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  1. Schizophrenia: a disorder of intersubjectivity : a phenomenological analysis.Van Duppen Zeno - unknown
    This dissertation combines two scientific disciplines and research fields, namely philosophy and psychopathology. Within such a wide field of investigation, two precise perspectives are to be adopted in this inquiry: stemming from the first field, the phenomenological perspective on subjectivity and intersubjectivity; stemming from the second, the psychopathological perspective on schizophrenia. The combination of philosophy and psychopathology has often proven fruitful. Moreover, the main motivation for such combined approach is justified by the strong belief that, when critically used, phenomenology offers (...)
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  • (1 other version)Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...)
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  • The Phenomenon of Ego-Splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy.Marco Cavallaro - 2017 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 (2):162-177.
    Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...)
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  • The interactive Now: A second-person approach to time-consciousness.Stephen Langfur - 2016 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 47 (2):156-182.
    Husserl offers insight into the constituting of the self-aware ego through time-consciousness. Yet his account does not satisfactorily explain how this ego can experience itself as presently acting. Furthermore, although he acknowledges that the Now is not a knife-edge present, he does not show what determines its duration. These shortfalls and others are overcome through a change of starting point. Citing empirical evidence, I take it as a basic given that when a caregiver frontally engages an infant of two months (...)
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  • (13 other versions)Books of Interest.Michael Kennedy & Mark Schaukowitch - 2020 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 53 (2):199-205.
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  • Ricoeur’s Transcendental Concern: A Hermeneutics of Discourse.William D. Melaney - 1971 - In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana. Dordrecht,: Springer. pp. 495-513.
    This paper argues that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy attempts to reopen the question of human transcendence in contemporary terms. While his conception of language as self-transcending is deeply Husserlian, Ricoeur also responds to the analytical challenge when he deploys a basic distinction in Fregean logic in order to clarify Heidegger’s phenomenology of world. Ricoeur’s commitment to a transcendental view is evident in his conception of narrative, which enables him to emphasize the role of the performative in literary reading. The meaning (...)
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  • The Enactive Philosophy of Embodiment: From Biological Foundations of Agency to the Phenomenology of Subjectivity.Mog Stapleton & Froese Tom - 2016 - In Miguel García-Valdecasas, José Ignacio Murillo & Nathaniel F. Barrett (eds.), Biology and Subjectivity Philosophical Contributions to Non-reductive Neuroscience. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 113-129.
    Following the philosophy of embodiment of Merleau-Ponty, Jonas and others, enactivism is a pivot point from which various areas of science can be brought into a fruitful dialogue about the nature of subjectivity. In this chapter we present the enactive conception of agency, which, in contrast to current mainstream theories of agency, is deeply and strongly embodied. In line with this thinking we argue that anything that ought to be considered a genuine agent is a biologically embodied (even if distributed) (...)
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  • Husserl and Stein on the phenomenology of empathy: perception and explication.James Jardine - 2014 - Synthesis Philosophica 29 (2):273-288.
    Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interpersonal understanding is rooted in a sui generis form of intentional experience, most commonly labeled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defense by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. After offering in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive (...)
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  • Time, Singularity and the Impossible: Heidegger and Derrida on Dying.Rafael Winkler - 2016 - Research in Phenomenology 46 (3):405-425.
    _ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 3, pp 405 - 425 This article focuses on Heidegger’s reflection on death in Being and Time, on the question of whether death can be mine, on what the connection between death and mineness can tell us about schizophrenia, and on the relation between Heidegger’s talk of death and mineness and Derrida’s talk of mourning and mineness.
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  • Intencionalidad, pasividad y autoconciencia en la fenomenología de Husserl.Francesco de Nigris - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (157):215-250.
    A pesar de los matices y variaciones de significado, el concepto husserliano de intencionalidad no deja de estar al servicio de la idea clásica de la verdad como adaequatio, finalmente adaptada al orden monádico de la conciencia trascendental. Veremos, sin embargo, que en los análisis de Husserl sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo se manifiesta toda la dificultad para interpretar intencionalmente la esfera pasiva de la conciencia, peligrando la peculiar vocación a la verdad de la misma intencionalidad. Intentaremos, mediante las (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intentionality and Phenomenality: Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):63-92.
    In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection. All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained (...)
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  • Self and Other: The Limits of Narrative Understanding.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60:179-202.
    If the self—as a popular view has it—is a narrative construction, if it arises out of discursive practices, it is reasonable to assume that the best possible avenue to self-understanding will be provided by those very narratives. If I want to know what it means to be a self, I should look closely at the stories that I and others tell about myself, since these stories constitute who I am. In the following I wish to question this train of thought. (...)
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  • Body Dysmorphia and the Phenomenology of Embodiment.David Mitchell - 2017 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 (1):16-27.
    ABSTRACTThis paper explores the relationship between phenomenology and body dysmorphia. This is, to explain, a disorder in which the sufferer perceives, and is obsessed by, defects in appearance which are either non-existent or severely exaggerated. I will see how Husserl’s and Sartre’s analyses of embodiment can explain the radical uncertainty, and anxiety, about appearance that underscores this condition. Their accounts of the body-as-lived reveal first of all an essential intimacy between body and self that the “objective”, material, view of the (...)
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  • I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...)
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  • Alienation, authenticity and the self.Gavin Rae - 2010 - History of the Human Sciences 23 (4):21-36.
    While many commentators have held that the concept ‘alienation’ is of crucial importance when attempting to understand human existence, others have held that it is an inherently empty concept that we should abandon. In this article, I refute the latters’ charge by showing that each conception of ‘alienation’ is underpinned by a normative ontological conception of the preferable, or authentic, self and show that the concept ‘alienation’ has ethical, existential and socio-political uses. From this I conclude that, when properly understood, (...)
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  • Das „Problem“ der Habituskonstitution und die Spätlehre des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie E. Husserls.Marco Cavallaro - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (3):237-261.
    Der vorliegende Aufsatz behandelt zwei Bereiche, deren Zusammenhang in der aktuellen Husserlforschung zu Unrecht in Vergessenheit geraten zu sein scheint: Zum einen konturiere ich den Habitusbegriff und das damit verbundene Problem der Habituskonstitution im Spätwerk E. Husserls. Zum anderen dient das Ergebnis dieser ersten Untersuchung dann als Grundlage für die Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie. Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen: Zuerst stelle ich, um die Bedeutung des Begriffs „Habitus“ zu klären, Ingardens Interpretationsalternativen der Habituskonstitution (...)
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  • For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.
    The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive of it.
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  • The Givenness of the Human Learning Experience and Its Incompatibility with Information Analytics.David Lundie - 2017 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 49 (4).
    The rise of learning analytics, the application of complex metrics developed to exploit the proliferation of ‘Big Data’ in educational work, raises important moral questions about the nature of what is measurable in education. Teachers, schools and nations are increasingly held to account based on metrics, exacerbating the tendency for fine-grained measurement of learning experiences. In this article, the origins of learning analytics ontology are explored, drawing upon core ideas in the philosophy of computing, such as the general definition of (...)
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  • Framing a phenomenological interview: what, why and how.Simon Høffding & Kristian Martiny - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):539-564.
    Research in phenomenology has benefitted from using exceptional cases from pathology and expertise. But exactly how are we to generate and apply knowledge from such cases to the phenomenological domain? As researchers of cerebral palsy and musical absorption, we together answer the how question by pointing to the resource of the qualitative interview. Using the qualitative interview is a direct response to Varela’s call for better pragmatics in the methodology of phenomenology and cognitive science and Gallagher’s suggestion for phenomenology to (...)
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  • How we affect each other. Michel Henry's 'pathos-with' and the enactive approach to intersubjectivity.Hanne De Jaegher - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):112-132.
    What makes it possible to affect one another, to move and be moved by another person? Why do some of our encounters transform us? The experience of moving one another points to the inter-affective in intersubjectivity. Inter-affection is hard to account for under a cognitivist banner, and has not received much attention in embodied work on intersubjectivity. I propose that understanding inter-affection needs a combination of insights into self-affection, embodiment, and interaction processes. I start from Michel Henry's radically immanent idea (...)
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  • Concrete consciousness: A Sartrean critique of functionalist accounts of mind.Joel W. Krueger - 2006 - Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.
    In this essay, I argue that Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of mind. Next, I look at Sartre's (...)
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  • Self-Reference and Logical Memory in Hegel's Theory of the Concept.Elisa Magrì - 2011 - Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos 1 (15):129-143.
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  • Embodying Social Practice: Dynamically Co-Constituting Social Agency.Brian W. Dunst - unknown
    Theories of cognition and theories of social practices and institutions have often each separately acknowledged the relevance of the other; but seldom have there been consistent and sustained attempts to synthesize these two areas within one explanatory framework. This is precisely what my dissertation aims to remedy. I propose that certain recent developments and themes in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, when understood in the right way, can explain the emergence and dynamics of social practices and institutions. Likewise, the (...)
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  • Subjectivity, Selfhood and the Use of the Word 'I'.Jonardon Ganeri - 2011 - In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, no self?: perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  • Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations.Stan Klein - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology -- Perception 5:1-15.
    In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries -- e.g.,how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity(for example,Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) (...)
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  • Self-intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
    Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order (...)
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  • The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence.Stan Klein - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a "thing" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to (...)
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  • Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness.Kenneth Williford - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
    In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Spontaniczność świadomości.Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson - 2010 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1).
    It is now conventional wisdom that conscious experience — or in Nagel’s canonical characterization, “what it is like to be” for an organism — is what makes the mind-body problem so intractable. By the same token, our current conceptions of the mind-body relation are inadequate and some conceptual development is urgently needed. Our overall aim in this paper is to make some progress towards that conceptual development. We first examine a currently neglected, yet fundamental aspect of consciousness. This aspect is (...)
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  • The self and its brain.Stan Klein - 2012 - Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.
    In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of "self" can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, and indeed has, been extensively (...)
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  • Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience.Michal Klincewicz - 2013 - Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Center
    In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated with (...)
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  • The You-I event: on the genesis of self-awareness.Stephen Langfur - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.
    I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural (...)
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  • The Deep Bodily Roots of Emotion.Albert A. Johnstone - 2012 - Husserl Studies 28 (3):179-200.
    This article explores emotions and their relationship to ‘somatic responses’, i.e., one’s automatic responses to sensations of pain, cold, warmth, sudden intensity. To this end, it undertakes a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of the first-hand experience of eight basic emotions, briefly exploring their essential aspects: their holistic nature, their identifying dynamic transformation of the lived body, their two-layered intentionality, their involuntary initiation and voluntary espousal. The fact that the involuntary tensional shifts initiating emotions are irreplicatable voluntarily, is taken to show that (...)
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  • Husserl, the absolute flow, and temporal experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):376-411.
    The notion of the absolute time-constituting flow plays a central role in Edmund Husserl’s analysis of our consciousness of time. I offer a novel reading of Husserl’s remarks on the absolute flow, on which Husserl can be seen to be grappling with two key intuitions that are still at the centre of current debates about temporal experience. One of them is encapsulated by what is sometimes referred to as an intentionalist (as opposed to an extensionalist) approach to temporal experience. The (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Open Body.Dorothée Legrand & Joel Krueger - 2009 - In Antonella Carassa, Francesca Morganti & Guiseppa Riva (eds.), Enacting Intersubjectivity: Paving the Way for a Dialogue Between Cognitive Science, Social Cognition, and Neuroscience. Universita della Svizzera Italiana. pp. 109-128.
    In this paper we characterize the body as constitutively open. We fi rst consider the notion of bodily openness at the basic level of its organic constitution. This will provide us a framework relevant for the understanding of the body open to its intersubjective world. We argue that the notion of “bodily openness” captures a constitutive dimension of intersubjectivity. Generally speaking, there are two families of theories intending to characterize the constitutive relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity: either the self is (...)
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  • The time of the self.Dan Zahavi - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):143-159.
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  • Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology.Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi - 2007 - In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-87.
    Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What (...)
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  • The Puzzle of the Psychiatric Interview.Giovanni Stanghellini - 2004 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 35 (2):173-195.
    The psychiatric interview plays a critical role in clinical assessment and therapy. Problems with assessment reliability and validity that were apparent in nosological and diagnostic discrepancies plagued the field of psychiatry historically. Technical approaches including structured interviews were developed to address these problems. Although these approaches decreased diagnostic variance, they focused narrowly on eliciting signs and symptoms conforming to previously agreed diagnostic categories, necessarily restricting the range and richness of experiences and narratives that are elicited. This restriction inhibits the utility (...)
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  • Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of pre-reflective (...)
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  • (1 other version)Self-Awareness: Issues in Classical Indian and Contemporary Western Philosophy.Matthew D. Mackenzie - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    In this dissertation I critically engage and draw insights from classical Indian, Anglo-American, phenomenological, and cognitive scientific approaches to the topic of self-awareness. In particular, I argue that in both the Western and the Indian tradition a common and influential view of self-awareness---that self-awareness is the product of an act of introspection in which consciousness takes itself as an object---distorts our understanding of both self-awareness and consciousness as such. In contrast, I argue for the existence and primacy of pre-reflective self-awareness (...)
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  • Bodies and sensings: On the uses of Husserlian phenomenology for feminist theory.Alia Al-Saji - 2010 - Continental Philosophy Review 43 (1):13-37.
    What does Husserlian phenomenology have to offer feminist theory? More specifically, can we find resources within Husserl’s account of the living body ( Leib ) for the critical feminist project of rethinking embodiment beyond the dichotomies not only of mind/body but also of subject/object and activity/passivity? This essay begins by explicating the reasons for feminist hesitation with respect to Husserlian phenomenology. I then explore the resources that Husserl’s phenomenology of touch and his account of sensings hold for feminist theory. My (...)
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  • Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.
    In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental (...)
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  • Is the Self a Social Construct?Dan Zahavi - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):551-573.
    There is a long tradition in philosophy for claiming that selfhood is socially constructed and self-experience intersubjectively mediated. On many accounts, we consequently have to distinguish between being conscious or sentient and being a self. The requirements that must be met in order to qualify for the latter are higher. My aim in the following is to challenge this form of social constructivism by arguing that an account of self which disregards the fundamental structures and features of our experiential life (...)
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  • Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'.Pessi Lyyra - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.
    A number of theories of consciousness define consciousness by the folk-intuition that consciousness is somehow aware of, or ‘given’ to itself. I attempt to undermine this intuition on phenomenological, conceptual and psychological grounds. An alternative, first-order theory of consciousness, however, faces the task of explaining the possibility of self-awareness for consciousness, as well as the everyday intuition supporting it. I propose that another, weaker kind of givenness, ‘givenness as availability’, is up to both of these tasks, and is therefore sufficient (...)
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  • Consciousness, self-consciousness, and meditation.Wolfgang Fasching - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):463-483.
    Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence (...)
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  • Being someone.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    My discussion will focus on what is arguable the main claim of Being No One: That no such things as selves exist in the world and that nobody ever was or had a self. In discussing to what extent Metzinger can be said to argue convincingly for this claim, I will also comment on his methodological use of pathology and briefly make some remarks vis-à-vis his understanding and criticism of phenomenology.
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  • (2 other versions)Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  • (1 other version)Phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - manuscript
    In Moran, D. (ed.): Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge, 2008.
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  • The retentional and the repressed: Does Freud's concept of the unconscious threaten Husserlian phenomenology?Talia Welsh - 2002 - Human Studies 25 (2):165-183.
    This paper investigates the claims made by both Freudian psychoanalysic thought and Husserlian phenomenology about the unconscious. First, it is shown how Husserl incorporates a complex notion of the unconscious in his analysis of passive synthesis. With his notion of an unintentional reservoir of past retentions, Husserl articulates an unconscious zone that must be activated from consciousness in order to come to life. Second, it is explained how Husserl still does not account for the Freudian unconscious. Freud's unconscious could be (...)
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  • Introduction—the explanatory gap: To close or to bridge? [REVIEW]Antoine Lutz - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):325-330.
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