Cognitive theories of metaphor understanding are typically described in terms of the mappings between different kinds of abstract, schematic, disembodied knowledge. My claim in this paper is that part of our ability to make sense of metaphorical language, both individual utterances and extended narratives, resides in the automatic construction of a simulation whereby we imagine performing the bodily actions referred to in the language. Thus, understanding metaphorical expressions like ‘grasp a concept’ or ‘get over’ an emotion involve simulating what it (...) must be like to engage in these specific activities, even though these actions are, strictly speaking, impossible to physically perform. This process of building a simulation, one that is fundamentally embodied in being constrained by past and present bodily experiences, has specific consequences for how verbal metaphors are understood, and how cognitive scientists, more generally, characterize the nature of metaphorical language and thought. (shrink)

Cognitive theories of metaphor understanding are typically described in terms of the mappings between different kinds of abstract, schematic, disembodied knowledge. My claim in this paper is that part of our ability to make sense of metaphorical language, both individual utterances and extended narratives, resides in the automatic construction of a simulation whereby we imagine performing the bodily actions referred to in the language. Thus, understanding metaphorical expressions like ‘grasp a concept’ or ‘get over’ an emotion involve simulating what it (...) must be like to engage in these specific activities, even though these actions are, strictly speaking, impossible to physically perform. This process of building a simulation, one that is fundamentally embodied in being constrained by past and present bodily experiences, has specific consequences for how verbal metaphors are understood, and how cognitive scientists, more generally, characterize the nature of metaphorical language and thought. (shrink)

Cognitive theories of metaphor understanding are typically described in terms of the mappings between different kinds of abstract, schematic, disembodied knowledge. My claim in this paper is that part of our ability to make sense of metaphorical language, both individual utterances and extended narratives, resides in the automatic construction of a simulation whereby we imagine performing the bodily actions referred to in the language. Thus, understanding metaphorical expressions like ‘grasp a concept’ or ‘get over’ an emotion involve simulating what it (...) must be like to engage in these specific activities, even though these actions are, strictly speaking, impossible to physically perform. This process of building a simulation, one that is fundamentally embodied in being constrained by past and present bodily experiences, has specific consequences for how verbal metaphors are understood, and how cognitive scientists, more generally, characterize the nature of metaphorical language and thought. (shrink)

This article identifies the structural and conceptual aspects of a visual construction often used in advertisements to establish a metaphoric or associative relation, that is, symmetric object alignment (SOA). It offers an account of the formal ingredients of SOA, which fall into two groups: object-constitutive factors (like size, shape, and color) and object-depictment factors (like perspective, orientation, and distance from viewing point). Both factors allow us to treat SOA as a visual rhetorical scheme. We also discuss how SOA relates to (...) conceptual structure, metaphoric or otherwise. Four types of relations are distinguished, based on the way in which perceptual and conceptual characteristics interact. Finally, we discuss the way in which these characteristics relate to the processing of such visual messages. One depictment factor will be focused on in particular: one-to-one versus one-to-many alignments. An attempt is made to connect these 2 patterns to the much-discussed topic in verbal metaphor theory, object comparison versus categorization. (shrink)

Conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002) is re-examined in the light of recent criticisms (e.g., Gibbs, 2000, 2001). It is argued that the assumption of four independent "cognitive spaces" enters the model primarily as an entailment of the "space," "blending," and "construction" metaphors, leads to unnecessary ambiguity, and works against statement of the theory in a form that supports derivation of testable hypotheses. Several examples from Fauconnier and Turner (2002) are analyzed to show that they can be interpreted (...) more simply, without need of four separate "spaces." Suggestions are made for reformulating conceptual integration theory without the problematic metaphors. (shrink)

Researchers have identified 2 distinctive types of pictorial displays, namely, pictorial metaphor and pictorial simile, and offered theoretical explanations of them. Regarding the distinction between pictorial metaphor and pictorial simile, we argue that symmetric image alignment of pictorial components depicting things at the object level is the principal design factor that sets pictorial simile apart from pictorial metaphor and links pictorial simile to pictorial grouping. Based on the idea of symmetric image alignment, an attempt is made to identify and explain (...) a further type of pictorial display, namely, pictorial oxymoron. We propose a hypothesis, called the "image grouping hypothesis," to provide an integrated account of pictorial grouping, pictorial simile, and pictorial oxymoron. The hypothesis can be summed up as follows: Symmetric image alignment of pictorial components depicting things of the same kind is apt for expressing pictorial grouping; symmetric image alignment of pictorial components depicting things of different kinds is apt for expressing pictorial simile; and symmetric image alignment of pictorial components depicting things that can be seen as incompatible with each other is apt for expressing pictorial oxymoron. (shrink)