- Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
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Costly false beliefs: What self-deception and pragmatic encroachment can tell us about the rationality of beliefs.Melanie Sarzano - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):95-118.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Defending Exclusivity.Sophie Archer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):326-341.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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1. The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Lairs.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 11-28.details
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Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.details
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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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At "permanent risk": Reasoning and self-knowledge in self-deception.Dion Scott-Kakures - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):576-603.details
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Reason and rationality.Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Luc Faucher - 2004 - In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Woleński (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. pp. 1-50.details
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Self-deception and scattered events.Roy A. Sorensen - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):64-69.details
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(1 other version)Imagination, delusion, and self-deception.Andy Egan - 2008 - In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernández (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.details
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Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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Seeing Through Self-Deception.Annette Barnes - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Do the self-deceived get what they want?Eric Funkhouser - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.details
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Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.details
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(1 other version)Self-deception and the nature of mind.Mark Johnston - 1994 - In Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. pp. 63--91.details
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Self-deception, action, and will.Robert Audi - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (2):133-158.details
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Deceiving oneself or self-deceived? On the formation of beliefs under the influence.Ariela Lazar - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):265-290.details
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Real Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):91-102.details
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Twisted Self Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.details
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(1 other version)3. Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind.Mark Johnston - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 63-91.details
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High anxiety: Barnes on what moves the unwelcome believer.Dion Scott-Kakures - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):313 – 326.details
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Self-deception, motivation, and the desire to believe.Dana K. Nelkin - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):384-406.details
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(2 other versions)Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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Motivated believing: Wishful and unwelcome.Dion Scott-Kakures - 2000 - Noûs 34 (3):348–375.details
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Finding Foundations for Bounded and Adaptive Rationality.Ralph Hertwig & Arthur Paul Pedersen - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (1-2):1-8.details
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Can You Succeed in Intentionally Deceiving Yourself?Dion Scott-Kakures Scott-Kakures - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20):17-40.details
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