- (1 other version)A representational account of olfactory experience.Clare Batty - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):511-538.details
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What the Nose Doesn't Know: Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience.Clare Batty - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):10-17.details
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Attention and mental paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.details
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There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
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The representational theory of consciousness.David Bourget - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Knowledge-how: A unified account.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 136-160.details
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Judging and the scope of mental agency.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-71.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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Centered worlds and the content of perception: Short version.Berit Brogaard - 1972 - In David Sosa (ed.), Philosophical Books (Analytic Philosophy). Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.details
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A dilemma for higher-order theories of consciousness.Isabel Gois - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):143-156.details
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Why experience told me nothing about transparency.Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):116-136.details
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Illusions of Affection: A Hyper-Illusory Account of Normative Valence.Mihailis Diamantis - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (5-6):6-29.details
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On the brain and emotion.Edmund T. Rolls - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):219-228.details
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Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'.Pessi Lyyra - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.details
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On the correct treatment of inverted earth.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):294-311.details
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Color, Externalism, and Switch Cases.David Bain - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):335-362.details
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Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
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Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts.Macdonald Cynthia - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):503-524.details
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The mind-body problem: An overview.Kirk Ludwig - 2003 - In Stephen Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1-46.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content.Michael Tye - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.details
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Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.details
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The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.details
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Intentionalism and change blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.details
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Are our concepts CONSCIOUS STATE and CONSCIOUS CREATURE vague?Michael V. Antony - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.details
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Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality.John J. Drummond - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.details
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Sensory qualities, sensible qualities, sensational qualities.Alex Byrne - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain and its integration with third-person methodologies: The experiential-phenomenological approach.Murat Aydede & Donald D. Price - 2005 - In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. pp. 243--273.details
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Chalmers on consciousness and quantum mechanics.Alex Byrne & Ned Hall - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):370-90.details
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Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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Consciousness, intentionality, and intelligence: Some foundational issues for artificial intelligence.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2000 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3):263-277.details
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Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Colour, philosophical perspectives.Adam Pautz - 2009 - In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 144-149.details
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Phenomenal consciousness and the allocentric-egocentric interface.Pete Mandik - 2005 - Endophysics.details
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Qualia, space, and control.Pete Mandik - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality: Transparent, translucent, and opaque.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.details
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Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.details
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Qualia.Michael Tye - 1997 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Distinguishing the senses.Michael Scott - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.details
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Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness and representationalism.Benj Hellie - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.details
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(1 other version)Representationalism about consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 261-276.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A decade of teleofunctionalism: Lycan's consciousness and consciousness and experience. [REVIEW]Thomas W. Polger & Owen J. Flanagan - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):113-126.details
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(1 other version)The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Synthese 134 (3):477-504.details
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Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist.Pete Mandik - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.details
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Precis of "Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory".Peter Carruthers - 2001 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 2 (1).details
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Conscious perceptual experience as representational self-prompting.John Dilworth - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.details
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