Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Valence and Value.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):658-680.
    Valence is a central component of all affective states, including pains, pleasures, emotions, moods, and feelings of desire or repulsion.This paper has two main goals. One is to suggest that enough is now known about the causes, consequences, and properties of valence to indicate that it forms a unitary natural-psychological kind, one that seemingly plays a fundamental role in motivating all kinds of intentional action. If this turns out to be true, then the correct characterization of the nature of valence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
    The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   112 citations  
  • If it itches, scratch!Richard J. Hall - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535.
    Many bodily sensations are connected quite closely with specific actions: itches with scratching, for example, and hunger with eating. Indeed, these connections have the feel of conceptual connections. With the exception of D. M. Armstrong, philosophers have largely neglected this aspect of bodily sensations. In this paper, I propose a theory of bodily sensations that explains these connections. The theory ascribes intentional content to bodily sensations but not, strictly speaking, representational content. Rather, the content of these sensations is an imperative: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • An Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (10):517-532.
    forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • Unpleasantness, Motivational Oomph, and Painfulness.Jennifer Corns - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):238-254.
    Painful pains are, paradigmatically, unpleasant and motivating. The dominant view amongst philosophers and pain scientists is that these two features are essentially related and sufficient for painfulness. In this article, I first offer scientifically informed characterizations of both unpleasantness and motivational oomph and argue against other extant accounts. I then draw on folk-characterized cases and current neurobiological and neurobehavioral evidence to argue that both dominant positions are mistaken. Unpleasantness and motivational oomph doubly dissociate and, even taken together, are insufficient for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • (1 other version)Ecological foundations of cognition. II: Degrees of freedom and conserved quantities in animal-environment systems.Robert E. Shaw & M. T. Turvey - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (11-12):11-12.
    Cognition means different things to different psychologists depending on the position held on the mind-matter problem. Ecological psychologists reject the implied mind-matter dualism as an ill-posed theoretic problem because the assumed mind-matter incommensurability precludes a solution to the degrees of freedom problem. This fundamental problem was posed by both Nicolai Bernstein and James J. Gibson independently. It replaces mind-matter dualism with animal-environment duality -- a better posed scientific problem because commensurability is assured. Furthermore, when properly posed this way, a conservation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations