There has been a recent surge of interest in ancient accounts of free will. It is surprising, then, that there have been virtually no attempts to discuss whether Plato had such an account. Those who have made an attempt quickly deny that such an account is present in the dialogues. I shall argue that if we draw a distinction between two notions of free will, it is plausible that some account of free will is, in fact, present in the dialogues, (...) the Republic in particular. This is the first in depth search into the question and I demonstrate that the defender of a Platonic free will thesis has more resources than she first appears to. It also has the benefit of giving us an obvious source material for Augustine's discussion. (shrink)

Traditionally, scholars have taken homoiôsis theôi in the Theaetetus digression to require neglect of particulars, but they have noted that although Socrates advocates it, he does not live such a life. To explain the discrepancy, Mahoney and Rue both argue that we need to reinterpret godlikeness to require active engagement in the city. I reject their reinterpretations and I revise the traditional view, arguing that godlikeness is not a single ideal. Instead, I argue, Plato provides several different portraits of godlikeness (...) that together suggest interest in particulars makes the person neither better nor worse as a philosopher. (shrink)

Among the instances of apparent illiberality in Plato's Republic, one stands out as especially curious. Long before making a forced return to the cave, and irrespective of the kinds of compulsion operative in such a homecoming, the philosopher-king has been compelled to apprehend the Good (Rep. VII.519c5-d2, 540a3-7). Why should compulsion be necessary or appropriate in this situation? Schooled intensively through the decades for an eventual grasping of the Good, beginning already with precognitive training in music and art calculated to (...) equip the guardian with a natural affinity towards the good and beautiful (Rep. III.401d3-402a4), the fully mature guardian might be expected to leap towards the Good when it is first opportune. For the Good is, according to Plato, the greatest thing to be learned (megiston mathêma; Rep. VI.504e4-5, 505a2). Reflection on these questions permits us to develop a richer appreciation of the forms of necessitation and compulsion Plato envisages for his guardians, which turn out to be primarily merely hypothetical instances of nomic necessitation. It follows that many of Plato's appeals to compulsion are neither coercive nor objectionably authoritarian. (shrink)

A close reading of Socrates’ arguments against the proposed definition of knowledge as true opinion together with a logos (“account”). I examine the orienting implications of his apparently destructive dilemma defeating the so-called dream theory and of his apparently decisive arguments rejecting the notions of “account” as verbalization, as working through the parts of the whole of the definiendum, and as identifying what differentiates the definiendum from all else. Whereas the dilemma implies of the object of knowledge that it must (...) be both simple and complex, the last two notions of “account” point to the kinds of discursive analysis that can do justice to its complexity; together the refutations suggest the relation between noesis, that is, eidetic intuition of the object in its simplicity, and discursive analysis of the object in its complexity that knowledge requires. (shrink)

Two speeches in Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates' well-known description of himself as a midwife and the 'digression' in the middle of the dialogue, wherein Socrates contrasts the philosopher and the public orator, have apologetic dimensions; they are, in part, attempts by Socrates to account for, and hence correct, his and the philosopher's undeserved public reputation. A careful reading of these passages in their dramatic contexts as philosophical apologies reveals interesting parallels to the Apology, insights into some of the major themes of (...) the Theaetetus, and a fuller appreciation of Socratic philosophy as portrayed in Plato's dialogues. (shrink)

A close reading of Socrates' refutation of the final proposed definition of knowledge, "true opinion with an account." I examine the provocations to further thinking Socrates poses with his dilemma of simplicity and complexity and then by his rejections of the three senses of "account," and I argue that these provocations guide the responsive reader to that rich and determinate understanding of the sort of 'object' which knowledge requires that the Parmenides and the Eleatic dialogues will go on to explicate.

Socrates' dream puts in generalized form the difficulty that plato saw in the mathematician's procedure of hypothesis, I.E., Of positing undemonstrated first principles ("prota") or elements ("stoicheia") as starting-Points of demonstration. If the elements are unknown, How can what is constructed from them be known?--A difficulty to which plato had earlier called attention in the 'republic' (510cd, 533cd.) this interpretation accords with the mathematical setting and personages of the dialogue, And explains why the explicit refutation of theaetetus' third proposal, That (...) knowledge be defined as true belief accompanied by a logos, Is so perfunctory and unconvincing. Furthermore, The dilemma thus brought to light is reflected in 'posterior analytics' (book i, Chap. 3), Which was presumably written during aristotle's residence in the academy in association with plato and the other mathematicians gathered around him. (shrink)

This paper explores a possible Platonic grounding of human freedom in the Philebus. The Philebus presents a particularly intruiging account of the humangood and freedom alike in terms of the right relation of nous and pleasure. Through a close analysis of key passages in this dialogue I show how Plato conceives of freedom in terms of the intellect’s ordering and directing of desire and pleasure to genuinely fulfilling ends. The greatest fulfillment of desire comes together with the purest pleasure in (...) the highest actualization of reason in lifelong philosophic activity: the mixed life and good life for human beings. (shrink)

This paper explores a possible Platonic grounding of human freedom in the Philebus. The Philebus presents a particularly intruiging account of the humangood and freedom alike in terms of the right relation of nous and pleasure. Through a close analysis of key passages in this dialogue I show how Plato conceives of freedom in terms of the intellect’s ordering and directing of desire and pleasure to genuinely fulfilling ends. The greatest fulfillment of desire comes together with the purest pleasure in (...) the highest actualization of reason in lifelong philosophic activity: the mixed life and good life for human beings. (shrink)

A close reading of the dilemmatic argument and of the discussions of the three senses of logos by which Socrates appears to refute the proposal that knowledge is true judgment together with a logos. I argue that the determinateness of each of Socrates' arguments implies further lines of thought for the reader and that these lead to an understanding of the relations of intuition and discourse in inquiry and of the compossible simplicity and complexity of the object of knowledge. These (...) lines of thought find their home, as it were, in the critical turn to the conception of forms in the Parmenides and in the practice of dialectic in the Sophist and the Statesman. (shrink)

The idea of freedom plays a key role in Plato's moral and political thought. In the Republic justice is shown to be beneficial because the just man alone is truly free. There are parallels here with modern discussions of freedom. The Laws argues that to be free a city must avoid the extremes of liberty and of authoritarianism. The legislator should rely on persuasion, not force, so that people willingly obey his laws. The underlying idea is that we are free (...) if we willingly follow the demands of reason rather than being coerced by external forces or by unruly desires. (shrink)