A phenomenon “emerges” when a concept is instantiated for the first time: hence emergence is relative to a set of concepts. Propositional thought and language emerge together. It is proposed that the degree of complexity of an object language relative to a given metalanguage can be gauged by the number of ways it can be translated into that metalanguage: in analogy with other forms of measurement, the more ways the object language can be translated into the metalanguage, the less powerful (...) the conceptual resources of the object language. (shrink)

Davidson claims that a creature that has spent its entire life in isolation cannot have thoughts. His two reasons for this claim are that interaction with another creature is required to locate the cause of the creature's responses, and that linguistic communication is necessary to acquire the concept of objective truth, which is itself required in order to have thoughts. I argue that, at best, these two reasons imply that in order to have thoughts a creature must be capable of (...) participating in triangulation, not that it must have already participated in triangulation. I then argue that triangulation doesn't solve the ambiguity problem; that is, it doesn't entail that a being's thoughts and utterances are about distal objects rather than proximal patterns of stimulation. Fortunately, ambiguity, like other forms of indeterminacy, doesn't entail that we cannot have thoughts. /// Davidson afirma que una criatura que ha pasado su vida entera aislada no puede tener pensamientos. Aduce dos razones para esto: que se requiere la interacción con otra criatura para localizar la causa de las respuestas de la criatura, y que la comunicación lingüística es necesaria para adquirir el concepto de verdad objetiva, que a su vez es necesario para tener pensamientos. Argumento que, en el mejor de los casos, estas dos razones implican que para tener pensamientos una criatura debe ser capaz de participar en una triangulacion, no que ya debe haber participado en ella. Arguyo, además, que la triangulación no resuelve el problema de la ambigüedad, esto es, no implica que lo que un ser piensa y dice sea acerca de objetos distantes, más que de patrones de estimulacion próximos. Por fortuna, la ambigiiedad, como otras formas de indeterminación, no implica que no podamos tener pensamientos. (shrink)

In this original and provocative account of the evolutionary origins of human communication, Michael Tomasello connects the fundamentally cooperative structure of human communication (initially discovered by Paul Grice) to the especially ...

Examines further the criteria for attributing thought to an object or creature by illuminating the relation between thought, language, and world on the one hand, and the sort of structure that thought and language require on the other. Examines the implications the Unified Theory has with regards to this relation, and challenges the widespread belief that we will not really understand the intentional attitudes, conceptualization, or language until we can give a purely extensional, physicalist account of them.

Since Descartes, epistemology has been based on first person knowledge. We must begin, according to the usual story, with what is most certain: knowledge of our own sensations and thoughts. In one way or another we then progress, if we can, to knowledge of an objective external world. There is then the final, tenuous, step to knowledge of other minds. I shall argue for a total revision of this picture. All propositional thought, whether positive or skeptical, whether of the inner (...) or of the outer, requires possession of the concept of objective truth, and this concept is accessible only to those creatures that are in communication with others. Knowledge of other minds is thus basic to all thought. But such knowledge requires and assumes knowledge of a shared world of objects in a common time and space. Thus the acquisition of knowledge is not based on a progression from the subjective to the objective; it emerges holistically, and is interpersonalfrom the start. (shrink)

Tim Crane University College London 1. Introduction P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of (...) the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in groups on the vivid green grass…’ (1979: 97). In other words, in describing experience, we tend to describe the objects of experience – the things which we experience – and the ways they are when we are experiencing them. (shrink)

Suppose you are stranded on an island and you want to get over to the nearby mainland. Your only option is to swim. But is the other shore close enough? If you embark and it isn’t, you drown. So you prefer to know before taking off. Happily, you are well equipped. You have not only a yardstick, but also a theodolite for measuring angles, and a good knowledge of trigonometry. You then determine the distance to the other shore by means (...) of triangulation. You fix two points, A and B, on your own shore, and identify a third point, C, in sight on the opposite shore. You then measure the distance between A and B with your yardstick, and the two angles ABC and CAB with your theodolite. With this information you can calculate the distances AC and BC to the other shore. (shrink)

from Donald Davidson: Problems of Rationality, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 231-266.

Because human cognition is creative and socially situated, knowledge accumulates, diffuses, and gets applied in new contexts, generating cultural analogs of phenomena observed in population genetics such as adaptation and drift. It is therefore commonly thought that elements of culture evolve through natural selection. However, natural selection was proposed to explain how change accumulates despite lack of inheritance of acquired traits, as occurs with template-mediated replication. It cannot accommodate a process with significant retention of acquired or horizontally (e.g. socially) transmitted (...) traits. Moreover, elements of culture cannot be treated as discrete lineages because they constantly interact and influence one another. It is proposed that what evolves through culture is the mind; ideas and artifacts are merely reflections of its current evolved state. Interacting minds transform (in part) through through a non-Darwinian autopoietic process similar to that by which early life evolved, involving not survival of the fittest but actualization of their potential. (shrink)