- Against normal function.Ron Amundson - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31 (1):33-53.details
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Revisionary Epistemology.Davide Fassio & Robin McKenna - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):755-779.details
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(1 other version)Conceptual Ethics II.David Plunkett Alexis Burgess - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1102-1110.details
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A Second Rebuttal On Health.Christopher Boorse - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):683-724.details
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The definition of mental disorder: evolving but dysfunctional?Rachel Bingham & Natalie Banner - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (8):537-542.details
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Disease.Rachel Cooper - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (2):263-282.details
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(1 other version)Conceptual Ethics I.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.details
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Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino - 1990 - Princeton University Press.details
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Defining mental disorder. Exploring the 'natural function' approach.Somogy Varga - 2011 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 6:1-.details
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(1 other version)Beyond Naturalism and Normativism: Reconceiving the 'Disease' Debate.Jeremy Simon - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (3):343-370.details
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Defining 'health' and 'disease'.Marc Ereshefsky - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 40 (3):221-227.details
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Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to be?Sally Haslanger - 2000 - Noûs 34 (1):31–55.details
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Defining dysfunction: Natural selection, design, and drawing a line.Peter H. Schwartz - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (3):364-385.details
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‘Race': Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic.Ron Mallon - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):525-551.details
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On the distinction between disease and illness.Christopher Boorse - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1):49-68.details
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What a theory of mental health should be.Christopher Boorse - 1976 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 6 (1):61–84.details
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Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.details
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Conceptual analysis versus scientific understanding: An assessment of Wakefield's folk psychiatry.Dominic Murphy & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):271-293.details
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Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder and the problem of defining harm to nonsentient organisms.Antoine C. Dussault - 2021 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42 (5):211-231.details
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Dysfunction and the Definition of Mental Disorder in the DSM.Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):353-370.details
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The Irrelevance of Harm for a Theory of Disease.Dane Muckler & James Stacey Taylor - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (3):332-349.details
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The harm of medical disorder as harm in the damage sense.David G. Limbaugh - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (1):1-19.details
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Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?Anna Alexandrova - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):421-445.details
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How to Proceed in the Disease Concept Debate? A Pragmatic Approach.Leen De Vreese - 2017 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (4):424-446.details
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Harm and the concept of medical disorder.Neil Feit - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (5):367-385.details
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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.details
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Reframing the Disease Debate and Defending the Biostatistical Theory.Peter H. Schwartz - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):572-589.details
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(1 other version)Conceptual Ethics II.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1102-1110.details
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Towards a socially constructed and objective concept of mental disorder.Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9401-9426.details
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Rehabilitating Disease: Function, Value, and Objectivity in Medicine.Russell Powell & Eric Scarffe - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):1168-1178.details
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Rethinking “Disease”: a fresh diagnosis and a new philosophical treatment.Russell Powell & Eric Scarffe - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (9):579-588.details
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Carnapian explication and ameliorative analysis: a systematic comparison.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1011-1034.details
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Health as a Secondary Property.Alex Broadbent - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):609-627.details
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Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering.Georg Brun - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1211-1241.details
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Is Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder Really a Disorder?Tamara Kayali Browne - 2015 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 12 (2):313-330.details
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An Alternative to Conceptual Analysis in the Function Debate.Peter H. Schwartz - 2004 - The Monist 87 (1):136-153.details
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The Concept of Disorder Revisited: Robustly Value-Laden Despite Change.I.—Rachel Cooper - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):141-161.details
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(1 other version)Disease and value: A rejection of the value-neutrality thesis.George J. Agich - 1982 - Theoretical Medicine: An International Journal for the Philosophy and Methodology of Medical Research and Practice 4:27-41.details
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A New Approach to Defining Disease.Mary Jean Walker & Wendy A. Rogers - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (4):402-420.details
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Well‐being and Philosophy of Science.Anna Alexandrova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (3):219-231.details
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The Prototype Resemblance Theory of Disease.K. Sadegh-Zadeh - 2008 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (2):106-139.details
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(1 other version)What is it to be healthy?Elselijn Kingma - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):128–133.details
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Health and Reference Classes.Sander Werkhoven - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (2):145-158.details
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Harm as a Necessary Component of the Concept of Medical Disorder: Reply to Muckler and Taylor.Jerome C. Wakefield & Jordan A. Conrad - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (3):350-370.details
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Does the harm component of the harmful dysfunction analysis need rethinking?: Reply to Powell and Scarffe.Jerome C. Wakefield & Jordan A. Conrad - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (9):594-596.details
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Escaping the Conceptual Analysis Straightjacket: Pathological Mechanisms and Canguilhem’s Biological Philosophy.Jonathan Sholl - 2015 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 58 (4):395-418.details
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Progress in Defining Disease: Improved Approaches and Increased Impact.Peter H. Schwartz - 2017 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (4):485-502.details
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Fuzzy health, illness, and disease.Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh - 2000 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (5):605 – 638.details
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The analytic–synthetic distinction and conceptual analyses of basic health concepts.Halvor Nordby - 2006 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 9 (2):169-180.details
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Defining disease beyond conceptual analysis: an analysis of conceptual analysis in philosophy of medicine.Maël Lemoine - 2013 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (4):309-325.details
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