Human behavior is the joint product of (i) contingencies of survival responsible for natural selection, and (ii) contingencies of reinforcement responsible for the repertoires of individuals, including (iii) the special contingencies maintained by an evolved social environment. Selection by consequences is a causal mode found only in living things, or in machines made by living things. It was first recognized in natural selection: Reproduction, a first consequence, led to the evolution of cells, organs, and organisms reproducing themselves under increasingly diverse (...) conditions. The behavior functioned well, however, only under conditions similar to those under which it was selected.Reproduction under a wider range of consequences became possible with the evolution of processes through which organisms acquired behavior appropriate to novel environments. One of these, operant conditioning, is a second kind of selection by consequences: New responses could be strengthened by events which followed them. When the selecting consequences are the same, operant conditioning and natural selection work together redundantly. But because a species which quickly acquires behavior appropriate to an environment has less need for an innate repertoire, operant conditioning could replace as well as supplement the natural selection of behavior.Social behavior is within easy range of natural selection, because other members are one of the most stable features of the environment of a species. The human species presumably became more social when its vocal musculature came under operant control. Verbal behavior greatly increased the importance of a third kind of selection by consequences, the evolution of social environments or cultures. The effect on the group, and not the reinforcing consequences for individual members, is responsible for the evolution of culture. (shrink)

Experiences of emotion are content-rich events that emerge at the level of psychological description, but must be causally constituted by neurobiological processes. This chapter outlines an emerging scientific agenda for understanding what these experiences feel like and how they arise. We review the available answers to what is felt (i.e., the content that makes up an experience of emotion) and how neurobiological processes instantiate these properties of experience. These answers are then integrated into a broad framework that describes, in psychological (...) terms, how the experience of emotion emerges from more basic processes. We then discuss the role of such experiences in the economy of the mind and behavior. (shrink)

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories (...) are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories. (shrink)

What produces emotions? Why do we have emotions? How do we have emotions? Why do emotional states feel like something? This book considers these questions, going beyond examining brain mechanisms of emotion, by proposing a theory of what emotions are, and an evolutionary, Darwinian, theory of the adaptive value of emotion.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword xi Steven Pinker Acknowledgments xvii Contributors xix Introduction: The Emergence of Evolutionary Psychology xxiii David M. Buss PART I FOUNDATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY David M. Buss 1 Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology 5 John Tooby and Leda Cosmides 2 Life History Theory and Evolutionary Psychology 68 Hillard S. Kaplan and Steven W. Gangestad 3 Domain Specificity and Intuitive Ontology 96 Pascal Boyer and H. Clark Barrett 4 Methods of Evolutionary Sciences 119 Jeffry A. Simpson and Lorne (...) Campbell 5 Controversial Issues in Evolutionary Psychology 145 Edward H. Hagen PART II SURVIVAL David M. Buss 6 Locating Places 177 Irwin Silverman and Jean Choi 7 Adaptations to Predators and Prey 200 H. Clark Barrett 8 Adaptations to Dangers from Humans 224 Joshua D. Duntley PART III MATING David M. Buss Adaptationism and Human Mating Psychology 255 Donald Symons 9 Fundamentals of Human Mating Strategies 258 David P. Schmitt 10 Physical Attractiveness in Adaptationist Perspective 292 Lawrence S. Sugiyama 11 Adaptations to Ovulation 344 Steven W. Gangestad, Randy Thornhill, and Christine E. Garver-Apgar 12 Female Infidelity and Sperm Competition 372 Todd K. Shackelford, Nicholas Pound, Aaron T. Goetz, and Craig W. LaMunyon 13 Sexual Coercion 394 Neil M. Malamuth, Mark Huppin, and Bryant Paul 14 Commitment, Love, and Mate Retention 419 Lorne Campbell and Bruce J. Ellis PART IV PARENTING AND KINSHIP Martin Daly and Margo Wilson 15 Cooperation and Conflict among Kin 447 Jeffrey A. Kurland and Steven J. C. Gaulin 16 Evolution of Paternal Investment 483 David C. Geary 17 Parental Investment and Parent-Offspring Conflict 506 Catherine Salmon 18 Altruism and Genetic Relatedness 528 Eugene Burnstein 19 Hormones and the Human Family 552 Mark V. Flinn, Carol V. Ward, and Robert J. Noone PART V GROUP LIVING David M. Buss 20 Neurocognitive Adaptations Designed for Social Exchange 584 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby 21 Aggression 628 Anne Campbell 22 Managing Ingroup and Outgroup Relationships 653 Robert Kurzban and Steven Neuberg 23 Dominance, Status, and Social Hierarchies 676 Denise Cummins 24 The Evolution of Language 698 Peter F. MacNeilage and Barbara L. Davis 25 The Evolution of Cognitive Bias 724 Martie G. Haselton, Daniel Nettle, and Paul W. Andrews 26 The Evolution of Morality 747 Dennis Krebs PART VI EVOLUTIONIZING TRADITIONAL DISCIPLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY David M. Buss 27 Evolutionary Cognitive Psychology 776 Peter M. Todd, Ralph Hertwig, and Ulrich Hoffrage 28 Evolutionary Social Psychology 803 Douglas T. Kenrick, Jon K. Maner, and Norman P. Li 29 Evolutionary Developmental Psychology 828 David F. Bjorklund and Carlos Hernández Blasi 30 Evolutionary Personality Psychology 851 Aurelio José Figueredo, Jon A. Sefcek, Geneva Vasquez, Barbara H. Brumbach, James E. King, and W. Jake Jacobs 31 Biological Function and Dysfunction 878 Jerome C. Wakefield 32 Evolutionary Psychology and Mental Health 903 Randolph M. Nesse PART VII APPLICATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY TO OTHER DISCIPLINES David M. Buss 33 Literature and Evolutionary Psychology 931 Joseph Carroll 34 Evolutionary Psychology and the Law 953 Owen D. Jones Afterword 975 Richard Dawkins Author Index 981 Subject Index 1009. (shrink)

Basic affects reflect the diversity of satisfactions and discomforts that are inherited tools for living from our ancestral past. Affects are neurobiologically-ingrained potentials of the nervous system, which are triggered, moulded and refined by life experiences. Cognitive, information- processing approaches and computational metaphors cannot penetrate foundational affective processes. Animal models allow us to empirically analyse the large-scale neural ensembles that generate emotional-action dynamics that are critically important for creating emotional feelings. Such approaches offer robust neuro-epistemological strategies to decode the fundamental (...) nature of affects in all mammals, including humans, but they remain to be widely implemented. Here I summarize how we can develop a cross-species affective neuroscience that probes the neural nature of emotional affective states by studying the instinctual emotional apparatus of the mammalian body and brain. Affective feelings and emotional actions may reflect the dynamics of the primal viscero-somatic homunculus of SELF-representation. (shrink)

William Uttal is concerned that in an effort to prove itself a hard science, psychology may have thrown away one of its most important methodological tools—a critical analysis of the fundamental assumptions that underlie day-to-day empirical research. In this book Uttal addresses the question of localization: whether psychological processes can be defined and isolated in a way that permits them to be associated with particular brain regions. New, noninvasive imaging technologies allow us to observe the brain while it is actively (...) engaged in mental activities. Uttal cautions, however, that the excitement of these new research tools can lead to a neuroreductionist wild goose chase. With more and more cognitive neuroscientific data forthcoming, it becomes critical to question their limitations as well as their potential. Uttal reviews the history of localization theory, presents the difficulties of defining cognitive processes, and examines the conceptual and technical difficulties that should make us cautious about falling victim to what may be a "neo-phrenological" fad. (shrink)

I distinguish between two styles of research that are both called . Neurocellular economics (NE) uses the modelling techniques and mathematics of economics to model relatively encapsulated functional parts of brains. This approach rests upon the fact that brains are, like markets, massively distributed information-processing networks over which executive systems can exert only limited and imperfect governance. Harrison's (2008) deepest criticisms of neuroeconomics do not apply to NE. However, the more famous style of neuroeconomics is behavioural economics in the scanner. (...) This is often motivated by complaints about conventional economics frequently heard from behavioural economists. It attempts to use neuroimaging data to justify arguments for replacing standard aspects of microeconomic theory by facts and conjectures about human psychology. Harrison's grounds for unease about neuroeconomics apply to most BES, or at least to its explicit methodology. This methodology is naively reductionist and illegitimately assumes that economics should not do what all successful science does, namely, model abstract aspects of its target phenomena instead of would-be complete and fully ecologically situated facsimiles of them. (shrink)

The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional systems is an exemplar (...) of the interpretive stance radical behaviorism requires; a corresponding interpretive position can be based initially on a radical behaviorist view of human behavior and its determinants. This "contextual stance" is ontologically and methodologically distinct from the intentional stance over the range of explanations for which scientific psychology, cognitive or behaviorist, is responsible. (shrink)

Neuroeconomics, neuromarketing, neuroaesthetics, and neurotheology are just a few of the novel disciplines that have been inspired by a combination of ancient knowledge along with recent discoveries about how the human brain works.This fascinating and thought provoking new book critically questions our love affair with brain imaging.

Neuroeconomics has found no definitive role in the explanation of consumer choice and its undeveloped philosophical basis limits its attempt to explain economic behaviour. The nature of neuroeconomics is explored, especially with respect to what it reveals about the valuation of alternatives, choice and emotion. The tendency of human consumers to discount future rewards illustrates how behavioural and neuroscientific accounts of choice contribute to psychological explanations of choice and the issues this raises for both routine everyday choices and more extreme (...) compulsions. Central to this is the phenomenon of matching in which consumers tend to select the immediately larger or largest reward and the neurophysiological and behavioural bases of this choice. Recognition that rewards are evoked by reinforcement contingencies and that the rewards themselves engender emotional responses via classical conditioning enhances understanding the contribution of neurological activity to the explanation of consumer behaviour. It is argued that neuroeconomics can play a vital explanatory role by providing an evolutionarily consistent warrant for the ascription of intentionality. The Behavioural Perspective Model is used as a template for investigations of consumer choice that lead to iterative theoretical development, forming the basis of a neurophilosophy in which neuroeconomics can find a decisive role. (shrink)