Friedrich Nietzsche's complex connection to Charles Darwin has been much explored, and both scholarly and popular opinions have tended to assume a convergence in their thinking. In this study, Dirk Johnson challenges that assumption and takes seriously Nietzsche's own explicitly stated 'anti-Darwinism'. He argues for the importance of Darwin for the development of Nietzsche's philosophy, but he places emphasis on the antagonistic character of their relationship and suggests that Nietzsche's mature critique against Darwin represents the key to understanding his broader (...) Darwinian position. He also offers an original reinterpretation of the Genealogy of Morals, a text long considered sympathetic to Darwinian naturalism, but which he argues should be taken as Nietzsche's most sophisticated critique of both Darwin and his followers. His book will appeal to all who are interested in the philosophy of Nietzsche and its cultural context. (shrink)

Nietzsche often writes in praise of self-overcoming. He tells us that his humanity consists in “constant self-overcoming” 1 and that if someone wanted to give a name to his lifelong self-discipline against “Wagnerianism,” Schopenhauer, and “the whole modern ‘humaneness,’” then one might call it self-overcoming. He says that his writings “speak only” of his overcomings, later claiming that “the development of states that are increasingly high, rare, distant, tautly drawn and comprehensive … are dependent on the constant ‘self-overcoming of man’”,2 (...) and that “the most spiritual people, being the strongest, find their happiness where other... (shrink)

There is no doubt that Nietzsche, the most famous philosopher of the second half of the nineteenth century, was concerned with Darwin. This essay aims to provide a systematic evaluation of Nietzsche's work in those areas in which he felt the necessity to position himself with regard to Darwin, or "Darwinism," as he knew it.

Die Studie handelt von Nietzsches ursprünglicher Fragestellung, Sie geht von Nietzsches Satz in der vorrede zur Genealogie der Moral "Was habe ich mit Widerlegungen zu schaffen!" aus und zeigt, wie er zu verstehen ist. Nietzsche verschiebt sowohl die Fragestellung wie die Methode des Philosophierens: von der traditionellen Frage nach der Wahrheit über die Frage nach den Werten , nach der décadence, der Moral und der Rangordnung zur Frage nach der Kultur und zur Aufgabe der "Züchtung" im Sinne einer "Erhöhung der (...) Kultur". Diese Aufgabe ist das zweite Strukturmoment von Nietzches Denken neben der Genealogie.Diese bereitet die "Erhöhung der Kultur" nur vor.The purpose of this study is to identify the original problem which organizes the whole of Nietzsche's reflection. Starting from the statement, "what have I to do with refutations!" and the analysis of its meaning, it shows that Nietzsche imposes a mutation on both the problem of philosophy and its method; he dismisses the traditional question of truth and replaces it with the problem of culture, of which the questions of values , of morals, of décadence or hierarchy are particular aspects. Consequently, the task he assigns to the philosopher is that of Züchtung, which is to be understood as "the enhancement of culture". This task appears therefore as the second dimension of Nietzsche's reflection, in addition to geneology, which merely prepares the "enhancement of culture". (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article discusses Nietzsche's interpretation of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection and the basis for his rejection of the major elements of Darwin's overall scheme on observational grounds. Nietzsche's further opposition to the attempt of Darwin and many of his followers to reconcile the “struggle for existence” with Christian ethics is the subject of the second half of the essay.

La biología sintética encierra un enorme potencial transformador de los organismos vivos, incluyendo en un futuro quizás no muy lejano la transformación del propio genoma humano. Son claras las conexiones que pueden establecerse entre este enorme potencial transformador y las pretensiones de los partidarios del biomejoramiento humano. La construcción de genomas completamente sintéticos puede cambiar de forma definitiva e irreversible aspectos fundamentales de la vida humana, quizás hasta el punto de dar lugar a un organismo que difiera de nuestra especie (...) como ahora nosotros podemos diferir de los grandes simios. En este artículo se discuten los principales pros y contras que ha suscitado este debate, señalando algunos de los presupuestos más problemáticos de las propuestas recientes sobre el biomejoramiento humano. (shrink)

La recepción durante el siglo XXse preguntó si la filosofía nietzscheana era a-, im- o anti-política, es decir, si podía ser asimilada por la democracia, o si era antimoderna, elitista y reaccionaria. El italiano Roberto Esposito ha propuesto leerla como formando e informando el paradigma de la biopolítica. Se discuten cuatro lecturas de esa biopolítica: como formadora del paradigma de la inmunidad, como tanatopolítica, como liberal y neoliberal, y como biopolítica afirmativa.

In this paper, I directly oppose Nietzsche ’s endorsement of a morality of breeding to all forms of comparative, positive eugenics: the use of genetic selection to introduce positive improvement in individuals or the species, based on negatively or comparatively defined traits. I begin by explaining Nietzsche ’s contrast between two broad categories of morality: breeding and taming. I argue that the ethical dangers of positive eugenics are grounded in their status as forms of taming, which preserves positively evaluated character (...) traits and types through the active de-selection of negatively evaluated ones. The morality of taming is not a form of selection, but de-selection: the production of counter or anti-traits and types. Consequently, in its attempt to improve humanity, it tends necessarily toward violence as the elimination of de-selected forms of human life. In contrast, Nietzsche ’s morality of breeding selects traits and types by protecting them from de-selection—specifically, by attacking moral ideas, values, and practices designed to eliminate them. It tends not towards the destruction but preservation of types; its negativity targets not life but the ideas that disable, disempower, and eradicate forms of life. I argue, further, that the fundamental ethical difference between breeding and taming, and so between Nietzschean morality and eugenics, is found in their attitudes toward the natural world. The violence of eugenics as taming is grounded in its status as anti-natural, while Nietzsche ’s morality of breeding resists violence through its foundational affirmation of the conditions and limitations of the natural world: its resolute moral naturalism. Finally, I apply my interpretation of breeding and taming to two cases of comparative, positive eugenics: the historical case of racial eugenics and the so-called “designer baby” case in contemporary liberal eugenics. Nietzsche must condemn both as forms of the anti-natural morality of taming, to which the morality of breeding is diametrically opposed. (shrink)

Au mécanisme darwinien de sélection naturelle, Nietzsche oppose le danger qui menace les déviants, et du même coup, l'évolution. A partir de là, la nécessaire protection des déviants passe par une sélection artificielle, décrite en des termes qui paraissent très proches des thèses eugénistes. Quels sont les liens entre la pensée nietzschéenne et le sociodarwinisme antilibéral ? To the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection, Nietzsche opposes the danger threatening the deviants and hence evolution. Starting from such a point of view, (...) the necessary protection of the deviants moves through artificial selection, here described in terms very close to the eugenist theses. Hence, what are the links between the Nietzschean thought and the antiliberal sociodarwinism ? (shrink)

En su Genealogía de la moral, Nietzsche situó el resentimiento del débil en la base de la moralización de los valores originales del fuerte -entre ellos, la crueldad inherente a la afirmación de la vida que transformó éstos en negativos. A esta idea del resentimiento como un mecanismo esencialmente distorsionador se opone Jean Améry, víctima de la violencia nazi, en Más alla de la culpa y la expiación (1966), donde reivindica su resentimiento hacia los verdugos y sus cómplices como un (...) instrumento de verdad para exigirles el reconocimiento de su crimen y la negación de su condición de verdugos. El objetivo del artículo es reconstruir la trama conceptual en que se articula la divergencia entre Améry y Nietzsche, mostrando los diferentes compromisos ontológicos sobre la moral que sustentan sus respectivas concepciones del resentimiento. (shrink)