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(1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.details
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(1 other version)How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.details
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(1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
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The logical form of action sentences.Donald Davidson - 1966 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 81--95.details
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(1 other version)Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.details
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(3 other versions)The methodological character of theoretical concepts.R. Carnap - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1):38--76.details
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Summary of "Elements of Mind" and Replies to Critics.Tim Crane - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.details
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(1 other version)The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey, R. B. Braithwaite & G. E. Moore - 1931 - Mind 40 (160):476-482.details
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(1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Timothy Williamson & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):625.details
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Relevant implication.David Lewis - 1988 - Theoria 54 (3):161-174.details
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Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105.details
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Moral functionalism and moral motivation.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.details
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A relational theory of non-propositional attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Non-propositional intentionality: an introduction.Alex Grzankowski & M. Montague - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Against propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.details
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Probabilistic causation and the pre-emption problem.Peter Menzies - 1996 - Mind 105 (417):85-117.details
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Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.details
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The logical Form of Action Statements.".Donald Davidson - 1966 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press.details
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Nominalizing quantifiers.Friederike Moltmann - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):445-481.details
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Designating propositions.Jeffrey C. King - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):341-371.details
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Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions.Graeme Forbes - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 114-133.details
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On the proper treatment of opacity in certain verbs.Thomas Ede Zimmermann - 1993 - Natural Language Semantics 2 (1):149-179.details
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‘That’-Clauses and Non-nominal Quantification.Tobias Rosefeldt - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):301 - 333.details
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Propositional Attitudes?Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):207 - 232.details
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Believing in things.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.details
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Naturalistic analysis and the a priori.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2008 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Bradford.details
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On denoting propositions and facts.Terence Parsons - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:441-460.details
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Introducing the Canberra Plan.David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola - 2008 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Bradford. pp. 1--20.details
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Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.details
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Monotonicity in opaque verbs.Thomas Ede Zimmermann - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (6):715 - 761.details
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Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift.A. Moffett Marc - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):81-97.details
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Being Something: Properties and Predicative Quantification.Michael Rieppel - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):643-689.details
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Category mistakes in m&e.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):165–180.details
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Naturalising normativity.Mark Colyvan - 2008 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Bradford.details
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X—Transitivity and Indirect Speech.B. Rundle - 1968 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68 (1):187-206.details
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'the Grossest Confusion Possible'? - Frege And The Lambda-calculus.T. C. Potts - 1979 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 33 (130):761.details
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