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Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.details
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(1 other version)Animal action in the space of reasons.Susan Hurley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.details
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(1 other version)Animal Action in the Space of Reasons.Susan Hurley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):231-257.details
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(1 other version)Animals, thoughts and concepts.Hans-Johann Glock - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):35-104.details
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(1 other version)Animals, Thoughts And Concepts.Hans-Johann Glock - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):35-64.details
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(1 other version)Animal concepts: Content and discontent.Nick Chater & Cecilia Heyes - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):209-246.details
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(1 other version)Animal Concepts: Content and Discontent.Cecilia Heyes Nick Chater - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):209-246.details
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Content, embodiment and objectivity: The theory of cognitive trails.Adrian Cussins - 1992 - Mind 101 (404):651-88.details
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Reply to critics.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):165-174.details
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Emotional Experience and Propositional Content.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (4):535-561.details
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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More Mama, more milk, and more mouse.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):55-65.details
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Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.details
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Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.details
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Mental events.Wilfrid Sellars - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (4):325 - 345.details
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The generality constraint and categorial restrictions.Elisabeth Camp - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):209–231.details
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Steps toward Origins of Propositional Thought.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Disputatio 4 (29):39 - 67.details
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The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought.Jacob Beck - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):563-600.details
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XII.—Particular and General.P. F. Strawson - 1954 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54 (1):233-260.details
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Object individuation using property/kind information in rhesus macaques.Laurie R. Santos, Gregory M. Sulkowski, Geertrui M. Spaepen & Marc D. Hauser - 2002 - Cognition 83 (3):241-264.details
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Evidence for kind representations in the absence of language: Experiments with rhesus monkeys.Webb Phillips & Laurie R. Santos - 2007 - Cognition 102 (3):455-463.details
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Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):309-329.details
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Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):309-329.details
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The emergence of reasoning by the disjunctive syllogism in early childhood.Shilpa Mody & Susan Carey - 2016 - Cognition 154 (C):40-48.details
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Ape metaphysics: Object individuation without language.Natacha Mendes, Hannes Rakoczy & Josep Call - 2008 - Cognition 106 (2):730-749.details
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