- Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):334-358.details
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Should Expressivism Be a Theory at the Level of Metasemantics?Andrew Alwood - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):13-22.details
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Recent Publications.[author unknown] - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):577-578.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Timothy Williamson & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):625.details
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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 296, ISBN-13:9780199251315. £35.00. [REVIEW]Chris Alen Sula - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):227-228.details
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Inferentialist metaethics, bifurcations and ontological commitment.Christine Tiefensee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2437-2459.details
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Solving the problem of creeping minimalism.Matthew Simpson - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):510-531.details
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Summary.Michael Ridge - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):433-442.details
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The Autonomy of Ethics.A. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:197.details
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The autonomy of ethics.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199 – 206.details
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How to stand up for non-cognitivists.Huw Price - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292.details
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How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.details
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How to Define Theoretical Terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (2):321-321.details
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There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):185-212.details
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Erratum to: There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):213-214.details
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Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.details
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(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.details
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Conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:242-256.details
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Expressivism and Realist Explanations.Camil Golub - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1385-1409.details
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Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. [REVIEW]David O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.details
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Thinking How to Live.Garrett Cullity - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):308-311.details
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Comments on Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):699-706.details
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Expressivist embeddings and minimalist truth.James Dreier - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.details
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Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Another World.James Dreier - 2015 - In Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn. Oxford University Press. pp. 155-171.details
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The question of realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
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Moral epistemology and the Because Constraint.Nick Zangwill - 2006 - In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell. pp. 263--281.details
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Semantic Hermeneutics.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2014 - In Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 119-146.details
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Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.details
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Mackie's Realism.Jamie Dreier - 2010 - In Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchen (eds.), A World Without Values. Springer.details
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