This book offers a powerful response to what Varner calls the "two dogmas of environmental ethics"--the assumptions that animal rights philosophies and anthropocentric views are each antithetical to sound environmental policy. Allowing that every living organism has interests which ought, other things being equal, to be protected, Varner contends that some interests take priority over others. He defends both a sentientist principle giving priority to the lives of organisms with conscious desires and an anthropocentric principle giving priority to certain very (...) inclusive interests which only humans have. He then shows that these principles not only comport with but provide significant support for environmental goals. (shrink)

'Andrew Dobson's book meets the need for an accessible introduction to green political thought ... a useful and interesting book.'- Environmental Politics.

I present the foundational structure for a life-centered theory of environmental ethics. The structure consists of three interrelated components. First is the adopting of a certain ultimate moral attitude toward nature, which I call “respect for nature.” Second is a belief system that constitutes a way of conceiving of the natural world and of our place in it. This belief system underlies and supports the attitude in a way that makes it an appropriate attitude to take toward the Earth’s natural (...) ecosystems and their life communities. Third is a system of moral rules and standards for guiding our treatment of those ecosystems and life communities, a set of normative principles which give concrete embodiment or expression to the attitude of respect for nature. The theory set forth and defended here is, I hold, structurally symmetrical with a theory of human ethics based on the principle of respect for persons. (shrink)

The assumption that environmental ethics must be nonanthropocentric in order to be adequate is mistaken. There are two forms of anthropocentrism, weak and strong, and weak anthropocentrism is adequate to support an environmental ethic. Environmental ethics is, however, distinctive vis-a-vis standard British and American ethical systems because, in order to be adequate, it must be nonindividualistic.Environmental ethics involves decisions on two levels, one kind of which differs from usual decisions affecting individual fairness while the other does not. The latter, called (...) allocational decisions, are not reducible to the former and govern the use of resources across extended time. Weak anthropocentrism provides a basis for criticizing individual, consumptive needs and can provide the basis for adjudicatingbetween these levels, thereby providing an adequate basis for environmental ethics without the questionable ontological commitments made by nonanthropocentrists in attributing intrinsie value to nature. (shrink)

Many recent critical discussions of anthropocentrism have focused on Bryan Norton's ‘convergence hypothesis': the claim that both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric ethics will recommend the same environmentally responsible behaviours and policies. I argue that even if we grant the truth of Norton's convergence hypothesis, there are still good reasons to worry about anthropocentric ethics. Ethics legitimately raises questions about how to feel, not just about which actions to take or which policies to adopt. From the point of view of norms for (...) feeling, anthropocentrism has very different practical implications from nonanthropocentrism; it undermines some of the common attitudes – love, respect, awe – that people think it appropriate to take toward the natural world. (shrink)

I present a Third World critique of the trend in American environmentalism known as deep ecology, analyzing each of deep ecology’s central tenets: the distinction between anthropocentrism and biocentrism, the focus on wildemess preservation, the invocation of Eastem traditions, and the belief that it represents the most radical trend within environmentalism. I argue that the anthropocentrism/biocentrism distinction is of little use in understanding the dynamics of environmental degredation, that the implementation of the wildemess agenda is causing serious deprivation in the (...) Third World, that the deep ecologist’s interpretation of Eastem traditions is highly selective, and that in other cultural contexts radical environmentalism manifests itself quite differently, with a far greater emphasis on equity and the integration of ecological concems with livelihood and work. I conclude that despite its claims to universality, deep ecology is firmly rooted in American environmental and cultural history and is inappropriate when applied to the Third World. (shrink)

As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as (...) that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly the individual only. (shrink)

Challenges readers to reconsider the moral standing of plants.

In any proposal for specicide, as represented by mosquito eradication, one must acknowledge that this involves a complex set of moral trade-offs. Taking it as given that the health burden of vector-borne diseases has to be reduced drastically, this chapter lays out the landscape of normative arguments that can be brought in the mosquito’s defence. These, in turn, should be involved in deliberations about whether such large-scale eradication practices can be morally justified. In favour of mosquito protection, several (but not (...) exhaustive) kinds of arguments are presented based on individual mosquito’s moral standing, the value of each species, concerns about hubris and risks, and questions about preferable alternatives. At the same time, this chapter also inquires whether the conflict between humans and mosquitos can be framed as a matter of self-defence—attributing to humans a right to defend themselves. A morally important distinction here is that the mosquito is merely instrumentalized by the disease that it carries which is the real motive of self-defence, showing that mosquitos are innocent in several senses of the term. Taking all these different moral considerations seriously leaves us with an awareness that the eradication of these species cannot be treated lightly. (shrink)

Abstract:Non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics face problems that cannot be resolved within a holistic framework of natural value since such frameworks posit abstract and general properties as the bearers of intrinsic value and thus ignore the moral claims of individual organisms. Two paradigm examples of such approaches, Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic and Arne Neass' Deep Ecology suffer from this problem. Christine Korsgaard's argument for the conceptual separation of intrinsic and instrumental valuing, however, serves as a strong theoretical grounding for a (...) reconceptualization of the value of nature, which can best be described as an enlightened anthropocentrism, while preserving the spirit of Leopold's and Naess' proposals. (shrink)

The environmental crisis is the most prominent challenge humanity has ever had to battle with, and humanity is currently failing. The Anthropocene—or so called ‘age of humans’—is indeed a period when the survival of humanity has never been so much at risk. This book locates itself in the field of critical green political theory. Fremaux's analysis of the current environmental crisis calls for us to embrace radical shifts in our modes of being; or, in other words, socially progressive innovations that (...) will be described within the unique framework of "Green Republicanism." In offering a constructive and emancipatory delineation of what could be considered an ecological civilization that is respectful of its natural environment and social differences, this book describes how to shift from an ‘arrogant speciesism’ and materialistic lifestyle to a post-anthropocentric ecological humanism focusing on the ‘good life’ within ecological limits. This new political regime calls for a radical reinvention of our societies, a decentering of the humans within our metaphysical worldview, and a withdrawal of the capitalist technosphere at the benefit of the biosphere. It will require a new economic paradigm that replaces the unsustainable capitalist logic of growth by sustainable degrowth and steady economics. Rooted in ethical thinking and political philosophy, this book seeks to offer a concrete roadmap of how sustainable societies can be fostered. (shrink)

This paper develops a language for distinguishing more rigorously between various senses of the term ‘anthropocentrism.’ Specifically, it differentiates between:1. Perceptual anthropocentrism (which characterizes paradigms informed by sense-data from human sensory organs);2. Descriptive anthropocentrism (which characterizes paradigms that begin from, center upon, or are ordered around Homo sapiens / ‘the human’)3. Normative anthropocentrism (which characterizes paradigms that constrain inquiry in a way that somehow privileges Homo sapiens / ‘the human’ [passive normative anthropocentrism]; and which characterizes paradigms that make assumptions or (...) assertions about the superiority of Homo sapiens, its capacities, the primacy of its values, its position in the universe, and/or make prescriptions based on these assertions and assumptions [active normative anthropocentrism]). (shrink)

Anthropocentrism, in its original connotation in environmental ethics, is the belief that value is human-centred and that all other beings are means to human ends. Environmentally -concerned authors have argued that anthropocentrism is ethically wrong and at the root of ecological crises. Some environmental ethicists argue, however, that critics of anthropocentrism are misguided or even misanthropic. They contend: first that criticism of anthropocentrism can be counterproductive and misleading by failing to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate human interests. Second, that humans (...) differ greatly in their environmental impacts, and consequently, addressing human inequalities should be a precondition for environmental protection. Third, since ecosystems constitute the “life-support system” for humans, anthropocentrism can and should be a powerful motivation for environmental protection. Fourth, human self-love is not only natural but helpful as a starting point for loving others, including nonhumans. Herein we analyze such arguments, agreeing with parts of them while advancing four counter-arguments. First, redefining the term anthropocentrism seems to be an attempt to ignore behavior in which humans focus on themselves at the risk of the planet. Second, if addressing human inequalities is a precondition for environmental protection, biodiversity protection will remain out of the scope of ethical consideration for an indefinite period of time. Third, anthropocentric motivations can only make a positive contribution to the environment in situations where humans are conscious of a direct benefit to themselves. Fourth, ‘self-love’ alone is an inadequate basis for environmental concern and action. We also explore the question of agency, shared responsibility, and a fair attribution of blame for our environmental predicaments. (shrink)

Attacks nothing less than the currently prevailing worldphilosophy--humanism, which the author feels is exceedingly dangerous in itshidden assumptions.

Two of the most important political movements of the late twentieth century are those of environmentalism and feminism. In this book, Val Plumwood argues that feminist theory has an important opportunity to make a major contribution to the debates in political ecology and environmental philosophy. _Feminism and the Mastery of Nature_ explains the relation between ecofeminism, or ecological feminism, and other feminist theories including radical green theories such as deep ecology. Val Plumwood provides a philosophically informed account of the relation (...) of women and nature, and shows how relating male domination to the domination of nature is important and yet remains a dilemma for women. (shrink)

Selon l'interprétation traditionnelle de la révolution coperni­cienne, le géocentrisme est un anthropocentrisme et l'héliocen­trisme, un anthro­­popériphérisme. C'est cette double assimila­tion que cet article entend remettre en question. En effet, le géocentrisme peut être appréhendé comme un théocentrisme, un héliocentrisme, un diablo­centrisme et un anthropofinalisme, mais il n'en reste pas moins, indubitablement, un anthropopéri­phérisme. Le seul «anthropocentra­lisme» qui lui appartienne est un anthropoconceptualisme qui, hors de toute perspective valo­risante, n'est qu'une incapacité à se dé­centrer. Quant à l'hélio­centrisme proprement dit, s'il s'oppose (...) à l'anthropofinalisme des Anciens et à ce qu'il croit être leur anthropo­centralisme, il ne dégénère pas pour autant en un anthropo­péri­phérisme, car, d'une part, il est davantage préoccupé par la centration du So­leil que par la décentration de la Terre et, d'autre part, il par­vient même à s'accom­moder de perspectives franchement anthro­pocentriques. ––– According to the traditional interpretation of the Copernican revolution, the old geocentric system was anthropocentric and the new heliocentric system anthropoperipheric. The double assimilation is what this article wants to call into question. Although a geocentric system can be seen to be theocentric, a heliocentric system can be interpreted as being diabolocentric and anthropofinalist, but also undeniably anthropoperipheric. The only way a heliocentric system can be seen as anthropo­centric is as being anthropoconceptualist. Far from honouring man, this demonstrates an incapacity to see things from a point of view other than man's own. Although a heliocentric system is opposed to the ancient anthropofinality and what was seen as anthropocentrality, it is not necessarily anthropoperipheric. This is firstly because the new system was far more preoccupied with the new centrality of the sun than with the new position of the earth, and secondly because the new system managed to incorporate many aspects of anthropocentrality in her new vision. (shrink)

In What Is Posthumanism? he carefully distinguishes posthumanism from transhumanism (the biotechnological enhancement of human beings) and narrow definitions of the posthuman as the hoped-for transcendence of materiality.

_Zoographies_ challenges the anthropocentrism of the Continental philosophical tradition and advances the position that, while some distinctions are valid, humans and animals are best viewed as part of an ontological whole. Matthew Calarco draws on ethological and evolutionary evidence and the work of Heidegger, who called for a radicalized responsibility toward all forms of life. He also turns to Levinas, who raised questions about the nature and scope of ethics; Agamben, who held the "anthropological machine" responsible for the horrors of (...) the twentieth century; and Derrida, who initiated a nonanthropocentric ethics. Calarco concludes with a call for the abolition of classical versions of the human-animal distinction and asks that we devise new ways of thinking about and living with animals. (shrink)

A philosophical exploration of the nature, scope, and significance of ecofeminist theory and practice. This book presents the key issues, concepts, and arguments which motivate and sustain ecofeminism from a western philosophical perspective.

In this volume leading international environmental philosophers further the debate about the value of nature, the concept of the environment, and the metaphysical, ethical, social and international implications of these concepts. Philosophers have to some extent neglected the study of nature and the natural environment, and this collection not only provides a long-overdue contribution to that study, but also points to inadequacies of much contemporary ethical and political theory. For environmentalists who are not philosophers, it will stimulate reflection on their (...) own concepts and principles. [Book Synopsis]. (shrink)

After the first wave of writings in environmental philosophy in the early 1970s, which were mostly critical of anthropocentrism, a new trend emerged which sought to humanise this subject, and to revive or vindicate anthropocentric stances. Only in this way, it was held, could environmental values become human values, and ecological movements manage to become social ecology. Later writers have detected tacit anthropocentrism lurking even in Deep Ecology, or have defended ‘perspectival anthropocentrism’, as the inevitable methodology of any system of (...) environmental ethics devised by and for the guidance of human beings. Human good, broadly enough conceptualised, is held to be the basis of ethics. Besides, it is sometimes added, non-anthropocentric considerations in any case add nothing to anthropocentric ones, when broadly construed. (shrink)

The critique of anthrocentrism has been one of the major tasks of ecophilosophy, whose characteristic general thesis has been that our frameworks of morality and rationality must be challenged to include consideration of nonhumans. But the core of anthrocentrism is embattled and its relationship to practical environmental activism is problematic. I shall argue here that although the criticisms that have been made of the core concept have some justice, the primary problem is not the framework challenge or the core concept (...) itself, but rather certain problematic understandings of it which have developed in environmental philosophy. In the case of the intrinsic/instrumental distinction, much of the criticism turns on unrealistic expectations about what the distinction means and what it can do; in the case of anthropocentrism, a perverse reading which I will call cosmic anthrocentrism has invited many of the criticisms which have been widely seen as fatal to the concept. Using concepts and models originating in feminist theory and other liberation critiques, I outline an alternative, feminist rereading of anthrocentrism. I argue that this model is theoretically illuminating and capable of meeting major objections that the perverse readings have invited. Critics of the core distinctions have almost universally identified the two core concepts and issues of anthrocentrism and instrumental/intrinsic value. The analysis I present will show how these concepts and issues are connected, but also why there is more to anthrocentrism than the failure to recognise the intrinsic value of nature, and why anthrocentrism rather that intrinsic value should be the major conceptual focus of environmental critique. It will also show why the framework challenge is of practical importance to the green movement and why anthrocentrism is a serious problem in contemporary life. (shrink)

To hold an environmental ethic is to hold that non-human beings and states of affairs in the natural world have intrinsic value. This seemingly straightforward claim has been the focus of much recent philosophical discussion of environmental issues. Its clarity is, however, illusory. The term ‘intrinsic value’ has a variety of senses and many arguments on environmental ethics suffer from a conflation of these different senses: specimen hunters for the fallacy of equivocation will find rich pickings in the area. This (...) paper is largely the work of the underlabourer. I distinguish different senses of the concept of intrinsic value, and, relatedly, of the claim that non-human beings in the natural world have intrinsic value; I exhibit the logical relations between these claims and examine the distinct motivations for holding them. The paper is not however merely an exercise in conceptual underlabouring. It also defends one substantive thesis: that while it is the case that natural entities have intrinsic value in the strongest sense of the term, i.e., in the sense of value that exists independently of human valuations, such value does not as such entail any obligations on the part of human beings. The defender of nature’s intrinsic value still needs to show that such value contributes to the well-being of human agents. (shrink)

I present a Third World critique of the trend in American environmentalism known as deep ecology, analyzing each of deep ecology’s central tenets: the distinction between anthropocentrism and biocentrism, the focus on wildemess preservation, the invocation of Eastem traditions, and the belief that it represents the most radical trend within environmentalism. I argue that the anthropocentrism/biocentrism distinction is of little use in understanding the dynamics of environmental degredation, that the implementation of the wildemess agenda is causing serious deprivation in the (...) Third World, that the deep ecologist’s interpretation of Eastem traditions is highly selective, and that in other cultural contexts radical environmentalism manifests itself quite differently, with a far greater emphasis on equity and the integration of ecological concems with livelihood and work. I conclude that despite its claims to universality, deep ecology is firmly rooted in American environmental and cultural history and is inappropriate when applied to the Third World. (shrink)

The Concept of Milieu in Environmental Ethics discusses how we can come together to address current environmental problems at the planetary level, such as climate change, biodiversity loss, transborder pollution and desertification. -/- The book recognises the embedded individual sociocultural and environmental contexts that impact our everyday choices. It asks, in this pluralism of worldviews, how can we build common ground to tackle environmental issues? What is our individual moral responsibility within the larger collaborative challenge? Through philosophical reasoning, this book (...) pragmatically addresses these questions and builds a framework to support sustainable ways of living. At the core of the book, it draws on the concept of milieu (fūdo) inspired by the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō, which captures how we act within and perceive our surroundings as a web of culturally, historically and geographically situated meanings and values. It argues that the milieu connects us as individuals with community, past and future history, and the natural world, providing us with common ground for global environmental ethics. -/- This book will be an engaging and interesting read for scholars, researchers and students in environmental ethics, philosophy and sustainability. (shrink)

The article analyzes the presence of the anthropocentric and ecocentric argument in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights related to environmental issues. To this effect, at first, it presents the content of these two approaches, explaining their contributions and limitations. With this theoretical framework, identifies four stages in the Court's jurisprudence, which show the gradual transition from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism within its reflections on human rights. Finally, the results of the analysis offer light on the possible development (...) of the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous right in inter-American human rights system. (shrink)

This essay examines the ways in which objectivity and realism have been conceived in the history of Western ethics and meta-ethics, and looks to classical Daoism for an alternative framework.

Anthropocentrism in philosophy is deeply paradoxical. Ethics investigates the human good, epistemology investigates human knowledge, and antirealist metaphysics holds that the world depends on our cognitive capacities. But humans good and knowledge, including their language and concepts, are empirical matters, whereas philosophers do not engage in empirical research. And humans are inhabitants, not 'makers', of the world. Nevertheless, all three can be drastically reinterpreted as making no reference to humans.".

This book is an inquiry into ki-energy, its role within Eastern mind-body theory, and its implications for our contemporary Western understanding of the body. Yuasa examines the concept of ki-energy as it has been used in such areas as acupuncture, Buddhist and Taoist meditation, and the martial arts. To explain the achievement of mind-body oneness in these traditions he offers an innovative schematization of the lived body. His approach is interdisciplinary and cross-cultural, offering insights into Western philosophy, religion, medical science, (...) depth psychology, parapsychology, theater, and physical education. To substantiate the relationship that ki-energy forms between the human body and its environment, Yuasa introduces contemporary scientific research on ki-energy in China and Japan, as well as evidence from acupuncture medicine and from the experience of meditators and martial arts practitioners. This evidence requires not only a rethinking of the living human body and of the mind-body and mind-matter relation, but also calls into question the adequacy of the existing scientific paradigm. Yuasa calls for an epistemological critique of modern science and explores the issue of the relation of teleology to science. (shrink)

Cost-benefit analysis makes the assumption that everything from consumer goods to endangered species may in principle be given a value by which its worth can be compared with that of anything else, even though the actual measurement of such value may be difficult in practice. The assumption is shown to fail, even in simple cases, and the analysis to be incapable of taking into account the transformative value of new experiences. Several kinds of value are identified, by no means all (...) commensurable with one another – a situation with which both economics and contemporary ethical theory must come to terms. A radical moral pluralism is recommended as in no way incompatible with the requirements of rationality, which allows that the business of living decently involves many kinds of principles and various sorts of responsibilities. In environmental ethics, pluralism offers the hope of reconciling various rival theories, even if none of them is universally applicable. (shrink)

Anthropocentrism can intelligibly be criticised as an ontological error, but attempts to conceive of it as an ethical error are liable to conceptual and practical confusion. After noting the paradox that the clearest instances of overcoming anthropocentrism involve precisely the sort of objectivating knowledge which many ecological critics see as itself archetypically anthropocentric, the article presents the follwoing arguments: there are some ways in which anthropocentrism is not objectionable; the defects associated with anthropocentrism in ethics are better understood as instances (...) of speciesism and human chauvinism; it is unhelpful to call these defects anthropocentrism because there is an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism in any ethic at all; moreover, because the defects do not typically involve a concern with human interests as such, the rhetoric of anti-anthropocentrism is counterproductive in practice. (shrink)

Professional environmental ethics arose directly out of the interest in the environment created by Earth Day in 1970. At that time many environmentalists, primarily because they had read Aldo Leopold’s essay, “The Land Ethic,” were convinced that the foundations of environmental problems were philosophical. Moreover, these environmentalists were dissatisfied with the instrumental arguments based on human use and benefit—which they felt compelled to invoke in defense of nature—because they thought these arguments were part of the problem. Wanting to counter instrumental (...) arguments in some way with non- or even anti-instrumental arguments, and unable to think of anything else to say, they began wistfully suggesting that perhaps nature had or ought to have rights. When professional environmental ethics came into its own in the early 1980s, rights for nature were one of the first subjects to be debated in detail. Unfortunately, however, no one could come up with a theory to support such rights attributions. Nevertheless, because rights had been invoked by environmentalists to challenge the preeminent role of instrumental value arguments, and because the field of environmental ethics developed in support of environmental concerns and arguments, environmental ethicists turned to an examination of noninstrumental or intrinsic value arguments for the preservation of nature. (shrink)

In the literature of environmental philosophy, the single most potent argument that has been made against the claim that nature may possess intrinsic value in any objective sense is the Humean thesis of projectivism and its associated view that human consciousness is the source of all values. Theorists, in one way or another, have to face up to this challenge. For instance, J. Baird Callicott upholds this Humean foundation to modern Western philosophy. However, by distinguishing between the source and locus (...) of value, he makes it possible to argue that nature is the locus of intrinsic value without at the same time compromising the thesis that human consciousness is the source of all values. On the other hand, Holmses Rolston, III, another eminent environmental philosopher, criticizes the distinction as well as challenges the Humean foundation itself. In this article, I attempt to resolve the disagreement between Callicott and Rolston over this particular distinction, thereby doing justice to the insights which each theorist, undoubtedly, has brought to bear on the issue of intrinsic value, at least as far as individual organisms is concerned. However, I am also critical of both for having failed to draw out the full implications behind certain crucial distinctions that should be made about the notion of intrinsic value itself. (shrink)

Humanism – in the sense that humans alonehave moral standing, or else a surpassing degree of it– has traditionally dominated all of ethicaldiscourse. However, its past formulations havesuccumbed to the temptation merely to stipulate sucha criterion, such as rationality, which nonhumans areoften deemed (without sufficient argument) to failwithout exception. Animal liberationistarguments do exist in counterpoint to traditionalhumanism, but one current difficulty seems to be asimple clash of basic assumptions, with an indecisiveresult. Although the author of this paper is anonanthropocentrist, he (...) attempts to further the moraltheoretical debate by constructing a more powerfulversion of humanism, based in a pursuit of the good,per se. The theory is premised upon viewing humans asgenerally having and leading lives of greater value,in some relevant sense. This essay prefigures theauthor's refutation of humanism, more generally, inthe understanding that such a world view cannot trulybe refuted unless its best version is answered.Whatever the status of this paper's offering of``Obligatory'' Anthropocentrism, the theory can be seento have a great deal more success than itspredecessors in parrying, and apparently outdoing,contemporary animal liberationist philosophies. (shrink)

Watsuji proposes a conception of the self as embodied and dynamic in constant cyclic relationship with the historical milieu. I argue that the concept of a relational individual can provide some solutions to the problem in environmental ethics of the spatial distance between an agent and the consequences of her actions. Indeed, by becoming aware of the interdependent relation between the self and the local shared milieu, one develops and recognizes feelings of care and belonging, which promote more environmentally sensitive (...) lifestyles. Furthermore, this care and awareness of interdependence can be expanded to a global level, including distant human beings and natural environments. Ethics thus emerges from the constant dynamic relation between the relational individual and the historical milieu. keywords: Watsuji Tetsurō—environmental ethics—sustainability— self—relational self— milieu— Japanese philosophy— historicity— spatial distance— Augustin Berque. (shrink)

Die Originalität von Helmuth Plessners Philosophie besteht darin, dass sie die praktisch nötigen Ermöglichungsstrukturen und Grenzen anthropologischer Vergleiche in der personalen Lebensführung aufdeckt. Sie leistet diese Rekonstruktion, indem sie phänomenologische, hermeneutische und dialektische Methoden kombiniert, um qualitative Grenzerfahrungen, deren Deutung und Interpretation philosophisch untersuchen zu können. Theoretisch setzt diese Untersuchung auf die lebenspraktische These, dass sich das Wesen des Menschen nicht feststellen lässt, sondern auch künftig der personalen Lebensführung unergründlich bleibt. Die naturphilosophische Fundierung bioanthropologischer Vergleiche legt die exzentrische Positionalität als (...) den Ermöglichungs- und Begrenzungsgrund frei. Die sozial- und kultur-philosopische Fundierung sozial- und kultur-anthropologischer Vergleiche rekonstruiert das privat-öffentliche Doppelgängertum von Personen in ihrer Mitwelt als diesen Grund. Die geschichtsphilosophische Fundierung politisch-anthropologischer Vergleiche legt zumindest immanent transzendente Utopien als denjenigen Ermöglichungs- und Begrenzungsgrund frei, der sich dem Umgang mit einem globalen Hochkapitalismus gewachsen zeigen kann. (shrink)