Epistemology, as generally understood by philosophers of science, is rather remote from the history of science and from historical concerns in general. Rheinberger shows that, from the late nineteenth through the late twentieth century, a parallel, alternative discourse sought to come to terms with the rather fundamental experience of the thoroughgoing scientific changes brought on by the revolution in physics. Philosophers of science and historians of science alike contributed their share to what this essay describes as an ongoing quest to (...) historicize epistemology. Historical epistemology, in this sense, is not so concerned with the knowing subject and its mental capacities. Rather, it envisages science as an ongoing cultural endeavor and tries to assess the conditions under which the sciences in all their diversity take shape and change over time. (shrink)

We provide an overview of three ways in which the expression “Historical epistemology” (HE) is often understood: (1) HE as a study of the history of higher-order epistemic concepts such as objectivity, observation, experimentation, or probability; (2) HE as a study of the historical trajectories of the objects of research, such as the electron, DNA, or phlogiston; (3) HE as the long-term study of scientific developments. After laying out various ways in which these agendas touch on current debates within both (...) epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g., skepticism, realism, rationality of scientific change), we conclude by highlighting three topics as especially worthy of further philosophical investigation. The first concerns the methods, aims and systematic ambitions of the history of epistemology. The second concerns the ways in versions of HE can be connected to versions of naturalized and social epistemologies. The third concerns the philosophy of history, and in particular the level of analysis at which a historical analysis should aim. (shrink)

From 1827 to 1831 the German historian Leopold von Ranke travelled through Germany, Austria, and Italy, hunting for documents and archives. During this journey Ranke developed a new model for historical research that transformed the archive into the most important site for the production of historical knowledge. Within the archive, Ranke claimed, the trained historian could forget his personal predispositions and political loyalties, and write objective history. This essay critically examines Ranke's model for historical research through a study of the (...) obstacles, frustrations, and joys that he encountered on his journey. It shows how Ranke's archival experiences inspired him to re-evaluate his own identity as a historian and as a human being, and investigates some of the affiliations between his model for historical research and the political realities of Prince Metternich's European order. Finally, the essay compares Ranke's historical discipline to other nineteenth-century disciplines, such as anthropology and archaeology. (shrink)

From the late-fifteenth century onwards, scholars across Europe began to write books about how to read and evaluate histories. These pioneering works - which often take surprisingly modern-sounding positions - grew from complex early modern debates about law, religion, and classical scholarship. In this book, based on the Trevelyan Lectures of 2005, Anthony Grafton explains why so many of these works were written, why they attained so much insight - and why, in the centuries that followed, most scholars gradually forgot (...) that they had existed. Elegant and accessible, What Was History? is a deliberate evocation of E. H. Carr’s celebrated and icononclastic Trevelyan Lectures on What Is History?, and will appeal to a broad readership of students, scholars and historical enthusiasts. Anthony Grafton is one of the most celebrated historians writing in English today, and What Was History? is a powerful and imaginative exploration of some central themes in the history of European ideas. (shrink)

Philosophers of history in the past few decades have been predominantly interested in issues of explanation and narrative discourse. Consequently, they have focused consistently and almost exclusively on the historian’s output, thereby ignoring that historical scholarship is a practice of reading, thinking, discussing, and writing, in which successful performance requires active cultivation of certain skills, attitudes, and virtues. This paper, then, suggests a new agenda for philosophy of history. Inspired by a “performative turn” in the history and philosophy of science, (...) it focuses on the historian’s “doings” and proposes to analyze these performances in terms of epistemic virtue. It argues that historical scholarship is embedded in “practices” or “epistemic cultures,” in which knowledge is created and warranted by means of such virtues as honesty, carefulness, accuracy, and balance. These epistemic virtues, however, are not etched in stone: historians may highlight some of them, exchange one for another, or reinterpret their meaning. On the one hand, this suggests a rich area of research for historians of historiography. To what extent can consensus, conflict, continuity, and change in historical scholarship be explained in terms of epistemic virtue? On the other hand, the proposal outlined in this article raises a couple of philosophical questions. For example, on what grounds can historians choose among epistemic virtues? And what concept of the self comes with the notion of virtue? In addressing these questions, philosophy of history may expand its current scope so as to encompass not only “writings” but also “doings,” that is, the virtuous performances historians recognize as professional conduct. (shrink)

Philosophy of history before the nineteenth century was based on the classical theory of history. That theory, in justifying the purpose of historical studies, maintained that history was a storehouse of good and bad examples; was of particular use in educating statesmen, since it provided them with vicarious experience; and was a more compelling moral guide than the abstractions of philosophy. The unquestioned authority of Polybius and other ancient historians, as well as. of the definitions of history by Pseudo-Dionysius and (...) Cicero , perpetuated the exemplar theory. The rise of professional, academic historical study rendered it irrelevant; Bolingbroke was its last notable exponent. (shrink)

The object of this essay is to discuss two problems and to present solutions to them, which do not quite agree with what is generally said of them. The first problem concerns the history of methods for reaching firm historical knowledge. In three methodological manuals for historians, written by J. G. Droysen, E. Bernheim, and C.-V. Langlois and C. Seignobos and first published in the late nineteenth century, the task of the historian was said to be how to obtain firm (...) knowledge about history. The question is how this message should be understood. The second problem concerns the differences between the three manuals. If their common goal is firm historical knowledge, are there any major differences of opinion? The answer given in this article is yes, and the ground is sought in their theories of truth. (shrink)

Shapiro traces the genesis of the fact, a modern concept that originated not in natural science but in legal discourse. She follows the concept's evolution and diffusion across a variety of disciplines in early modern England.

Our oldest archival records originate from the Near East. Systems of archival record-keeping developed over several millennia in Mesopotamia before spreading to Egypt, the Mycenean world, and the Persian empire, and continuing through the Hellenistic and Seleucid periods. Yet we know little about the way archival practices were established, transmitted, modified, and adapted by other civilizations. This interdisciplinary volume offers a systematic approach to archival documents and to the societies which created them, addressing questions of formal aspects of creating, writing, (...) and storing ancient documents, and showing how archival systems were copied and adapted across a wide geographical area and an extensive period of time. (shrink)

This article provides an account of the Enlightenment dispute over hermeneutical skepticism with particular reference to the idea of hermeneutical probability in the philosophical work of Christian August Crusius. The essay sheds new light on the hermeneutical issues addressed in the philosophical school of the so-called Thomasians based mainly in Leipzig in the first half of the eighteenth century. The paper deals with Crusius’ wide-ranging efforts to cope with the uncertain character of most parts of human knowledge and his attempts (...) to construct a workable theory of hermeneutical probability. This raises points of central interest relating to probabilism in the methodology of textual interpretation and connects Crusius to contemporary discussions of hermeneutical skepticism. (shrink)

The German tradition of Historik is reflection on what historians do: on the writing of history, on historical research, on historiography. Four different traditions of Historik can be discerned by evaluating lectures on Historik between 1750 and 1900: the humanistic-rhetorical, the scientificauxiliary, the historico-philosophical, and the epistemological. Historik was pursued by many scholars as an integral part of their academic endeavor, and it serves didactic-preparatory purposes. Historik contributes to the systematization of historical knowledge; the specialization into distinct research methods and (...) areas of work; the systematic foundation of the autonomy and function of historical studies in relation to other sciences and to the practical context of historians and their audiences; and the historical safeguarding of standards arrived at in the development of science. (shrink)

Leopold von Ranke galt im vergangenen Jahrhundert als einer der bedeutendsten Historiker. Sein 54 Bände umfassendes Opus magnum sowie die von ihm initiierte Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie wurden bei Duncker & Humblot verlegt.Heute gleicht er einem ziemlich »ramponierten Requisit«, das von Treitschke bis Wehler schon zuviele Historiker zur Selbstinszenierung ihrer Schulen mitbenutzten - ohne sich weiter für Ranke zu interessieren. Die deutsche kritische Geschichtswissenschaft erreichte endlich, daß dieser außergewöhnliche Historiker darüber nahezu vergessen wurde - allen Arbeiten etwa von Fuchs, Iggers, Schulin (...) oder Vierhaus zum Trotze.Rückkehrend zu ersten Quellen versucht der Autor in der vorliegenden Forschungsarbeit vor allem darzustellen, was Rankes Historie im Innersten zusammenhält. Allgemein heißt solches »Historik« - dem Begründungsversuch einer »wissenschaftlichen Historik« ist zunächst ein eigenes Kapitel gewidmet: Kaum zu vermeiden war, daß dasselbe auch eine »Kritik neuerer Geschichtsschreiber« wurde. Daß Rankes - nach einer glücklichen Formulierung Muhlacks - »implizite« Historik für die kommende Geschichtswissenschaft so vergessen wie lehrreich ist, sollten die folgenden Kapitel erweisen. Allerdings zeigte sich soviel Neues, daß im Rahmen einer Dissertation unmöglich der ganze Ranke und dessen gesamte Historik erfaßt werden konnte: So kommen nur Rankes Anfänge, seine außerordentliche Geschichtsforschung und Geschichtsschreibung in den Blick: Jung-Rankes Verhältnis zur klassischen Philologie, zur Historie, zur Philosophie, seine ungehörige Portion Zeit-, Kultur- und Wissenschafts-Kritik, sein paradigmatischer Historiker-Streit mit Leo und seine noch Rankes Nach-Ruf belastenden historisch-politischen Verstrickungen - all dies wird erstmals im Zusammenhang wieder entdeckt.Endpunkt ist Rankes Berufung zum ordentlichen Geschichts-Professor 1834 - bis dahin hatte Ranke wider Willen eine der ungewöhnlichsten Historiker-Karrieren zurückgelegt, die ihn oft an den Rand existienzieller Krisen führte: Ranke hatte Neu-Land betreten, und wie er »verzweifelt« und »mutig« seine Wege bahnte, wurde exemplarisch für die mit und durch ihn entstehende moderne Geschichtswissenschaft.Ziel der »Historik des jungen Ranke« ist es, dem noch kaum erforschten Lehr-Pfad nachzugehen, den Ranke künftigen Historikern vorgegangen ist - denn Ranke ist einer der Vor-Gänger zu einer wirklich wissenschaftlichen Historie. (shrink)