This study has two goals: first, to show that Avicenna’s account of being and thing significantly influenced Aquinas’s doctrine of the primary notions; second, to establish the value of adopting a mereological construal of these primary notions in the metaphysics of Avicenna and Aquinas. I begin with an explication of the mereological construal of the primary notions that casts these notions in terms of wholes and parts. Being and thing refer to the same entitative whole and have the same extension, (...) but they are distinct in intension according to the different entitative parts they signify. Existence and essence constitute the two most fundamental entitative parts of every entitative whole. Being is taken to mean that which has existence, and thing signifies that which has essence. I then show how this mereological construal of the primary notions clarifies a number of texts in Avicenna and Aquinas. Finally, I address a few arguments against employing this mereological interpretation of the primary notions. (shrink)

The paper provides some introductory comments and a preliminary translation of Avicenna’s Burhān, IV, 2. I shall first set the stage by outlining the structure of the book (sec. 1). I will then briefly introduce (sec. 2) a number of notions that are dealt with in the first treatise of the Burhān (e.g. definition, description). Burhān, IV, 2 is split into two parts: the first focuses mainly on Aristotle’s An. Post., B, 4, whereas the second covers some of the topics (...) of B, 5 and B, 6. Accordingly, sec. 3 will be devoted to a cursory presentation of Aristotle’s arguments in An. Post., B, 4 along with a more detailed discussion of its Avicennan counterpart, focusing on the indemonstrability of definition; sec. 4, finally, will be a presentation of the second part of the chapter, concerning the relationship between definition and division. An English translation of the entire chapter is appended to the paper and is accompanied by some notes. (shrink)

The concept of ‘‘certitude” is central in Arabic discussions of the theory of demonstration advanced by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics. In the Arabic tradition it is ‘‘certitude,” rather than ‘‘knowledge”, that is usually identified as the end sought by demonstrations. Al-Fārābī himself devotes a short treatise, known as the Conditions of Certitude, to determining the criteria according to which a subject can claim to have absolute certitude of any proposition. In this article the author traces the roots of the (...) concept of certitude to the Arabic translation of the Posterior Analytics. She then offers a close reading of the text of al-Fārābī's Conditions and its parallels in his Epitome of the Posterior Analytics. She argues that the identification of certitude as a cognitive state distinct from knowledge enabled al-Fārābī to introduce a number of interesting and sometimes problematic innovations into Arabic epistemology. Foremost amongst his positive innovations is the recognition that contingent as well as necessary propositions allow for an attenuated form of certitude, and the introduction of reliabilism into the justification of claims to certitude. But al-Fārābī is also one of the first philosophers to articulate explicitly the idea that certitude must include an element of ‘‘knowing that one knows,” a controversial principle that tends to undermine both al-Fārābī’s reliabilism and his efforts to loosen some of the strictures in traditional Aristotelian epistemology. (shrink)

Did classical kalām debates about how thing and existent relate to each other pave the way for Avicenna's distinction between essence and existence? There are some indications that the concept of thingness may have played a bridging role between the mutakallimūn's discussions and those of Avicenna. Nevertheless, Avicenna's appeals to thingness occur most densely in passages devoted to analyzing the relationship between efficient and final causes, an entirely Aristotelian topic. A philological question arises: should these passages be emended to read (...) causality in place of thingness? I argue that the balance of evidence compels us to retain thingness. For Avicenna, thingness is the respect in which the final cause is prior to the efficient cause ; existence, by contrast, is the respect in which the efficient cause is prior to the final cause. In fact, over the course of Avicenna's career a progression from the kalām problematic of šay' v. maw[gcaron]ūd to his own problematic of māhiyya v. wu[gcaron]ūd can be detected in his discussions of efficient and final causation. (shrink)

It has generally been assumed that Anselm was the originator of the ontological argument. Notwithstanding the fact that it has received much criticism, Malcolm defends its so-called second version. In this paper we shall examine some features of ibn Sina’s notion of the Necessary Existent which show that prior to Anselm, ibn Sina formulated a version of this argument which corresponds in some senses to Malcolm’s version, and that a close examination of ibn Sina’s peculiar version enables us to criticize (...) Malcolm’s version as it has not been done heretofore. (shrink)

While the ontological arguments of Anselm and Descartes continue to be the source of controversy among philosophers and theologians in the West, scant attention has been paid to the ontological argument first formulated by Ibn Sina (370/980 - 429/1037), and thereafter reformulated by various Muslim philosophers throughout the centuries up to the present day. Here several versions of the argument will be presented in historical sequence, and some of the most important recent discussions of the argument by contemporary Muslim philosophers (...) will be mentioned. Some reflections on the argument and the discussions of it will then be presented along with comments of a comparative nature regarding contemporary Islamic philosophy and Western philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Thomas of Aquino, from the time he wrote his commentary on the ’Sentences’ through writing the ’Summa of Theology’, recognized how far beyond Aristotle’s was the rational theology of Avicenna. After perfecting his approach to proving the existence of God in the "five ways," Aquinas further developed Avicenna’s organization for treating God’s nature by simplifying Avicenna’s often convoluted thought and added his own developments in content and order. In sum, Aquinas’s treatment of God’s nature depends closely upon Avicenna’s treatment of (...) the subject in his ’Metaphysics’ 8.3-7, even more so than upon Aristotle. This conclusion can be seen by comparing the doctrines of Aristotle, Avicenna and Aquinas on the divine nature. (shrink)

Lo studio esamina la struttura e la concezione della Metafisica avicenniana così come è presentata nella sezione del Sifa specificatamente dedicata alla disciplina. Lo studio è accompagnato da un esame comparativo con altre opere di Avicenna, e l'A. ne desume che nonostante lo schema comune della trattazione, che ha al suo apice l'enfasi sulla teologia, l'articolazione dell'Ilahyyat è la più completa. La sezione finale è centrata sulle fonti di Avicenna, individuate negli Analitici secondi, nella Metafisica libri G-E e nei commentari (...) di Alessandro di Afrodisia e Alfarabi. (shrink)