- Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases.Michael Milona & Hichem Naar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3071-3096.details
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Against Interpretability: a Critical Examination of the Interpretability Problem in Machine Learning.Maya Krishnan - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 33 (3):487-502.details
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Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Prime Time (for the Basing Relation).Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: Routledge.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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Situating feminist epistemology.Natalie Alana Ashton & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):28-47.details
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The Whence and Whither of Experience.Nick Treanor - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1119-1138.details
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Alan F. Chalmers: The Scientist’s Atom and the Philosopher’s Stone: How Science Succeeded and Philosophy Failed to Gain Knowledge of Atoms.Michael R. Matthews - 2011 - Science & Education 20 (2):173-190.details
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Reasons, Dispositions, and Value.Aaron P. Elliott - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.details
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Baseless Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (50):211-231.details
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Justified group belief is evidentially responsible group belief.Paul Silva - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):262-281.details
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Some Recent Existential Appeals to Mathematical Experience.Michael J. Shaffer - 2006 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 10 (2):143–170.details
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Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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Occurrent states.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):1-17.details
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Aesthetic Properties as Powers.Vid Simoniti - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1434-1453.details
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How Hochberg Helped Us Take the Ontological Turn: An Introduction.Fraser MacBride - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (2):163-169.details
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Belief‐Independent Processes and the Generality Problem for Reliabilism.Mark McEvoy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):19-35.details
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(2 other versions)What Is the Problem of Perception?Tim Crane - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.details
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(3 other versions)Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification.Louis E. Loeb - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):279-303.details
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(1 other version)Misinformation.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):533-550.details
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(1 other version)Process Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, and the Value of Knowledge.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):289-302.details
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(1 other version)How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):389-410.details
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(1 other version)On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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(1 other version)Armstrong on Truthmaking and Realism.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2016 - In Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 207-218.details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.details
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On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3311-3328.details
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Maps, languages, and manguages: Rival cognitive architectures?Kent Johnson - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):815-836.details
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Conhecimento e justificação: a origem de debate entre internalismo vs. externalismo.João Batista Scieczkowski - 2008 - Filosofia Unisinos 9 (3):228-242.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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In Defence of Swamping.Julien Dutant - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):357-366.details
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The Possibility of Love Independent Reasons.Jussi Suikkanen - 2011 - Essays in Philosophy 12 (1):32-54.details
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What Realism Implies and What it Does Not.Richard Boyd - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (1‐2):5-29.details
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Status of the rationality assumption in psychology.Marvin S. Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):332-333.details
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Who shall be the arbiter of our intuitions?Daniel Kahneman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.details
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Performing competently.Lola L. Lopes - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):343-344.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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Telling Stories without Words.Kristin Andrews - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.details
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Unreliable Knowledge.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):529-545.details
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Mental Maps1.Ben Blumson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):413-434.details
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Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.details
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God knows (but does God believe?).Dylan Murray, Justin Sytsma & Jonathan Livengood - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):83-107.details
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Knowing Without Evidence.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):309-331.details
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Knowing That P without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.details
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The Value of Knowledge.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.details
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The trouble with being sincere.Timothy Chan & Guy Kahane - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):215-234.details
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How to refrain from answering Kripke’s puzzle.Lewis Powell - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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The preface paradox dissolved.John N. Williams - 1987 - Theoria 53 (2-3):121-140.details
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