Husserls Briefwechsel is von entscheidender Bedeutung für das Verständnis seiner philosophischen Entwicklung, seiner wissenschaftlichen Arbeit und Publikationsvorhaben. Er nimmt darin Stellung zu den politischen Entwicklungen in Deutschland und spricht sich aus über weltanschaulich-religiöse Fragen. Außerdem bestimmt er sein Verhältnis zu anderen Philosophen und Schulen. Die vorliegende, textkritisch konstituierte und reich kommentierte Gesamtausgabe ist nicht nur für Philosophen, Wissenschaftshistoriker und Zeitgeschichtlicher von hohem Interesse. Die Ausgabe umfaßt in sachlicher Gliederung Husserls Korrespondenz (ca. 1300 Einzelstücke) mit über 250 Personen und Instanzen, wobei (...) neben den Briefen Husserls - und, in großzügiger Auswahl, seiner Frau Malvine - auch alle erhaltenen Briefe an Husserl aufgenommen sind (ca. 700 Einzelstücke). Die Bände I--IV orientieren sich an der chronologischen Entwicklung der Husserlschen Philosophie, die Bände V--IX an der sachlichen Nähe der Korrespondenzpartner zu Husserls Philosophie. Band X enthält neben der Einführung in die Ausgabe verschiedene Register zur differenzierten Aufschlüsselung der Ausgabe. Edmund Husserl's correspondence is of eminent importance for a clear understanding of his philosophical development, his scientific work, and his publications. In his letters, he reacts on the political developments in Germany and ponders on the philosophy of life and on religious questions. He also clearly defines his relationships with other philosophers and schools of philosophy. This annotated and richly commented correspondence edition is of vital interest to philosophers, researchers and historians. The ten volumes consist of Husserl's correspondence (about 1300 letters) with more than 250 institutes and persons, and in addition to his letters, the letters of his wife Malvine and those received by both (about 700) are also included. Volumes I--IV present a chronological development of Husserl's philosophical system, Volumes V--IX are devoted to the correspondence partners in philosophy. The last volume consists of an extensive Introduction and a variety of indexes to all volumes in the set. (shrink)

an der Universität Göttingen gehaltenen Vcwlesung über Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis,l ist annähernd voll­ ständig erhalten; die Blätter des V cwlesungsmanuskripts zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins liegen verstreut in den Konvoluten F I 6 und 2 F I 8 des Husserl-Archivs zu Löwen. Allerdings fußt der Erste Teil des Erstdrucks, dessen Bezeichnung als Die Vorlesungen über das innere Zeit­ bewußtsein aus dem Jahre 1905 gleichwohl auch in vcwliegender Neuausgabe beibehalten wurde, nur zum Teil noch, und auch (...) in diesem Teil mit be­ trächtlichen Abweichungen, auf dem Text des ursprünglichen Vcwlesungs­ manuskripts des Jahres I905; und umgekehrt hat nur ein Teil des Textes des ursprünglichen Vcwlesungs-Manuskripts - mit den erwähnten Abwand­ lungen - Eingang in den Ersten Teil des Erstdrucks gefunden. Wo der Text dieses Ersten Teils des Erstdrucks dem des ursprünglichen Vcwlesungs­ manuskripts entspricht, wurde er er mit diesem verglichen, und ollensicht­ liche Irrtümer im Erstdruck wurden berichtigt; in den Textkritischen Anmer­ kungen ist dann mit dem Vermerk nach dem Ms. verbessert die Text­ fassung des Erstdrucks wiedergegeben. Ferner wurde in den Textkritischen Anmerkungen vcwliegender Neuausgabe überall der ursprüngliche und voll­ ständige· Text des Vorlesungsmanuskripts von I905 wiedergegeben, auf dessen Zusammenhang die entsprechenden Teile des Erstdrucks zurückgehen, wo dieser von ienem abweicht. Einige zum V cwlesungsmanuskript gehörige Blätter, deren Text sich iedoch nicht zusammenhängend dem übrigen einfügt, wurden im vcwliegenden Band unter B (S. 135-382) mit abgedruckt. Die 1 Vgl. oben die "Einleitung des Herausgebers", S. XIV-XVII. (shrink)

Dan Zahavi engages with classical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and a range of empirical disciplines to explore the nature of selfhood. He argues that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed or dependent upon others, but accepts that certain dimensions of the self and types of self-experience are other-mediated.

I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.

What is the self? Does it exist? If it does exist, what is it like? It's not clear that we even know what we're asking about when we ask these large, metaphysical questions. The idea of the self comes very naturally to us, and it seems rather important, but it's also extremely puzzling. As for the word "self"--it's been taken in so many different ways that it seems that you can mean more or less what you like by it and (...) come up with almost any answer. Galen Strawson proposes to approach the (seeming) problem of the self by starting from the thing that makes it seem there is a problem in the first place: our experience of the self, our experience of having or being a self, a hidden, inner mental presence or locus of consciousness. He argues that we should consider the phenomenology (experience) of the self before we attempt its metaphysics (its existence and nature). And when we have considered what it's like for human beings (assuming we can generalize about ourselves), we need to consider what it might be like for other possible creatures: what's the very least that might count as experience of oneself as a self? This, he proposes, will give us a good idea of what we ought to be looking for when we go on to ask whether there is such a thing-an idea worth following wherever it leads. It leads Strawson to conclude that selves, inner subjects of experience, do indeed exist. But they bear little resemblance to traditional conceptions of the self. (shrink)

The Transcendence of the Ego may be regarded as a turning-point in the philosophical development of Jean-Paul Sartre. Prior to the writing of this essay, published in France in 1937, Sartre had been intimately acquainted with the phenomenological movement which originated in Germany with Edmund Husserl. It is a fundamental tenet of Husserl, the notion of a transcendent ego, which is here attacked by Sartre. This disagreement with Husserl has great importance for Sartre and facilitated the transition from phenomenology to (...) the doctrine of Being and Nothingness. (shrink)

A clarification of Husserl's changing conceptions of imaginary consciousness ( phantasy ) and memory, especially at the level of auto-affective time-consciousness, suggests an interpretation of Freud's concept of the Unconscious. Phenomenology of consciousness can show how it is possible that consciousness can bring to present appearance something unconscious, that is, something foreign or absent to consciousness, without incorporating it into or subordinating it to the conscious present. This phenomenological analysis of Freud's concept of the Unconscious leads to a partial critique (...) of Freud's metapsychological determination of the Unconscious as a simple, internally unperceived representational consciousness. It also suggests an account of how a reproductive inner consciousness can free the subject from the experience of anxiety by allowing for possibilities of self-distanciation and symbolic self-representation that protect the subject from traumatic affection by and through its own instinctual drives. (shrink)

The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.

... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...

In the last decade of his life (from 1928 to 1938), Husserl sought to develop a new understanding of his transcendental phenomenology (in publications such as Cartesian Meditations, Formal and Transcendental Logic, and the Crisis) in order to combat misconceptions of phenomenology then current (chief among which was Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology as articulated in Being and Time). During this period, Husserl had an assistant and collaborator, Eugen Fink, who sought not only to be midwife to the birth of Husserl’s own (...) ideas but who also wanted to mediate between Husserl and Heidegger. As a result of the Fink- Husserl collaboration there appeared a rich flow of works that testify to the depth with which transcendental phenomenology had been rethought. Bruzina is the chief scholar of this material. This paper attempts both to disentangle the relationships between the phenomenologies of Husserrl, Heidegger, and Fink and to assess critically the value of Bruzina’s contribution. (shrink)

Husserl (1859-1938) hatte sich in seinem Werk "Formale und transzendentale Logik" das Ziel gesetzt, den inneren Sinn, die Gliederung und Zusammengehörigkeit all dessen nachzuweisen, was bislang an logischen Problemen behandelt worden war, und die Notwendigkeit einer phänomenologischen Durchleuchtung der gesamten logischen Problematik darzutun. Ein Hauptstück der analytisch-deskriptiven Untersuchungen, die einer solchen phänomenologischen Begründung der Logik dienen, ist "Erfahrung und Urteil". Das Buch entstand in Zusammenarbeit mit Schülern und Mitarbeitern.

In seiner letzten Schrift unternimmt Husserl den Versuch, auf dem Wege einer teleologisch-historischen Besinnung auf die Ursprünge unserer kritischen wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Situation die Notwendigkeit einer transzendentalphänomenologischen Umwendung der Philosophie zu begründen. Er geht von seinem Begriff der "Lebenswelt" aus und entwickelt eine auf diesen Zentralbegriff seiner Spätphilosophie gegründete eigenständige Einleitung in die transzendentale Phänomenologie.

The concept of imagination is notoriously ambiguous. Thus one must be cautious not to use ‘imagination’ as a placeholder for diverse phenomena and processes that perhaps have not much more in common than that they are difficult to assign to some other, better defined domain, such as perception, conceptual thought, or artistic production. However, this challenge also comes with great opportunities: the fecundity and openness of ‘imagination’ appeal to researchers from different disciplines with different approaches and questions, and it draws (...) together fields of enquiry that are initially considered far apart. Hence, arguably, the field of imagination is particularly poised for interdisciplinary enquiry. In the section on Imagination in Interdisciplinary Research, I will talk about some of the issues that have already entered that field of interdisciplinary inquiry. (shrink)

This major new work by Anthony J. Steinbock, a leading authority in Phenomenology and Husserl Studies, explores an interrelated set of problems in Husserl's phenomenology and provides an excellent example of phenomenology in practice, demonstrating how its methods and resources shed light on philosophical problems.

I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.

This book contains a series of essays that explore the concept of unconsciousness as it is situated between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. A leading goal of the collection is to carve out phenomenological dimensions within psychoanalysis and, equally, to carve out psychoanalytical dimensions within phenomenology. The book examines the nature of unconsciousness and the role it plays in structuring our sense of self. It also looks at the extent to which the unconscious marks the body as it functions outside of experience (...) as well as manifests itself in experience. In addition, the book explores the relationship between unconsciousness and language, particularly if unconsciousness exists prior to language or if the concept can only be understood through speech. The collection includes contributions from leading scholars, each of whom grounds their investigations in a nuanced mastery of the traditional voices of their fields. These contributors provide diverse viewpoints that challenge both the phenomenological and psychoanalytical traditions in their relation to unconsciousness. (shrink)

Moritz Geiger developed an original phenomenological account of the splitting of the Ego in two papers, written in 1911 and 1913. Husserl read the 1911 paper as he was working on preliminary manuscripts to Ideas I. The first part of Husserl’s comments focused precisely on the splitting of the Ego. In this paper I will answer three questions: What is the historical-philosophical context of Geiger’s and Husserl’s discussion on the splitting of the ego? What are the phenomenological features of the (...) splitting of the ego? What is the relevance of Geiger’s account of the splitting of the ego, for the further development of Husserl’s phenomenology? Reading Geiger was, indeed, the first occasion in which Husserl started to develop his own phenomenological account of the splitting of the ego. This will prove itself to be crucial for his mature analyses on the phenomenological reduction, as Husserl will distinguish more clearly between reflection and splitting of the ego. (shrink)