To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...) door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information. (shrink)

This article addresses the recent reception of Franz Brentano's writings on consciousness. I am particularly interested in the connection established between Brentano's theory of consciousness and higher-order theories of consciousness and, more specifically, the theory proposed by David Rosenthal. My working hypothesis is that despite the many similarities that can be established with Rosenthal's philosophy of mind, Brentano's theory of consciousness differs in many respects from higher-order theories of consciousness and avoids most of the criticisms generally directed to them. This (...) article is divided into eight parts. The first two sections expound the basic outline of Rosenthal's theory, and the third summarizes the principal objections that Rosenthal addresses to Brentano, which I, then, examine in sections 4 and 5. In sections 6 and 7, I discuss Brentano's principle of the unity of consciousness, and in section 8, I consider the scope of the changes that Brentano brings to his theory of consciousness in his later writings, which follow the 1874 publication of Psychology. I then draw the conclusion that Brentano's theory rests on a view of intransitive and intrinsic self-consciousness. (shrink)

in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.

Although the “Transcendental Aesthetic” is the briefest part of the first Critique, it has garnered a lion's share of discussion. This fact reflects the important implications that Kant drew from his arguments there. He used the arguments concerning space and time to display examples of synthetic a priori cognition, to secure his division between intuitions and concepts, and to support transcendental idealism. Earlier, in the years around 1770, Kant's investigations into space and time had facilitated his turn toward “critical” philosophy. (...) Prior to that time, Kant's main interests in space and time pertained to physics and metaphysics. As he entered the critical period, he delved into the cognitive basis of our experience of space (and time), and drew his conclusions about their ideality. Kant's doctrines of space and time provoked extensive response in his own time and throughout the nineteenth century. These responses variously concerned the metaphysics, physics, epistemology, psychology, and geometry of space. Throughout the nineteenth century, philosophers, physiologists, and psychologists sought to extend or to refute Kant's theories of space. By the last decades of the nineteenth century, many had rightly concluded that the existence of non-Euclidean geometry as a candidate description of physical space refuted Kant's full doctrine of space - though some have hoped that his position might be saved by restricting it to “visual space.”. (shrink)

For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis (...) - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano. (shrink)

Il s'agit d'une version courte, en portugais, de mon étude "Deux thèses de Brentano sur la conscience". Je propose une relecture des textes principaux de Franz Brentano sur la conscience. Mon point de départ est la formulation de deux thèses sur la conscience que Brentano avance au tout début du deuxième chapitre du deuxième livre de sa Psychologie et qui constituent le fondement de sa théorie des objets primaires et des objets secondaires. Mon hypothèse de travail s’appuie sur le principe (...) de l’unité de la conscience qui représente la clé à la plupart des problèmes que l’on associe généralement à la théorie de la conscience de Brentano. J’examine trois de ces problèmes dans la deuxième partie de cette étude, à savoir les problèmes de la duplication, de la régression et de la complexité. Dans la dernière partie de cette étude, je propose une analyse du principe de l’unité de la conscience qui tient compte des écrits de Brentano après la publication de sa Psychologie en 1874 et j’évalue, en conclusion, la portée des changements que Brentano apporte à sa théorie de la conscience dans ses écrits publiés à titre posthume. (shrink)

Cette étude a pour double objectif de retracer quelques éléments cartésiens dans la philosophie de Brentano et d'évaluer sa théorie de la conscience à la lumière des débats actuels dans la philosophie de l'esprit contemporaine. Les deux premières parties de cette étude évaluent la dette de Brentano à l'endroit de la philosophie de Descartes. Dans la première, je montre que Descartes est associé à plusieurs principes fondamentaux de la psychologie de Brentano, tandis que dans la deuxième, je propose une interprétation (...) de l'inexistence intentionnelle de Brentano à l'aide de la distinction cartésienne entre ens formale et ens objectivum. La troisième partie est un commentaire critique de l'évaluation par D. Rosenthal de la théorie de la conscience de Brentano dans sa Psychologie. Je m'intéresse plus particulièrement à la distinction que fait Rosenthal entre une conception aristotélicienne et une conception cartésienne de la conscience et me demande sous laquelle de ces deux catégories se range la théorie de Brentano. Dans la dernière partie, j'évalue la portée de quelques-unes des modifications importantes que Brentano fait subir à sa psychologie et à sa théorie de la conscience dans ses derniers travaux et j'avance l'hypothèse que ses positions sur la substance pensante et la conscience de soi le rapprochent encore davantage de Descartes. (shrink)

My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences.