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  1. What is an Emotion?William James - 1884 - Mind 9:188.
    A perfectly matched layer (PML) absorbing material composed of a uniaxial anisotropic material is presented for the truncation of finite-difference time-domain (FDTD) lattices. It is shown that the uniaxial PML material formulation is mathematically equivalent to the perfectly matched layer method published by Berenger (see J. Computat. Phys., Oct. 1994). However, unlike Berenger's technique, the uniaxial PML absorbing medium presented in this paper is based on a Maxwellian formulation. Numerical examples demonstrate that the FDTD implementation of the uniaxial PML medium (...)
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  • The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions.Demian Whiting - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
    Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the (...)
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  • The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.
    We review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
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  • The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
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  • Desires, Values and Norms.Olivier Massin - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 352.
    The thesis defended, the “guise of the ought”, is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts to be or oughts to do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key distinction between values and norms: positive and (...)
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness and intentionality.George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 468--484.
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  • A Contemporary View of Brentano’s Theory of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):64-87.
    In this paper I consider Franz Brentano’s theory of emotion. I focus on three of its central claims: (i) emotions are sui generis intentional phenomena; (ii) emotions are essentially evaluative phenomena; (iii) emotions provide the basis of an epistemology of objective value. I argue that all three claims are correct, and I weave together Brentano’s arguments with some of my own to support them. In the course of defending these claims, Brentano argues that ‘feeling and will’ are united into the (...)
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  • Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind.George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 512--537.
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  • Analytic psychology.G. F. Stout - 1896 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):4-5.
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  • The logic of emotion.Robert C. Solomon - 1977 - Noûs 11 (1):41-49.
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  • analytic psychology.George Stout - 1896 - Allen & Unwin.
    Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s).
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  • Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1958 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (2):273-273.
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  • Gefühl und Gefühlsempfindungen.Carl Stumpf - 1928 - Verlag von Johann Ambrosis Barth.
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  • Grundlinien der Psychologie.Stephan Witasek - 1908 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 66:99-100.
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