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The mark of bodily ownership

Analysis 73 (4):643-651 (2013)

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  1. Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):133-158.
    Article copyright 2002. We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher's view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second (...)
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  • Marginal Consciousness.A. GURWITSCH - 1985
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  • (1 other version)Sight and touch.Michael Martin - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Bodily awareness: A sense of ownership.Michael G. F. Martin - 1995 - In José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel & Naomi Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press. pp. 267–289.
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  • What is embodiment? A psychometric approach.Matthew R. Longo, Friederike Schüür, Marjolein P. M. Kammers, Manos Tsakiris & Patrick Haggard - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):978-998.
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  • Body and Mind in the Trobriand Islands.Gunter Senft - 1998 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 26 (1):73-104.
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  • Wittgenstein and bodily self-knowledge.Edward Harcourt - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):299-333.
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  • The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.Christopher Peacocke - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.
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  • Habeas corpus: The sense of ownership of one's own body.Frederique de Vignemont - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  • On Sensations of Position.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):55-58.
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  • Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness. [REVIEW]Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
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