I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empirical thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience: ‘each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” . . . this narrative is us, our identities’ (Oliver Sacks); ‘self is a perpetually rewritten story . . . in the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we “tell about” our lives’ (Jerry Bruner); ‘we are all virtuoso novelists. . . . We try to make all of our material (...) cohere into a single good story. And that story is our autobiography. The chief fictional char- acter . . . of that autobiography is one’s self’ (Dan Dennett). The second is a normative, ethical claim: we ought to live our lives narratively, or as a story; a ‘basic condition of making sense of ourselves is that we grasp our lives in a narrative’ and have an understanding of our lives ‘as an unfolding story’ (Charles Taylor). A person ‘creates his identity [only] by forming an autobiographical narrative – a story of his life’, and must be in possession of a full and ‘explicit narrative [of his life] to develop fully as a person’ (Marya Schechtman). (shrink)

This article examines the narrative approach to self found in philosophy and related disciplines. The strongest versions of the narrative approach hold that both a person's sense of self and a person's life are narrative in structure, and this is called the hermeneutical narrative theory. This article provides a provisional picture of the content of the narrative approach and considers some important objections that have been raised to the narrative approach. It defends the view that the self constitutes itself in (...) narrative and argues for something less than the hermeneutical view insofar as the narrative is less agency-oriented and without an overarching thematic unity. (shrink)

Together, the chapters in this handbook lay out the theories and presents the evidence on which they are based, highlights the important new discoveries, and ...

Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far (...) as personal identity is concerned, it is phenomenal rather than psychological continuity that matters. We then consider different ways in which the phenomenal approach may be developed, and respond to a number of objections. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding [II.xxvii.17]. (shrink)

-Das durchgehende Thema der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist die zeitliche Konstitution eines reinen Empfindungsdatums und die einer solchen Konstitution zugrunde liegende Selbstkonstitution der 'phanomenologischen Zeit'.- Martin Heidegger, 1928".

There has been a long-standing interest in the putative roles that various so-called ‘theory of mind’ abilities might play in enabling us to understand and enjoy narratives. Of late, as our understanding of the complexity and diversity of everyday psychological capacities has become more nuanced and variegated, new possibilities have been articulated: (i) that our capacity for a sophisticated, everyday understanding of actions in terms of reason (our folk psychology) may itself be best characterized as a kind of narrative practice (...) and (ii) that acquiring the capacity for supplying and digesting reasons explana- tions might (at least normally) depend upon having a special training with narratives. This introductory paper to the volume situates the claims of those who support the narrative approach to folk psychology against the backdrop of some traditional and new thinking about intersubjectivity, social cognition and ‘theory of mind’ abilities. Special emphasis is laid on the different reasons for being interested in these claims about narrative practice and folk psychology in light of various empirical and philosophical agendas. (shrink)

Das Buch bietet eine neuartige Erklärung des biographischen Selbstverständnisses, die bei den psychischen Grundlagen ansetzt. Personen schreiben sich u.a. Persönlichkeitsmerkmale zu, indem sie sich ihre Lebensgeschichte vor Augen führen – und diese interpretieren. Individuelle Vorstellungen, soziale Normen und Erwartungen beeinflussen die Konstruktion von Geschichten, über die Personen definieren, wer sie sind oder sein wollen. Was aber genau heißt es, ein biographisches Selbstverständnis zu haben? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, wählt die Autorin einen integrativen Ansatz, der mentale Eigenschaften und Fähigkeiten von (...) Personen in den Blick nimmt und hinsichtlich ihrer Funktion für das biographische Selbstverständnis analysiert. Im Zentrum der Untersuchung steht daher ein multidimensionaler Begriff des Selbstbewusstseins, der verschiedene Formen und Ebenen von Selbstbezugnahmen unterscheidet. In den Fokus genommen werden bestimmte Strukturmerkmale wie etwa Zeitbewusstsein, zeitübergreifende Einheit sowie das Gefühl der Urheberschaft von Handlungen. (shrink)

Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can survive dreamless sleep.