The continuing relevance of Ludwik Fleck’s work, above its status as a classic in science studies, lies in his reflexive conceptualisation of an open epistemology. As early as 1929, in the midst of a broad debate about a ‘crisis’ of science, Fleck offered a socio-historical analysis of the widely assumed crisis in form of an epistemology. He presented his argument, which was in itself an interrogation of the metaphysical foundations of science, as a reflexive and political intervention to this debate. (...) His book of 1935, Genesis and development of a scientific fact, in which he developed the notion of the thought collective, can be read in a similar vein as a functional analysis of science under National Socialism. His traumatic experiences during this period fostered his drive for science, democracy and epistemology. When he returned to the epistemological debate in 1946, he sharpened the presentation of his argument, presenting it rhetorically as an ironic political dialogue. This surprising text unfolds as an epistemological intervention by a participant observer. In this respect, Fleck’s epistemology, combining the historical analysis with reflexive intervention, is still a message in a bottle. (shrink)

This 1983 book is a lively and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of natural science, organized around the central theme of scientific realism. It has two parts. 'Representing' deals with the different philosophical accounts of scientific objectivity and the reality of scientific entities. The views of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Putnam, van Fraassen, and others, are all considered. 'Intervening' presents the first sustained treatment of experimental science for many years and uses it to give a new direction to debates about (...) realism. Hacking illustrates how experimentation often has a life independent of theory. He argues that although the philosophical problems of scientific realism can not be resolved when put in terms of theory alone, a sound philosophy of experiment provides compelling grounds for a realistic attitude. A great many scientific examples are described in both parts of the book, which also includes lucid expositions of recent high energy physics and a remarkable chapter on the microscope in cell biology. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper argues that different epistemic styles exist in science, and that these make up an important unit of analysis for studying science. On occasion these different sets of commitments to ways of doing and knowing about the world may fall along national boundaries. The case presented here examines German and American embryology around 1900 and shows that differences in goals and approaches make up different epistemic styles.In particular, the Germans sought causal mechanical explanations of as many phenomena as (...) possible, guided by strong theories which achieved confirmation when they fit with as much of the available data as possible. The Americans, in contrast, sought definitive facts, as many as possible, which might be quite specific or narrowly based. These facts could lead to empirical generalizations which, in turn, could guide the generation of new knowledge in the form of new facts. Thus, the two epistemic styles emphasized different goals, processes of investigation, and standards of evidence. (shrink)

The ArgumentOver the years national styles have been invoked or denigrated in the writing of the history of science. This paper is an attempt to give the concept of national style a degree of precision and clarity enabling scholars to understand when and how it may be invoked and when and how its use would be dubious or even forbidden. The example of the United States of America is used because the history of the sciences in the United States was (...) often written loosely in terms supposedly conducive to national style analyses. We first discuss the problem of commonalities, factors widely present within all countries in the Western tradition, which, by definition, cannot be exclusive national attributes. Here the problem is to somehow determine whether the supposed national style attribute is a case of a significantly different degree of intensity than some presumed norm in the Western tradition.The principal thesis advanced is that pre-existing historiographic assumptions largely determine whether or not a scholar finds or does not find a national style. This is discussed in terms of some examples for the U.S. case. More particularly, a number of examples are discussed from the three principal genres or schools in current writing in the history of science: the knowledge-centered; the doing-science; and the context-oriented. Based on the analysis of the examples, an attempt is made to sketch an approach to a more rigorous use of the concept of national style. (shrink)

The story of this book of 'materials on Ludwik Fleck' is also the story of the reception of Ludwik Fleck. In this volume, some essential materials which have been produced by that reception have been gathered together.

At first glance there seem to be many similarities between Thomas S. Kuhn’s and Ludwik Fleck’s accounts of the development of scientific knowledge. Notably, both pay attention to the role played by the scientific community in the development of scientific knowledge. But putting first impressions aside, one can criticise some philosophers for being too hasty in their attempt to find supposed similarities in the works of the two men. Having acknowledged that Fleck anticipated some of Kuhn’s later theses, there seems (...) to be a temptation in more recent research to equate both theories in important respects. Because of this approach, one has to deal with the problem of comparing the most notable technical terms of both philosophers, namely ‘‘thought style’’ and ‘‘paradigm’’. This paper aims at a more thorough comparison between Ludwik Fleck’s concept of thought style and Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm. Although some philosophers suggest that these two concepts are essentially equal in content, a closer examination reveals that this is not the case. This thesis of inequality will be defended in detail, also taking into account some of the alleged similarities which may be responsible for losing sight of the differences between these theories. (shrink)

The continuing relevance of Ludwik Fleck’s work, above its status as a classic in science studies, lies in his reflexive conceptualisation of an open epistemology. As early as 1929, in the midst of a broad debate about a ‘crisis’ of science, Fleck offered a socio-historical analysis of the widely assumed crisis in form of an epistemology. He presented his argument, which was in itself an interrogation of the metaphysical foundations of science, as a reflexive and political intervention to this debate. (...) His book of 1935, Genesis and development of a scientific fact, in which he developed the notion of the thought collective, can be read in a similar vein as a functional analysis of science under National Socialism. His traumatic experiences during this period fostered his drive for science, democracy and epistemology. When he returned to the epistemological debate in 1946, he sharpened the presentation of his argument, presenting it rhetorically as an ironic political dialogue. This surprising text unfolds as an epistemological intervention by a participant observer. In this respect, Fleck’s epistemology, combining the historical analysis with reflexive intervention, is still a message in a bottle. (shrink)

Many decades after the publication of Genesis and development of a scientific fact, Fleck’s collective Denkstil remains a very important notion for analyzing the history of the biological and medical sciences. Following Fleck’s perspective this paper argues that the history of the sex hormones was critically shaped by our representation of the sexes, and our perceptions of the division of reproductive labor. Emerging at the boundary between physiological laboratories and consultation room, a molecular/endocrine style of thought stabilized during the early (...) decades of the twentieth century around the manipulation of sex hormones. This not only proved important in normalizing the sexual body, but also in defining sterility, menstrual disorders or menopause as pathological events to be treated ‘causally’.Analyzing the role played by industrial companies like the German firm Schering which produced these drugs, the paper suggests that the idea of a work style may be a convenient way to complement Fleck’s style of thought. First, the idea of work style is a reminder that science involves material action, which has strong links with industrial production. Second, it draws our attention to a deeply entrenched goal of the modern biosciences, the search for means to control the variability of the living, and standardize its uses. (shrink)

A scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs. These beliefs form the foundation of the "educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice". The nature of the "rigorous and rigid" preparation helps ensure that the received beliefs are firmly fixed in the student's mind. Scientists take great pains to defend the assumption that scientists know what the world is like...To this end, "normal science" will often suppress novelties which undermine its foundations. Research (...) is therefore not about discovering the unknown, but rather "a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education". (shrink)

The sociological dimension of science is studied using the discovery of the Wasserman reaction and its accidental application as a test for syphilis as a basis, ...

Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.

In the work of both Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn the scientific literature plays important roles for stability and change of scientific phenomenal worlds. In this article we shall introduce the analyses of scientific literature provided by Fleck and Kuhn, respectively. From this background we shall discuss the problem of how divergent thinking can emerge in a dogmatic atmosphere. We shall argue that in their accounts of the factors inducing changes of scientific phenomenal worlds Fleck and Kuhn offer substantially different (...) approaches, and we shall discuss in which respects their approaches may be compatible. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz soll versucht werden, die praktische Möglichkeit eines Verfahrens einer "externen" Sicht auf die Probleme der Wissenschaftstheorie zu demonstrieren. Da es sich um ein u. W. bisher unerprobtes Verfahren handelt, könnte es nur durch eine konkret ausgewiesene reductio ad absurdum eliminiert werden. Um jedoch den Anschein eines naiven Instrumentalismus zu vermeiden, seien zwei erläuternde Bemerkungen vorangeschickt. Es ist anzunehmen, daß die drei gesonderten Fachrichtungen bemüht sind, jenseits ihrer Grenzen von einem fachlich nicht spezialisierten Publikum rezipiert oder zumindest begriffen (...) zu werden. Das heißt, jede einzelne wendet sich an den allgemeingebildeten Leser, ohne sich bewußt zu sein, daß die beiden anderen das gleiche Ziel verfolgen. Dies impliziert die Möglichkeit, den unreflektierten Anspruch auf Gemeinverständlichkeit zu hinterfragen. Dementsprechend läßt sich vermuten, daß die wachsende Verschwommenheit des Gegenstandes der Wissenschaftsforschung die Kehrseite der erstrebten Gemeinverständlichkeit ist. Ein äußerliches Merkmal unseres Verfahrens manifestiert sich in der vielfachen Verwendung des der Alltagssprache entlehnten Wortes "Vokabular". Darin äußert sich lediglich ein sprachlicher Kunstgriff, um eine langwierige sprachanalytische Auseinandersetzung zu vermeiden. Worauf es ankommt, ist allein die Feststellung, daß den untersuchten Vokabularen strukturelle Regelmäßigkeiten anhaften, die innerhalb der konventionellen Wissenschaftsforschung nicht erklärt werden könne. Ähnlich ist auch die statistische Darstellungsweise nur ein vorläufiges Hilfsmittel zur Veranschaulichung dieser Beobachtungen: ein Gerüst, das, im Sinne Wittgensteins , nach dem Gebrauch nicht mehr benötigt wird. (shrink)

Many decades after the publication of Genesis and development of a scientific fact, Fleck’s collective Denkstil remains a very important notion for analyzing the history of the biological and medical sciences. Following Fleck’s perspective this paper argues that the history of the sex hormones was critically shaped by our representation of the sexes, and our perceptions of the division of reproductive labor. Emerging at the boundary between physiological laboratories and consultation room, a molecular/endocrine style of thought stabilized during the early (...) decades of the twentieth century around the manipulation of sex hormones. This not only proved important in normalizing the sexual body, but also in defining sterility, menstrual disorders or menopause as pathological events to be treated ‘causally’. Analyzing the role played by industrial companies like the German firm Schering which produced these drugs, the paper suggests that the idea of a work style may be a convenient way to complement Fleck’s style of thought. First, the idea of work style is a reminder that science involves material action, which has strong links with industrial production. Second, it draws our attention to a deeply entrenched goal of the modern biosciences, the search for means to control the variability of the living, and standardize its uses. (shrink)