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  1. (1 other version)Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An Agenda for Reform.Marc A. Rodwin - 2012 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 40 (3):511-522.
    Why do physicians have financial conflicts of interest? They arise because society expects physicians to act in their patients’ interest, while simultaneously, financial incentives encourage physicians to practice medicine in ways that promote their own interests or those of third parties. Because physicians’ clinical choices, referrals, and prescriptions affect the fortune of third parties (providers, medical facilities, insurers, drug firms and suppliers of ancillary services), these third parties may offer physicians financial incentives to make income-driven clinical choices. In the past, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Understanding Pharmaceutical Research Manipulation in the Context of Accounting Manipulation.Abigail Brown - 2013 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 41 (3):611-619.
    The problem of the manipulation of data that arises when there is both opportunity and incentive to mislead is better accepted and studied — though by no means solved — in financial accounting than in medicine. This article analyzes pharmaceutical company manipulation of medical research as part of a broader problem of corporate manipulation of data in the creation of accounting profits. The article explores how our understanding of accounting fraud and misinformation helps us understand the risk of similar information (...)
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  • (1 other version)Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets: Addressing the Misalignment of Financial Incentives and Public Health.Marc-André Gagnon - 2013 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 41 (3):571-580.
    This paper explains how the current architecture of the pharmaceutical markets has created a misalignment of financial incentives and public health that is a central cause of harmful practices. It explores three possible solutions to address that misalignment: taxes, increased financial penalties, and drug pricing based on value. Each proposal could help to partly realign financial incentives and public health. However, because of the limits of each proposal, there is no easy solution to fixing the problem of financial incentives.
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  • The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
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  • (1 other version)Five Un-Easy Pieces of Pharmaceutical Policy Reform.Marc A. Rodwin - 2013 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 41 (3):581-589.
    The federal government indirectly subsidizes the pharmaceutical industry by funding basic research, various tax credits and deductions, patent rules, grants of market exclusivity, and other means, in order to spur drug development, promote public health, and improve medical care. But today, the pharmaceutical industry often neglects these goals and sometimes even undermines them, due to what Lawrence Lessig refers to as institutional corruption — that is, widespread or systemic practices, usually legal, that undermine an institution’s objectives or integrity. A key (...)
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  • (1 other version)Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets: Addressing the Misalignment of Financial Incentives and Public Health.Marc-André Gagnon - 2013 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 41 (3):571-580.
    This article argues that the misalignment of private profit-maximizing objectives with public health needs causes institutional corruption in the pharmaceutical sector and systematically leads firms to act contrary to public heath. The article analyzes how financial incentives generate a business model promoting harmful practices and explores several means of realigning financial incentives in order to foster therapeutic innovation and promote the rational use of medicines.
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  • Clinical Trials and Drug Promotion.Jon Jureidini, Leemon McHenry & Peter Mansfield - 2008 - International Journal of Risk and Safety in Medicine 20:73-81.
    Selective reporting is prevalent in the medical literature, particularly in industry-sponsored research. In this paper, we expose selective reporting that is not evident without access to internal company documents. The published report of study 329 of paroxetine in adolescents sponsored by GlaxoSmithKline claims that “paroxetine is generally well tolerated and effective for major depression in adolescents”. By contrast, documents obtained during litigation reveal that study 329 was negative for efficacy on all 8 protocol specified outcomes and positive for harm.
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  • (1 other version)Five Un‐Easy Pieces of Pharmaceutical Policy Reform.Marc A. Rodwin - 2013 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 41 (3):581-589.
    Improper dependencies slant policy over a drug's life span, biasing the development of new drugs, the testing and marketing approval for new drugs, and the monitoring of patient safety after drugs are marketed. This article examines five ways in which the public improperly depends on pharmaceutical firms that compromise the integrity of pharmaceutical policy. Today the public relies on pharmaceutical firms: (1) to set priorities on drug research and development; (2) to conduct clinical trials to test whether drugs are safe (...)
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  • (1 other version)Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An Agenda for Reform.Marc A. Rodwin - 2012 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 40 (3):511-522.
    Why do physicians have financial conflicts of interest? They arise because society expects physicians to act in their patients’ interest, while simultaneously, financial incentives encourage physicians to practice medicine in ways that promote their own interests or those of third parties. Because physicians’ clinical choices, referrals, and prescriptions affect the fortune of third parties, these third parties may offer physicians financial incentives to make income-driven clinical choices. In the past, physicians and scholars typically conceived of conflicts of interest as an (...)
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  • (1 other version)Understanding Pharmaceutical Research Manipulation in the Context of Accounting Manipulation.Abigail Brown - 2013 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 41 (3):611-619.
    Good decision-making requires reliable information. In medicine, relevant information comes from clinical trials and other forms of scientific research. In business, one source is in corporate annual financial statements. As for-profit, publicly traded companies whose business is discovering, manufacturing, and marketing drugs, pharmaceutical companies sit at the nexus of these two fields. Determining the safety and efficacy of a pharmaceutical product and determining the profitability of a complex enterprise are similarly difficult tasks: each is fraught with deeply ambiguous information that (...)
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