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  1. Vagueness.Loretta Torrago - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):637.
    Consider an object or property a and the predicate F. Then a is vague if there are questions of the form: Is a F? that have no yes-or-no answers. In brief, vague properties and kinds have borderline instances and composite objects have borderline constituents. I'll use the expression "borderline cases" as a covering term for both. ;Having borderline cases is compatible with precision so long as every case is either borderline F, determinately F or determinately not F. Thus, in addition (...)
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  • Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
    Vagueness provides the first comprehensive examination of a topic of increasing importance in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic and language. Timothy Williamson traces the history of this philosophical problem from discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece to modern formal approaches such as fuzzy logic. He illustrates the problems with views which have taken the position that standard logic and formal semantics do not apply to vague language, and defends the controversial realistic view that vagueness is a kind (...)
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  • Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Truth is one of the most debated topics in philosophy; Wolfgang Kunne presents a comprehensive critical examination of all major theories, from Aristotle to the present day. He argues that it is possible to give a satisfactory 'modest' account of truth without invoking problematic notions like correspondence, fact, or meaning. The clarity of exposition and the wealth of examples will make Conceptions of Truth an invaluable and stimulating guide for advanced students and scholars.
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  • The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the (...)
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  • Common Ground.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
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  • Contextualism and Relativism.Mark Richard - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):215-242.
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  • Bivalence and What is Said.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):167–190.
    On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth-bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well-known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: ‘The downside . . . rightly emphasized by Williamson . . . is the implicit surrender of the T-scheme’. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T- scheme, and (...)
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  • The Unity of the Proposition.Richard Gaskin - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Richard Gaskin analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express--what marks them off from mere aggregates of words and meanings respectively. Since he identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, his account has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality.
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  • Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases.Miroslava Andjelkovic & Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28:211-242.
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  • Direct Reference and Vague Identity.Roy Sorensen - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):177-194.
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  • Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):211-244.
    According to the principle of bivalence, truth and falsity are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive options for a statement. It is either true or false, and not both, even in a borderline case. That highly controversial claim is central to the epistemic theory of vagueness, which holds that borderline cases are distinguished by a special kind of obstacle to knowing the truth-value of the statement. But this paper is not a defence of the epistemic theory. If bivalence holds, it presumably (...)
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  • The Pragmatic Fallacy.Nathan Salmon - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (1):83--97.
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  • Interpreted Logical Forms.Richard K. Larson & Peter Ludlow - 1993 - Synthese 95 (3):305 - 355.
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  • Semantics for Non-Declaratives.Kirk Ludwig & Dan Boisvert - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
    This article begins by distinguishing force and mood. Then it lays out desiderata on a successful account. It sketches as background the program of truth-theoretic semantics. Next, it surveys assimilation approaches and argues that they are inadequate. Then it shows how the fulfillment-conditional approach can be applied to imperatives, interrogatives, molecular sentences containing them, and quantification into mood markers. Next, it considers briefly the recent set of propositions approach to the semantics of interrogatives and exclamatives. Finally, it shows how to (...)
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  • Attitudinal Objects.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - In Chris Tillman (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.
    This paper defends the view that attitudinal objects such as claims, beliefs, judgments, and requests form an ontological category of its own sharply distinguished from that of events and states and that of propositions. Attitudinal objects play a central role in attitude reports and avoid the conceptual and empirical problems for propositions. Unlike the latter, attitudinal objects bear a particular connection to normativity. The paper will also discuss the syntactic basis of a semantics of attitude reports based on attitudinal objects.
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  • Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence.Christopher S. Hill - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
    There is an important family of semantic notions that we apply to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts - as when we say that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Thought and World presents a theory of the content of such notions. The theory is largely deflationary in spirit, in the sense that it represents a broad range of semantic notions - including the concept of truth - as being entirely free from substantive metaphysical and (...)
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  • The Truth About Moods.Kirk Ludwig - 1997 - ProtoSociology 10:19-66.
    Assertoric sentences are sentences which admit of truth or falsity. Non-assertoric sentences, imperatives and interrogatives, have long been a source of difficulty for the view that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as the core of a theory of meaning. The trouble for truth-theoretic semantics posed by non-assertoric sentences is that, prima facie, it does not make sense to say that imperatives, such as 'Cut your hair', or interrogatives such as 'What time is it?', are truth (...)
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  • The Conventional and the Analytic.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):239 - 274.
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  • Supervaluationism and the Report of Vague Contents.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
    Schiffer has given an argument against supervaluationist accounts of vagueness, based on reports of vague contents. Suppose that Al tells Bob ‘Ben was there’, pointing to a certain place, and later Bob says, ‘Al said that Ben was there’, pointing in the same direction. According to supervaluationist semantics, Schiffer contends, both Al’s and Bob’s utterances of ‘there’ indeterminately refer to myriad precise regions of space; Al’s utterance is true just in case Ben was in any of those precisely bounded regions (...)
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  • Distinctions Without a Difference.Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):203-251.
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  • Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
    What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, Horwich has refined and developed (...)
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  • The Unity of the Proposition: Replies to Vallicella, Schnieder, and García‐Carpintero.Richard Gaskin - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):303-311.
    Richard Gaskin presents a work in the philosophy of language.
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  • Presuposicion Y Significado Expresivo.Josep Macià - 2002 - Theoria 17 (3):499-513.
    Presuppositions are well known phenomena. One way of treating them is as partial 'meaning-functions '. There is an attractive argument that holds that in order to explain the contrast between such sentences as "John came into the room" and "That bastard John came into the room" it is required to make our semantic theory essentially more complex. This argument appeals to the fact that contrasts such as the ones just mentioned play a role in the validity of logical inferences. In (...)
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  • Conceptions of Truth.Thomas Hofweber - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):136-139.
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  • Meaning and Uselessness: How to Think About Derogatory Words.Jennifer Hornsby - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):128–141.
    Williams explains why there might have been some point to a linguistic approach in ethics. I suggest that there might be some point to paying attention to an ethical dimension in philosophy of language. I shall consider words that I label ‘derogatory’, and questions they raise about linguistic meaning.
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  • Wissenschaftslehre.Bernard Bolzano & Alois Höfler - 1837 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 22 (4):15-16.
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  • Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:141-162.
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  • Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
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  • Direct Reference and Vague Identity.Roy Sorensen - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):175--94.
    Todd’s quip absurdly implies he knew that 30 carats is the threshold for vulgarity. But most philosophers think stopping here misses the root of the joke. They think there is a more fundamental absurdity; that it is even possible for a single carat to make the difference between a vulgar ring and a non-vulgar ring. We epistemicists defend the possibility.
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  • The Content–Force Distinction.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):141-164.
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  • Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning.Stephen Barker - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):633-639.
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  • Wissenschaftslehre.Walter Dubislav - 1930 - Erkenntnis 1 (1):408-409.
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  • Mood and Language-Game.Erik Stenius - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):254 - 274.
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  • Attitudinal Objects: Their Ontology and Importance for Philosophy and Natural Language Semantics.Friederike Moltmann - 2019 - In Brian Brian & Christoph Schuringa (eds.), Judgment. Act and Object. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 180-201.
    This paper argues for the philosophical and semantic importance of attitudinal objects, entities such as judgments, claims, beliefs, demands, and desires, as an ontological category distinct from that of events and states and from that of propositions. The paper presents significant revisions and refinements of the notion of an attitudinal object as it was developed in my previous work.
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  • Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
    If it is not now determined whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, can an assertion that there will be one be true? The problem has persisted because there are compelling arguments on both sides. If there are objectively possible futures which would make the prediction true and others which would make it false, symmetry considerations seem to forbid counting it either true or false. Yet if we think about how we would assess the prediction tomorrow, when a sea (...)
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  • Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. [REVIEW]William P. Alston - 2000 - Dialogue 41 (3):589-590.
    This book is the culmination of almost forty years of writing and thinking about speech acts and the use theory of meaning. Chapter 1 sets out and defends a version of the Austin-Searle trichotomy of a sentential act, i.e., uttering a sentence or surrogate, an illocutionary act, i.e., uttering a sentence with a certain "content" as reported by indirect speech, and a perlocutionary act, i.e., producing an effect on an audience by an utterance. Chapter 2 poses the question: what condition (...)
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  • Two Issues of Vagueness.Stephen Schiffer - 1998 - The Monist 81 (2):193--214.
    Two issues of vagueness, which may together exhaust its philosophical interest, are, first, to solve the sorites paradox and, second, to explain the notion of a borderline case. I’ll try to make a little headway on both issues.
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  • Vagueness: A Fifth Column Approach.Crispin Wright - 2003 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press.
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  • Küenne on Conceptions of Truth. [REVIEW]Marian David - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):179-191.
    The review focuses on Küenne's account of truthmaking and on his minimalist approach to truth.
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  • The Modest, or Quantificational, Account of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):122-168.
    Truth is a stable, epistemically unconstrained property of propositions, and the concept of truth admits of a non-reductive explanation: that, in a nutshell, is the view for which I argued in Conceptions of Truth. In this paper I try to explain that explanation in a more detailed and, hopefully, more perspicuous way than I did in Ch. 6.2 of the book and to defend its use of sentential quantification against some of the criticisms it has has come in for.
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  • Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
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  • Conversational Impliciture.Kent Bach - 1994 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 284.
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  • Critical Notice: Paul Horwich's ‘Truth'.H. Field - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):321-30.
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  • Vagueness and Partial Belief.Stephen Schiffer - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):220-257.
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  • Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 129.
    John MacFarlane has formulated a version of truth-relativism, and argued for its application in some cases – future contingents, knowledge attributions and epistemic modals among them. Mark Richard also defends a version of relativism, which he applies to vagueness-inducing features of the semantics of gradable adjectives. On MacFarlane’s and Richard’s characterization, truth-relativist claims posit a distinctive kind of context-dependence, the dependence of the evaluation of an assertion as true or otherwise on aspects of the context of the evaluation itself – (...)
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  • Against the Power of Force: Reflections on the Meaning of Mood.Michael Pendlebury - 1986 - Mind 95 (379):361-372.
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