dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s, it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r, x would give response z; so finkish dispositions afford a counter‐example to the simplest conditional analysis of dispositions. Martin went on to suggest that finkish dispositions required (...)
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  • Nature’s Metaphysics.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.
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  • Causality and Properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.
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  • Dispositions and Antidotes.Alexander Bird - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.
    In ‘Finkish Dispositions’1 David Lewis proposes an analysis of dispositions which improves on the simple conditional analysis. In this paper I show that Lewis’ analysis still fails. I also argue that repairs are of no avail, and suggest why this is so.
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  • Causation.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
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  • New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
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  • Quiddistic Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):1-32.
    Is the relation between properties and the causal powers they confer necessary, or contingent? Necessary, says Sydney Shoemaker, on pain of skepticism about the properties. Contingent, says David Lewis, swallowing the skeptical conclusion. I shall argue that Lewis is right about the metaphysics, but that Shoemaker and Lewis are wrong about the epistemology. Properties have intrinsic natures (quiddities), which we can know.
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  • Dispositions, Rules, and Finks.Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.
    This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes—interfering dispositions and conditions—to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all cases, at least (...)
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  • Three Theses About Dispositions.Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter & Frank Jackson - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):251-257.
    I. Causal Thesis: Dispositions have a causal basis. II. Distinctness Thesis: Dispositions are distinct from their causal basis. III. Impotence Thesis: Dispositions are not causally active.
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  • The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions.Jennifer McKitrick - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):349–369.
    Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part 1, I explain more fully what I mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions are not bare. In part 3, I consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases. In part 4, I (...)
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  • From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):466-479.
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  • Laws of Nature.John W. Carroll - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):971-973.
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  • Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
    What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as (...)
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  • Humeanism Without Humean Supervenience: A Projectivist Account of Laws and Possibilities.Barry Ward - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):191-218.
    Acceptance of Humean Supervenience and the reductive Humean analyses that entail it leads to a litany of inadequately explained conflicts with our intuitions regarding laws and possibilities. However, the non-reductive Humeanism developed here, on which law claims are understood as normative rather than fact stating, can accommodate those intuitions. Rational constraints on such norms provide a set of consistency relations that ground a semantics formulated in terms of factual-normative worlds, solving the Frege-Geach problem of construing unasserted contexts. This set of (...)
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  • Probability and Induction.William Kneale - 1949 - Mind 60 (239):310-317.
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  • Superficial Dispositionalism.Lauren Ashwell - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):635-653.
    Dispositional ascriptions do not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering factors may be poised to prevent the disposition from manifesting in its very stimulus conditions. Such factors are commonly called finks and masks. It is thought, however, that finks and masks cannot be intrinsic to the disposition bearer; if an intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain conditions, the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. I argue that we should accept intrinsic finks (...)
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  • Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals.Sungho Choi - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):795-841.
    For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of dispositional properties. Apparently, though, the majority of them have reached the consensus that dispositional ascriptions cannot be analysed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. In this paper it will be brought to light that this consensus is wrong. Specifically, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, which is generally (...)
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  • Possible Worlds.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1976 - Noûs 10 (1):65-75.
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  • The Nature of Fundamental Properties.Troy Wayne Cross - 2004 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    Are fundamental properties dispositional, like fragility , or categorical, like triangularity? Much hangs on this question, including the modal status of the laws of nature and the relation between conceivability and possibility. I first map the contours of the issue, exploring the space of possible positions and outlining the common assumptions. Next I evaluate the existing arguments, none of which I find ultimately persuasive. Finally, I introduce a novel position, macro-Humeanism, which renders fundamental properties categorical, yet attempts to capture the (...)
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  • The Individuation of Events.Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 216-34.
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  • A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
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  • The Metaphysics within Physics.Tim Maudlin - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (3):610-611.
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  • Dispositions and Conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
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  • Identity Through Time.David Armstrong - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel. pp. 67-78.
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  • Dispositions and Habituals.Michael Fara - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):43–82.
    Objects have dispositions. As Nelson Goodman put it, “a thing is full of threats and promises”. But sometimes those threats go unfulfilled, and the promises unkept. Sometimes the dispositions of objects fail to manifest themselves, even when their conditions of manifestation obtain. Pieces of wood, disposed to burn when heated, do not burn when heated in a vacuum chamber. And pastries, disposed to go bad when left lying around too long, won’t do so if coated with lacquer and put on (...)
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  • On the Need for Properties: The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back.C. B. Martin - 1997 - Synthese 112 (2):193-231.
    The development of a compositional model shows the incoherence of such notions as levels of being and both bottom-up and top-down causality. The mathematization of nature through the partial considerations of physics qua quantities is seen to lead to Pythagoreanism, if what is not included in the partial consideration is denied. An ontology of only probabilities, if not Pythagoreanism, is equivalent to a world of primitive dispositionalities. Problems are found with each. There is a need for properties as well as (...)
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  • A Causal Analysis of Seeing.Michael Tye - 1982 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (3):311-325.
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  • Causal Structuralism.John Hawthorne - 2001 - In James Tomberlin (ed.), Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 361--78.
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  • The Causal Theory of Names.Gareth Evans - 1973 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 47 (1):187–208.
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  • Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable Without Them.Wilfrid Sellars - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (October):287-313.
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  • Opposing Powers.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.
    A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.
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  • What is a Disposition?Troy Cross - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):321-41.
    Attempts to capture the distinction between categorical and dispositional states in terms of more primitive modal notions – subjunctive conditionals, causal roles, or combinatorial principles – are bound to fail. Such failure is ensured by a deep symmetry in the ways dispositional and categorical states alike carry modal import. But the categorical/dispositional distinction should not be abandoned; it underpins important metaphysical disputes. Rather, it should be taken as a primitive, after which the doomed attempts at reductive explanation can be transformed (...)
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  • Philosophical Papers, Volume II.David Lewis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (8):433-437.
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.Nathan Salmon & David Lewis - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (2):237.
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  • Philosophical Explanations.Alvin I. Goldman & Robert Nozick - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):81.
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  • Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein & D. M. Armstrong - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.
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  • Minds and Machines.Hilary Putnam, Alan Ross Anderson & Sidney Hook - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):177-177.
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  • Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
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  • Rules and Powers.John Heil & C. B. Martin - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):283-312.
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  • Dispositions All the Way Round. RichardHolton - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):9–14.
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  • A Theory of Universals: Volume 2: Universals and Scientific Realism.D. M. Armstrong - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual and potential findings of natural science. He thus reconciles (...)
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  • On Properties.Hilary Putnam - 1969 - In Rescher Nicholas (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel: A Tribute on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday. Springer Netherlands. pp. 235-254.
    It has been maintained by such philosophers as Quine and Goodman that purely ‘extensional’ language suffices for all the purposes of properly formalized scientific discourse. Those entities that were traditionally called ‘universals’ — properties, concepts, forms, etc. — are rejected by these extensionalist philosophers on the ground that ‘the principle of individuation is not clear’. It is conceded that science requires that we allow something tantamount to quantification over non-particulars (or, anyway, over things that are not material objects, not space-time (...)
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  • Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
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  • Symposium: The Causal Theory of Perception.H. P. Grice & Alan R. White - 1961 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 35:121-168.
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  • Power for Realists.Charles B. Martin - 1993 - In Keith Cambell, John Bacon & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press. pp. 175-786.
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