Intuitionistic meta-methodologies, which abound in recent philosophy of science, take the criterion of success for theories of scientific rationality to be whether those theories adequately explicate our intuitive judgments of rationality in exemplary cases. Garber's (1985) critique of Laudan's (1977) intuitionistic meta-methodology, correct as far as it goes, does not go far enough. Indeed, Garber himself advocates a form of intuitionistic meta-methodology; he merely denies any special role for historical (as opposed to contemporary or imaginary) test cases. What all such (...) positions lack is a base from which to inform, criticize, or restructure our core methodological intuitions. To acquiesce in this is to deny that exemplary cases can serve the sort of warranting role required for intuitionism. This point is reinforced by a series of reasons for denying the warranting role of pre-analytic judgments of rationality. These reasons point the way toward an improved approach to meta-methodology. (shrink)

Unter dem Begriff der „Verwissenschaftlichung der Methodologie der Wissenschaft“ verstehen wir den Einfluß wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis auf die eine oder andere Art und Weise auf die Methodologie der Wissenschaft, insbesondere den Gebrauch von wissenschaftlichen Ideen und Methoden für die Formulierung und Lösung von methodologischen Problemen der Wissenschaft und Problemen der Methodologie selbst. Es werden vier Haupttendenzen im Prozeß der Verwissenschaftlichung der Methodologie vorgestellt: (a) der Übergang vom „statement view“ zum mathematischen Holismus; (b) die Verwissenschaftlichung auf system-theoretischer Basis; (c) der Einzug soziologischer (...) Methoden in die methodologische Analyse der Wissenschaft und (d) die methodologischen Anwendungen von Forschungsresultaten im Bereich der Künstlichen Intelligenz. Darüberhinaus werden einige besondere Formen der Implementierung wissenschaftlicher Konstruktionen in der Methodologie ins Auge gefaßt. (shrink)

Some important attempts at construction an universal scientific languages are carried out during the last five decades in the methodology of science. Among them it could be mentioned such as the logico-positivistic intention for a building a historical invariant observational language, Carnap’s physicalism, the different attempts at building an universal language based on some version of the theory of system or on the cybernetics and so on. Here should be added as well the positivistic dogma that all scientific theories could (...) be reconstructed on a certain formal language, e.g. that one of the first or higher order predicate calculus, or the language of set theory. All these attempts end in failure and the persuasion that there are various types of scientific languages was gradually formed. This persuasion takes its foundations from the methodological pluralism, i.e. from the view according to which there is not an “absolute methodological system of reference”, and for this reason the very idea for a creation of an universal scientific language is a harmful fiction. However, the radical pluralistic point of view puts more questions than can resolve. (shrink)