Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

Arne Dekke Eide Naess was born on January 27, 1912 in Oslo. After a long and successful life he passed away on January 12, 2009 in Oslo as the most renowned Norwegian philosopher, where he was honoured with a state funeral. He was one of the most important public figures in Norway and in his later years became known all over the world as a pioneer of the ecological movement. Given this publicity in recent decades his earlier life was forgotten (...) or obscured in a sense — especially his student years in Paris, Vienna and Oslo before the outbreak of World War II, when he attended the famous Vienna Circle around Moritz Schlick during a stay in Vienna 1934–36. Here he wrote his dissertation Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten which was published in Oslo by the Norwegian Academy of Science in 1936. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to show that the distinctions made by Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber between the natural sciences and the 'Geisteswissen-schaften' are sound in principle, pace the arguments to the contrary within classical logical empiricism. It is held that intentional contexts are characteristic of social science. Intentional contexts are held to be more important in psychology than mental states, like toothache. If logical behaviourism is to have any plausibility, it has to be shown how intentional contexts (...) can be dealt with. Carnap's programme was to reconstruct scientific discourse within a truth-functional language. It is argued that his reduction of belief-sentences was not successful. It is further argued that in the logical empiricist's discussions of the problem of Verstehen, only motivational understanding is taken account of, what Max Weber calls observational understanding is overlooked as we try to show through a discussion of Theodore Abel's well-known explication of 'the operation called Verstehen'. From this it is concluded that the founda-tional problems of social science are different from those of natural science, and this conclusion is further elaborated through an exposition of views held by authors in the German tradition, which, in the fifties, many philosophers held to be obsolete. (shrink)

The purpose of the study (of which this is the concluding part) is to show that the distinctions made by Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber between the natural sciences and the ?Geistesvrissenschaften? are sound in principle, pace the arguments to the contrary within classical logical empiricism. It is held that intentional contexts are characteristic of social science. Intentional contexts are held to be more important in psychology than mental states, like toothache. If logical behaviourism is to have any plausibility, it (...) has to be shown how intentional contexts can bs dealt with. Carnap's programme was to reconstruct scientific discourse within a truth?functional language. It is argued that his reduction of belief?sentences was not successful. It is further argued that in the logical empiricist's discussions of the problem of Verstehen, only motivational understanding is taken account of, what Max Weber calls observational understanding is ignored, as we try to show through a discussion of Theodore Abel's well?known explication of ?the operation called Verstehen?. From this it is concluded that the foundational problems of social science are different from those of natural science, and this conclusion is further elaborated through an exposition of views held by authors in the German tradition, which, in the fifties, many philosophers held to be obsolete. (shrink)