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Self-Experience.Brentyn Ramm - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):142-166.details
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Being Somewhere. Egocentic spatial representation as self-representation.Ferdinand Pöhlmann - 2017 - Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.details
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Liar!Jonathan Webber - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):651-659.details
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Una explicación del autoconocimiento psicológico.Javier Vidal - 2017 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 54:353-392.details
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The Second Person Perspective.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1693-1711.details
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Perspectives on de se immunity.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10089-10107.details
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On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3):324-342.details
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In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):281-299.details
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Fully Understanding Concept Possession.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):3-27.details
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Explaining Public Action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):475-485.details
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The Moral Insignificance of Self‐consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).details
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First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.details
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First-person representations and responsible agency in AI.Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7061-7079.details
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Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order thought theories.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1563-1572.details
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Thinking About You.Léa Salje - 2016 - Mind 126 (503):817-840.details
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Is Kant's I think Unique?Christopher Peacocke - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):742-747.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.details
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Selfless Memories.Raphaël Millière & Albert Newen - 2022 - Erkenntnis:0-22.details
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Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière, Robin L. Carhart-Harris, Leor Roseman, Fynn-Mathis Trautwein & Aviva Berkovich-Ohana - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:375105.details
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Against Virtual Selves.Tom McClelland - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):21-40.details
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Unity, Mereology and Connectivity.Farid Masrour - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):509-520.details
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Ordinary self‐consciousness as a philosophical problem.James Laing - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):709-724.details
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The early Yogācāra theory of no-self.Jenny Hung - 2018 - Asian Philosophy 28 (4):316-331.details
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Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.details
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Thinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):138-160.details
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I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.details
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Anscombe and Davidson on Practical Knowledge. A Reply to Hunter.Olav Gjelsvik - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (6).details
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Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.details
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The philosophical significance of the De Se.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):253-276.details
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De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.details
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Replies.Jonardon Ganeri - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1761-1771.details
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Mental Time Travel and Attention.Jonardon Ganeri - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4):353-373.details
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Replies.Kit Fine - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):367 - 395.details
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The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.details
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The mark of bodily ownership.F. de Vignemont - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):643-651.details
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Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee.Annalisa Coliva - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):233-252.details
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Reflective Reasoning & Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12786.details
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The puzzle of mirror self-recognition.Johannes L. Brandl - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):279-304.details
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Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology.José Luis Bermúdez - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):263-280.details
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Replies to Commentators.T. Bayne - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):520-529.details
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Constitutive Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Self-concernment without self-reference.Roberto Sá Pereira - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1).details
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De se thought and immunity to error through misidentification.Hongqing Cui - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciencesdetails
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The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness.Farid Masrour - 2020 - In The Oxford Handbook of The Philosophy of Consciousness. pp. 208-229.details
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Unity of Consciousness: In Defense of a Leibnizian View.Farid Masrour - 2014 - In Christopher Hill David Bennett (ed.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press.details
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Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Nonconceptual mental content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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