_ Source: _Page Count 30 Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their children are genetically related to them. I examine eight reasons prospective parents have for preferring genetic children: for parent-child physical resemblance, for family resemblance, for (...) psychological similarity, for the sake of love, to achieve a kind of immortality, for the genetic connection itself, to be a procreator, and to experience pregnancy. I argue that, with the possible exception of the pregnancy desire, these reasons fail to defeat a duty to adopt a child rather than create one, even assuming that we do have some leeway to favor our own interests. (shrink)

This book, written by four internationally renowned bioethicists and first published in 2000, was the first systematic treatment of the fundamental ethical issues underlying the application of genetic technologies to human beings. Probing the implications of the remarkable advances in genetics, the authors ask how should these affect our understanding of distributive justice, equality of opportunity, the rights and obligations as parents, the meaning of disability, and the role of the concept of human nature in ethical theory and practice. The (...) book offers a historical context to contemporary debate over the use of these technologies by examining the eugenics movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The questions raised in this book will be of interest to any reflective reader concerned about science and society and the rapid development of biotechnology, as well as to professionals in such areas as philosophy, bioethics, medical ethics, health management, law, and political science. (shrink)

It is technically possible to clone a human being. The result of the procedure would be a human being in its own right. Given the current level of cloning technology concerning other animals there is every reason to believe that early human clones will have shorter-than-average life-spans, and will be unusually prone to disease. In addition, they would be unusually at risk of genetic defects, though they would still, probably, have lives worth living. But with experimentation and experience, seriously unequal (...) prospects between cloned and noncloned people should erode. We shall ignore arguments about cloning that focus on the potential for harm to the fetus or resultant human being, where harm is understood solely in terms of physical and mental health. Unless the resultant people would generally have lives worth living there is no positive case for cloning, or any other form of reproduction, for that matter. If the resultant beings will generally have lives worth living there is a prima facie case for allowing cloning. We imagine the case in which the resultant beings will have lives well worth living. (shrink)

In this provocative book, philosopher Nicholas Agar defends the idea that parents should be allowed to enhance their children’s characteristics. Gets away from fears of a Huxleyan ‘Brave New World’ or a return to the fascist eugenics of the past Written from a philosophically and scientifically informed point of view Considers real contemporary cases of parents choosing what kind of child to have Uses ‘moral images’ as a way to get readers with no background in philosophy to think about moral (...) dilemmas Provides an authoritative account of the science involved, making the book suitable for readers with no knowledge of genetics Creates a moral framework for assessing all new technologies. (shrink)

Embryonic stem cell research holds great promise for biomedical research, but involves the destruction of human embryos. Katrien Devolder explores the tension between the view that embryos should never be deliberately harmed, and the view that such research must go forward. She provides an in-depth analysis of major attempts to resolve the problem.

Cloning - few words have as much potential to grip our imagination or grab the headlines. No longer the stuff of science fiction or Star Wars - it is happening now. Yet human cloning is currently banned throughout the world, and therapeutic cloning banned in many countries. In this highly controversial book, John Harris does a lot more than ask why we are so afraid of cloning. He presents a deft and informed defence of human cloning, carefully exposing the rhetorical (...) and highly dubious arguments against it. He begins with an introduction to what a human clone is, before tackling some of the most common and frequently bizarre criticisms of cloning: Is it really wicked? Can we regulate it? What about the welfare of cloned children? Does it turn human beings into commodities? Dismissing one by one some of the myths about human cloning, in particular that it is degrading and unsafe, he astutely argues that some of our most cherished values, such as the freedom to start a family and the freedom from state control, actually support the case for human cloning. Offering a brave and lucid insight into this ethical minefield, John Harris at last shows that far from ending the diversity of human life or creating a race of super-clones, cloning has the power to improve and heal human life. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Can philosophers come up with persuasive reasons to allow or to ban human reproductive cloning? Yes. Can philosophers agree, locally and temporarily, which practices related to cloning should be condoned and which should be rejected? Some of them can. Can philosophers produce universally convincing arguments for or against different kinds of human cloning? No. This paper analyses some of the main arguments presented by philosophers in the cloning debate, and some of the most important objections against them. The clashes (...) between the schools of thought suggest that philosophers cannot be trusted to provide the public authorities, or the general public, a unified, universally applicable view of the morality of human reproductive cloning. (shrink)

Direct reprogramming of human skin cells makes available a source of pluripotent stem cells without the perceived evil of embryo destruction, but the advent of such a powerful biotechnology entangles stem cell research in other forms of moral complicity. Induced pluripotent stem cell (iPSC) research had its origins in human embryonic stem cell research and the projected biomedical applications of iPS cells almost certainly will require more embryonic stem cell research. Policies that inhibit iPSC research in order to avoid moral (...) complicity are themselves complicit in preventable harms to patients. Moral complicity may be unavoidable, but a Blue Ribbon Panel charged with assessing the need for additional embryonic stem cell lines may ease a transition from embryonic stem cell research to clinical applications of iPS cells. (shrink)

Technology and responsibility: reflections on the new tasks of ethics.--Jewish and Christian elements in philosophy: their share in the emergence of the modern mind.--Seventeenth century and after: the meaning of the scientific and technological revolution.--Socio-economic knowledge and ignorance of goals.--Philosophical reflections on experimenting with human subjects.--Against the stream: comments on the definition and redefinition of death.--Biological engineering--a preview--Contemporary problems in ethics from a Jewish perspective.--Biological foundations of individuality.--Spinoza and the theory of organism.--Sight and thought: a review of "visual thinking."--Change and (...) permanence: on the possibility of understanding history.--The gnostic syndrome: typology of its thought, imagination, and mood.--The hymn of the pearl: case study of a symbol, and the claims for a Jewish origin of gnosticism.--Myth and mysticism: a study of objectification and interiorization in religious thought.--Origen's metaphysics of free will, fall, and salvation: a "divine comedy" of the universe.--The soul in gnosticism and Plotinus.--The abyss of the will: philosophical meditations on the seventh chapter of Paul's epistle to the Romans. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with two questions. First, is the cloning of humans beings morally acceptable, or not? Secondly, if it is acceptable, are there any significant benefits that might result from it? I begin by drawing a distinction between two very different cases in which a human organism is cloned: the first aims at producing a mindless human organism that will serve as a living organ bank; the second, at producing a person. I then consider each of these in (...) turn. The moral issues raised by the former are the same as those raised by abortion. For this reason, I do not discuss such cloning at length - though I do indicate, very briefly, the reasons for thinking that it is not morally problematic. The rest of the essay then focuses upon the question of the moral status of cloning in cases where the goal is to produce a human person. Here I begin by distinguishing between the question of whether such cloning is in principle morally acceptable, and the question of whether its use at the present time is morally defensible. The second of these questions I consider only briefly, but I do argue that the attempt to produce persons via cloning at the present time is open to serious moral objections. I then turn to the first question, and there I argue, first, that cloning that has the goal of producing persons is not intrinsically wrong; secondly, that such cloning would have a number of potential benefits; and thirdly, that none of the objections that have been directed against this sort of cloning can be sustained. My overall conclusion, accordingly, is that both sorts of cloning are in principle morally acceptable, and potentially beneficial to society. (shrink)

In this review of the Korean cloning scandal involving Woo-Suk Hwang, the nature of the disaster is documented and reasons why it occurred are suggested. The general problems it raises for scientific research are highlighted and six possible ways of improving practice are offered in the light of this case: better education of science students; independent monitoring and validation; guidelines for tissue donation for research; fostering of debate about ethically contentious research in science journals; development of an international code of (...) ethical research practice; fostering of public involvement in ethical review and debate through the web. (shrink)

In order to reach its full potential, human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research requires the use of human oocytes. There is currently a shortage of human eggs for research, and this shortage is likely to continue, as many states and countries prohibit their sale for research purposes, while at the same time condoning unregulated markets for oocytes for use in assisted reproduction. In this essay I first explore possible alternative sources of oocytes for hESC research and conclude that, at present, (...) women are the best source. I then examine arguments about exploitation and commodification that are often raised to prohibit payment to women for oocytes in both the reproductive and research contexts and find these arguments wanting. I conclude by suggesting that ethical concerns raised about a market in oocytes do not warrant a prohibition on the sale of eggs, but that a regulated market can consistently minimize ethical concerns while respecting women and providing important resources for advances in hESC research. (shrink)

In this paper I examine what I take to be the best case for reproductive human cloning, as a medical procedure designed to overcome infertility, and argue that it founders on an irresolvable tension in the attitude towards the importance of being ‘genetically related’ to our children implied in the desire to clone. Except in the case where couples are cloning a child they have previously conceived naturally, cloning is unable to establish the right sort of genetic relation to make (...) couples the parents of their cloned child. If anybody is the genetic parent of a cloned child it is the natural parent(s) of the DNA donor. Paradoxically, in order to resist the claims of the parents of the donor to the cloned child, the argument for human reproductive cloning must place more weight on the intention to parent a child, than we do in cases of ordinary reproduction. It must insist that the parental relation is established by the intentions of the couple who bring a clone into the world and not by their genetic relation to the child. The emphasis placed on intention as establishing the parental relationship works to undermine the justification for cloning in the first place. For cloning to play a useful role as a reproductive technology, it must allow couples to become parents who could do so no other way. However, to the extent that intention is sufficient to establish parenthood, adoption or surrogacy, which are existing alternatives to cloning, will serve equally well to allow couples to become parents. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children and that such use should not be prohibited. In ‘Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy’, Neil (...) Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related children. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning, including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions, thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted. In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz's criticisms misconstrue my arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument from adoption. (shrink)

Is human cloning equal to playing God? Is the technology--despite being scientifically exciting--a moral option in our world? In this volume, Ronald Cole-Turner gathers twelve nontechnical and highly accessible essays that explore this controversial subject.

Marshalling psychological and sociological theory and research, and drawing upon extensive clinical experiences as a psychiatrist and psychotherapist, the author explores the various dimensions of cloning. Clone Being attempts to anticipate possible consequences for a clone, his or her 'parents' and family, and society.

Many new reproductive methods such as artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation, freezing of human embryos, and surrogate motherhood were at first widely condemned but are now seen in Western society as not just ethically and morally acceptable, but beneficial in that they allow otherwise infertile couples to have children. The idea of human cloning was also quickly condemned but debate is now emerging. This article examines cloning from a Jewish perspective and finds evidence to support the view that there is (...) nothing inherently wrong with the idea of human cloning. A hypothesis is also advanced suggesting that even if a body was cloned, the brain, which is the essence of humanity, would remain unique. This author suggests that the debate should be changed from "Is cloning wrong?" to "When is cloning wrong?". (shrink)

The most publicly justifiable application of human cloning, if there is one at all, is to provide self-compatible cells or tissues for medical use, especially transplantation. Some have argued that this raises no new ethical issues above those raised by any form of embryo experimentation. I argue that this research is less morally problematic than other embryo research. Indeed, it is not merely morally permissible but morally required that we employ cloning to produce embryos or fetuses for the sake of (...) providing cells, tissues or even organs for therapy, followed by abortion of the embryo or fetus. (shrink)

The ethical implications of human clones have been much alluded to, but have seldom been examined with any rigour. This paper examines the possible uses and abuses of human cloning and draws out the principal ethical dimensions, both of what might be done and its meaning. The paper examines some of the major public and official responses to cloning by authorities such as President Clinton, the World Health Organisation, the European parliament, UNESCO, and others and reveals their inadequacies as foundations (...) for a coherent public policy on human cloning. The paper ends by defending a conception of reproductive rights of "procreative autonomy" which shows human cloning to be not inconsistent with human rights and dignity. (shrink)

Dan Brock has asserted that those who claim that the early embryo has full moral status are not consistent, and that the rationality of such a position is dubious when it is adopted from a religious perspective. I argue that both claims are flawed. Starting with the second claim, which is grounded in Brock’s moral abstolutist position, I argue that Brock has provided no argument on why the religious position should be less rational than the secular position. With regard to (...) the first claim, I argue that those who hold the view that the early embryo has full moral status can be consistent even if they do not oppose sexual reproduction, even if they do not grieve as much over the loss of embryos as over the loss of other humans, even if they prefer to save one child instead of 100 embryos in the event of fire, and even if they do not accept racism and sexism. (shrink)

There is, as some public figures have asserted, a real moral difference between creating embryos expressly for medical research and conducting research on embryos that are left over from infertility treatments. To create an embryo intending all along to destroy it is worse. But in the end, it isn't so much worse that we should ban all nonreproductive cloning.

ABSTRACT Many people now believe that human reproductive cloning – once sufficiently safe and effective – should be permitted on the grounds that it will allow the otherwise infertile to have children that are biologically closely related to them. However, though it is widely believed that the possession of a close genetic link to our children is morally significant and valuable, we argue that such a view is erroneous. Moreover, the claim that the genetic link is valuable is pernicious; it (...) tends to give rise to highly undesirable consequences, and therefore should be combated rather than pandered to. The emphasis on the genetic is unwarranted and unfortunate; rather than giving us moral reason to support reproductive cloning in the case of infertility, the fact that cloning requests are likely to be motivated by the genetic argument gives us reason to oppose its availability. (shrink)

The compromise position that accepts the use and derivation of stem cells from spare in vitro fertilisation embryos but opposes the creation of embryos for these purposes is a very weak ethical position. This paper argues that whatever the basis is on which defenders of this viewpoint accord intrinsic value to the embryo, once they accept the creation and sacrifice of embryos to benefit infertile people with a child-wish, they do not have a sound moral argument to condemn the creation (...) and sacrifice of embryos to benefit ill and injured people. (shrink)

Now that stem cell scientists are clamouring for human eggs for cloning-based stem cell research, there is vigorous debate about the ethics of paying women for their eggs. Generally speaking, some claim that women should be paid a fair wage for their reproductive labour or tissues, while others argue against the further commodification of reproductive labour or tissues and worry about voluntariness among potential egg providers. Siding mainly with those who believe that women should be financially compensated for providing eggs (...) for research, the new stem cell guidelines of the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) legitimise both reimbursement of direct expenses and financial compensation for many women who supply eggs for research. In this paper, the authors do not attempt to resolve the thorny issue of whether payment for eggs used in human embryonic stem cell research is ethically legitimate. Rather, they want to show specifically that the ISSCR recommended payment practices are deeply flawed and, more generally, that all payment schemes that aim to avoid undue inducement of women risk the global exploitation of economically disadvantaged women. (shrink)

An objection often is raised against the use of reproductive technology to create "nontraditional families," as in ovum donation for postmenopausal women or postmortem artificial insemination. The objection states that conceiving children in such circumstances is harmful to them because of adverse features of these nontraditional families. A similar objection is raised when parents, through negligence or willful disregard of risks, create children with serious genetic diseases or other developmental handicaps. It is claimed that such reproduction harms the children who (...) are created. In reply to this Harm to the Child Argument, it has been pointed out that the procreative acts that supposedly harm the child are the very acts that create the child. This reply has been developed into an argument that, in most of the types of cases under consideration, creating the child does not harm her. This reply, the No Harm Argument, has been stated in three main ways, and it is one of the most misunderstood arguments in bioethics. This paper examines the main rebuttals that have been made to the No Harm Argument and argues that none of them is successful. (shrink)

: In 1998, researchers discovered that embryonic stem cells could be derived from early human embryos. This discovery has raised a series of ethical and public-policy questions that are now being confronted by multiple international organizations, nations, cultures, and religious traditions. This essay surveys policies for human embryonic stem cell research in four regions of the world, reports on the recent debate at the United Nations about one type of such research, and reviews the positions that various religious traditions have (...) adopted regarding this novel type of research. In several instances the religious traditions seem to have influenced the public-policy debates. (shrink)

: Stem cell research that requires the destruction of human embryos is incompatible with Catholic moral principles, and with any ethic that gives serious weight to the moral status of the human embryo. Moreover, because there are promising and morally acceptable alternative approaches to the repair and regeneration of human tissues, and because treatments that rely on destruction of human embryos would be morally offensive to many patients, embryonic stem cell research may play a far less significant role in medical (...) progress than proponents believe. (shrink)

This essay provides a rationale for a regulated market for human oocytes. Although the commodification of human oocytes raises important moral concerns, these concerns do not justify laws banning commerce in human eggs. Given the burgeoning ART industry and the growing oocyte market, the most prudent course of action is to develop regulations for the human oocyte market that are designed to protect and promote important social values, such as health, safety, liberty, and respect for human life. Other responses, such (...) as banning the sale of eggs altogether or allowing donors to be compensated only for their services, would either create a black market or would lead to corruption and abuse. Society still needs to debate specific rules and policies that should govern the human egg market, but further discussion of that important task is best left to legislative bodies and other commentators. (shrink)