- (3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):109-111.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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(1 other version)Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by John Hawthorne.details
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Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright.Annalisa Coliva (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The role of disagreement in semantic theory.Carl Baker - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-18.details
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Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism.Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2008 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 207.details
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Richard on truth and commitment. [REVIEW]John MacFarlane - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):445 - 453.details
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Faultless Disagreement.Max Kolbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Truth and correct belief.Allan Gibbard - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.details
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Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):516-535.details
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Relative Correctness.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373.details
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Three Kinds of Relativism.Paul Boghossian - 2010 - In Steven D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 53–69.details
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Varieties of disagreement and predicates of taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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(1 other version)Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.details
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On being in a quandary. Relativism vagueness logical revisionism.Crispin Wright - 2001 - Mind 110 (1):45--98.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]David Jehle - 2006 - Studia Logica 84 (1):161-165.details
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The value of minimalist truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1103-1125.details
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Institutionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command.Stewart Shapiro & William W. Taschek - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):74.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Assessment–Sensitivity.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):516-527.details
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Talking with Vultures.Filippo Ferrari & Crispin Wright - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):911-936.details
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Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb.Crispin Wright - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael Patrick Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 38--60.details
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Reply to MacFarlane, Scharp, Shapiro, and Wright. [REVIEW]Mark Richard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):477-495.details
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